


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The Princeton theological
review



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OCT 1911
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME IX

OCTOBER, 1911

NUMBER 4

ON FAITH IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.

The English word "Faith" came into the language under the influence of the French, and is but a modification of the Latin "Fides", which is itself cognate with the Greek *πίστις*. Its root-meaning seems to be that of "binding". Whatever we discover to be "binding" on us, is the object of "faith".¹ The corresponding Germanic term, represented by the English word "Believe" (and the German, "Glauben") goes back to a root meaning "to be agreeable" (represented by our English "lief"), and seems to present the object of belief as something which we "esteem"—which we have "estimated" or "weighed" and "approved". The notion of "constraint" is perhaps less prominent in "belief" than in "faith", its place being taken in "belief" by that of "approval". We "believe" in what we find worthy of our confidence; we "have faith" in what compels our confidence. But it would be easy to press this too far, and it is likely that the two terms "faith", "belief" really express much the same idea.² In the natural use of language, therefore, which is normally controlled by what we call etymology, that is, by the intrinsic connotation of the terms, when we say "faith", "belief", our minds are pre-

¹ The Hebrew *אמונה, האמין* go back to the idea of "holding": we believe in what "holds". In both the sacred languages, therefore, the fundamental meaning of faith is "surety". Cf. Latin "*credo*".

² Cf. M. Heyne's German Dictionary *sub voc.* "Glaube": "*Glaube* is confiding acceptance of a truth. At the basis of the word is the root *lub*, which, with the general meaning of agreeing with and of approving, appears also in *erlauben* and *loben*."

occupied with the grounds of the conviction expressed: we are speaking of a mental act or state to which we feel constrained by considerations objective to ourselves, or at least to the act or state in question. The conception embodied in the terms "Belief", "Faith", in other words, is not that of an arbitrary act of the subject's; it is that of a mental state or act which is determined by sufficient reasons.

In their fundamental connotation, thus, these terms are very broad. There seems nothing in the terms themselves, indeed, to forbid their employment in so wide a sense as to cover the whole field of "sureness", "conviction". Whatever we accept as true or real, we may very properly be said to "believe", to "have faith in"; all that we are convinced of may be said to be matter of "belief", "faith". So the terms are, accordingly, very often employed. Thus, for example, Professor J. M. Baldwin defines "belief" simply as "mental endorsement or acceptance of something thought of as real"; and remarks of "conviction", that it "is a loose term whose connotation, so far as exact, is near to that here given to belief".³ He even adds—we think with less exactness—that "judgment" is merely "the logical or formal side of the same state of mind" which, on the psychological side, is called belief. To us, judgment appears a broader term than "belief", expressing a mental act which underlies "belief" indeed, but cannot be identified with it.⁴

Meanwhile we note with satisfaction that Professor Baldwin recognizes the element of constraint ("bindingness") in "belief", and distinguishes it clearly from acts of the will, thereby setting aside the definition of it—quite commonly given—which finds the differentia of beliefs, among convictions, in this—that they are "voluntary convictions". "There is", he says,⁵ "a distinct difference in consciousness

³ And Professor Stout: *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, I, p. 110. Cf. p. 112 &c.

⁴ Prof. Baldwin does not allow any psychological distinction between "belief" and "knowledge." See *sub voc.* "Knowledge".

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 112. The passage is quoted from Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology; Feeling and Will*. 1891, p. 171.

between the consent of belief and the consent of will. The consent of belief is, in a measure, a forced consent; it attaches to what is—to what stands in the order of things whether I consent or no. The consent of will is a forceful consent—a consent to what shall be through me.” That is to say, with respect to belief, it is a mental recognition of what is before the mind, as objectively true and real, and therefore depends on the evidence that a thing is true and real and is determined by this evidence; it is the response of the mind to this evidence and cannot arise apart from it. It is, therefore, impossible that belief should be the product of a volition; volitions look to the future and represent our desires; beliefs look to the present and represent our findings.

Professor Baldwin does not recognize this, however, in its entirety, as is already apparent from the qualification inserted into his description of “belief”. “It is”, says he, “*in a measure*, a forced consent.” He wishes, after all, to leave room for “voluntary beliefs”. Accordingly, he proceeds: “In cases in which belief is brought about by desire or will, there is a subtle consciousness of inadequate evidence, until by repetition the item desired or willed no longer needs volition to give it a place in the series deemed objective; then it is for the first time belief, but then it is no longer will.” “Beliefs”, then, according to Professor Baldwin, although not to be confounded with acts of the will, may yet be produced by the action of the will, even while the “evidence” on which they should more properly rest, is recognized by the mind willing them to be insufficient.

We cannot help suspecting this suggestion to rest on a defective analysis of what actually goes on in the mind in the instances commented on. These appear to us to be cases in which we determine to act on suppositions recognized as lacking sufficient evidence to establish them in our minds as accordant with reality and therefore not accepted as accordant with reality, that is to say, as “beliefs”. If they pass, as Dr. Baldwin suggests, gradually into “beliefs”, when re-

peatedly so acted upon—is that not because the mind derives from such repeated action, resulting successfully, additional evidence that the suppositions in question do represent reality and may be safely acted on as such? Would not the thing acted on in such cases be more precisely stated as the belief that these suppositions may be accordant with reality, not that they are? The consciousness that the evidence is inadequate which accompanies such action (though Dr. Baldwin calls it “subtle”)—is it not in fact just the witness of consciousness that it does not assert these suppositions to be accordant with reality, and does not recognize them as “beliefs”, though it is willing to act on them on the hypothesis that they may prove to be accordant with reality and thus make good their aspirations to become beliefs? And can any number of repetitions (repetitions of what, by the way?) make this testimony of consciousness void? Apparently what we repeat is simply volitions founded on the possibility or probability of the suppositions in question being in accordance with reality; and it is difficult to see how the repetition of such volitions can elevate the suppositions in question into the rank of beliefs except by eliminating doubt as to their accordance with reality by creating evidence for them through their “working well”. The repetition of a volition to treat a given proposition as true—especially if it is accompanied by a consciousness (however subtle) that there is no sufficient evidence that it is true—can certainly not result in making it true; and can scarcely of itself result in producing an insufficiently grounded conviction in the mind (always at least subtly conscious that it rests on insufficient evidence) that it is true, and so in “giving it a place in the series deemed objective”. A habit of treating a given proposition as correspondent to reality may indeed be formed; and as this habit is formed, the accompanying consciousness that it is in point of fact grounded in insufficient evidence, may no doubt drop into the background, or even wholly out of sight; thus we may come to act—instinctively, shall we say? or inadvertently?—on the supposi-

tion of the truth of the proposition in question. But this does not seem to carry with it as inevitable implication that "beliefs" may be created by the action of the will. It may only show that more or less probable, or more or less improbable, suppositions, more or less clearly envisaged as such, may enter into the complex of conditions which influence action, and that the human mind in the processes of its ordinary activity does not always keep before it in perfect clearness the lines of demarcation which separate the two classes of its beliefs and its conjectures, but may sometimes rub off the labels which serve to mark its convictions off from its suppositions and to keep each in their proper place.

It would seem to be fairly clear that "belief" is always the product of evidence and that it cannot be created by volitions, whether singly or in any number of repetitions. The interaction of belief and volition is, questionless, most intimate and most varied, but one cannot be successfully transmuted into the other, nor one be mistaken for the other. The consent of belief is in its very nature and must always be what Dr. Baldwin calls "forced consent", that is to say, determined by evidence, not by volition; and when the consent of will is secured by a supposition, recognized by consciousness as inadequately based in evidence, this consent of will has no tendency to act as evidence and raise the supposition into a belief—its tendency is only to give to a supposition the place of a belief in the ordering of life.

We may infer from this state of the case that "preparedness to act" is scarcely a satisfactory definition of the state of mind which is properly called "faith", "belief". This was the definition suggested by Dr. Alexander Bain. "Faith", "belief", certainly expresses a state of preparedness to act; and it may be very fairly contended that "preparedness to act" supplies a very good test of the genuineness of "faith", "belief". A so-called "faith", "belief" on which we are not prepared to act is near to no real "faith", "belief" at all. What we are convinced of, we should certainly confide in; and what we are unwilling to confide in we seem not quite

sure of—we do not appear thoroughly to believe, to have faith in. But though all “faith”, “belief” is preparedness to act, it does not follow that all preparedness to act is “faith”, “belief”. We may be prepared to act, on some other ground than “faith”, “belief”. On “knowledge” say—if knowledge may be distinguished from belief— or, as we have already suggested, on “supposition”—on a probability or even a possibility. To be sure, as we have already noted, the real ground of our action in such cases may be stated in terms of “faith”, “belief”. Our preparedness to act may be said to be our belief—our conviction—that, if the supposition in question is not yet shown to be in conformity to reality, it yet may be so. Meanwhile, it is clear that the supposition in question is not a thing believed to be in accordance with fact, and is therefore not a belief but a “supposition”; not a “conviction” but a conjecture. “Belief”, “faith” is the consent of the mind to the reality of the thing in question; and when the mind withholds its consent to the reality, “belief”, “faith” is not present. These terms are not properly employed except when a state of conviction is present; they designate the response of the mind to evidence in a consent to the adequacy of the evidence.

It, of course, does not follow that all our “beliefs”, “faiths” correspond with reality. Our convictions are not infallible. When we say that “belief”, “faith” is the product of evidence and is in that sense a compelled consent, this is not the same as saying that consent is produced only by compelling evidence, that is, evidence which is objectively adequate. Objective adequacy and subjective effect are not exactly correlated. The amount, degree and quality of evidence which will secure consent varies from mind to mind and in the same mind from state to state. Some minds, or all minds in some states, will respond to very weak evidence with full consent; some minds or all minds in some states, will resist very strong evidence. There is no “faith”, “belief” possible without evidence or what the mind takes for evidence; “faith”, “belief” is a state of mind

grounded in evidence and impossible without it. But the fullest "faith", "belief" may ground itself in very weak evidence—if the mind mistakes it for strong evidence. "Faith", "belief" does not follow the evidence itself, in other words, but the judgment of the intellect on the evidence. And the judgment of the intellect naturally will vary endlessly, as intellect differs from intellect or as the states of the same intellect differ from one another.

From this circumstance has been taken an attempt to define "faith", "belief" more closely than merely mental endorsement of something as true—as, broadly, the synonym of "conviction"—and to distinguish it as a specific form of conviction from other forms of conviction. "Faith", "belief", it is said (e. g. by Kant), is conviction founded on evidence which is subjectively adequate. "Knowledge" is conviction founded on evidence which is objectively adequate. That "faith" and "knowledge" do differ from one another, we all doubtless feel; but it is not easy to believe that their specific difference is found in this formula. It is of course plain enough that every act of "faith", "belief" rests on evidence which is subjectively adequate. But it is far from plain that this evidence must be objectively inadequate on pain of the mental response ceasing to be "faith", "belief" and becoming "knowledge". Are all "beliefs", "faiths", specifically such, in their very nature inadequately established convictions; convictions, indeed—matters of which we feel sure—but of which we feel sure on inadequate grounds—grounds either consciously recognized by us as inadequate, or, if supposed by us to be adequate, yet really inadequate?

No doubt there is a usage of the terms current—especially when they are set in contrast with one another—which does conceive them after this fashion; a legitimate enough usage, because it is founded on a real distinction in the connotation of the two terms. We do sometimes say, "I do not *know* this or that to be true, but I fully *believe* it"—meaning that though we are altogether persuaded of it we are

conscious that the grounds for believing it fall short of complete objective coerciveness. But this special usage of the terms ought not to deceive us as to their essential meaning. And it surely requires little consideration to assure us that it cannot be of the essence of "faith", "belief" that the grounds on which it rests are—consciously or unconsciously—objectively inadequate. Faith must not be distinguished from knowledge only that it may be confounded with conjecture. And how, in any case, shall the proposed criterion of faith be applied? To believe on grounds of the inadequacy of which we are conscious, is on the face of it an impossibility. The moment we perceive the objective inadequacy of the grounds on which we pronounce the reality of anything, they become subjectively inadequate also. And so long as they appear to us subjectively adequate, the resulting conviction will be indistinguishable from "knowledge". To say that "knowledge" is a justified recognition of reality and "faith", "belief" is an unjustified recognition of reality, is to erect a distinction which can have no possible psychological basis. The recognizing mind makes and can make no such distinction between the soundness and unsoundness of its own recognitions of reality. An outside observer might certainly distribute into two such categories the "convictions" of a mind brought under his contemplation; but the distribution would represent the outside observer's judgment upon the grounds of these convictions, not that of the subject himself. The moment the mind observed itself introduced such a distribution among its "convictions" it would remove the whole class of "convictions" to which it assigned an inadequate grounding out of the category of "convictions" altogether. To become conscious that some of its convictions were unjustified would be to abolish them at once as convictions, and to remove them into the category at best of conjectures, at worst of erroneous judgments. We accord with Dr. Baldwin therefore when he declares of this distinction that it is "not psychological".⁶

⁶ *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, I. p. 603.

The mind knows and can know nothing of objectively and subjectively adequate grounds in forming its convictions. All it is conscious of is the adequacy or inadequacy of the grounds on which its convictions are based. If they appeal to it as adequate, the mind is convinced; if they do not, it remains unconvinced. Faith, belief, is to consciousness just an act or state of conviction, of being sure; and therefore cannot be explained as something less than a conviction, something less than being sure, or as a conviction indeed, but a conviction which differs from other convictions by being, if not ungrounded, yet not adequately grounded. That were all one with saying it is a conviction no doubt, but nevertheless not quite a conviction—a manifest contradiction in terms.

The failure of this special attempt to distinguish between faith and knowledge need not argue, however, that there is no distinction between the two. Faith may not be inadequately grounded conviction any more than it is voluntary conviction—the two come to much the same thing—and yet be a specific mode of conviction over against knowledge as a distinct mode of conviction. The persistence with which it is set over against knowledge in our popular usage of the words as well as in the definitions of philosophers may be taken as an indication that there is some cognizable distinction between the two, could we but fasten upon it. And the persistence with which this distinction is sought in the nature of the grounds on which faith in distinction from knowledge rests is equally notable. Thus we find Dr. Alexander T. Ormond⁷ defining “faith” as “the personal acceptance of something as true or real, but—the distinguishing mark—on grounds that, in whole or in part, are different from those of theoretic certitude”. Here faith is distinguished from other forms of conviction—“knowledge” being apparently in mind as the other term of the contrast. And the distinguishing mark of “faith” is found in the nature of the grounds on which it rests. The nature of these

⁷ Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, I, p. 309.

grounds, however, is expressed only negatively. We are not told what they are but only that they are (in whole or in part) different to "those of theoretic certitude". The effect of the definition as it stands is therefore only to declare that the term faith does not express all forms of conviction, but one form only; and that this form of conviction differs from the form which is given the name of "theoretic certitude",—that is to say, doubtless, "knowledge"—in the grounds on which it rests. But what the positive distinguishing mark of the grounds on which the mode of conviction which we call faith rests is, we are not told. Dr. Ormond does, indeed, go on to say that "the moment of will enters into the assent of faith", and that "in the form of some subjective interest or consideration of value". From this it might be inferred that the positive differentia of faith, unexpressed in the definition, would be that it is voluntary conviction, conviction determined not by the evidence of reality present to our minds, but by our desire or will that it should be true—this desire or will expressing "some subjective interest or consideration of value".⁸

Put baldly, this might be interpreted as meaning that we "know" what is established to us as true, we "believe" what we think we should be advantaged by if true; we "know" what we perceive to be real, we "believe" what we should like to be real. To put it so baldly, may no doubt press Dr. Ormond's remark beyond his intention. He recognizes that "some faith-judgments are translatable into judgments of knowledge." But he does not believe that all are; and he suggests that "the final test of the validity" of these latter must lie in "the sphere of the practical rather than in that of theoretical truth". The meaning is not throughout perfectly clear. But the upshot seems to be that in Dr. Or-

⁸In his fuller discussion in his *Foundations of Knowledge*, 1900, Part III, ch. I, Dr. Ormond tells us that what positively characterizes belief as over against knowledge is, subjectively, that "the volitional motive begins to dominate the epistemological" (p. 306), and, objectively, that the quality of "*coerciveness*" is lacking. The two criteria come very much to the same thing.

mond's opinion, that class of convictions which we designate "faith" differs from that class of convictions which we designate "knowledge" by the fact that they rest (in whole or in part) not on "theoretical" but on "practical" grounds—that is to say, not on evidence but on considerations of value. And that appears ultimately to mean that we know a thing which is proved to us to be true or real; but we believe a thing which we would fain should prove to be true or real. Some of the things which we thus believe may be reduced to "knowledge" because there may be proofs of their reality available which were not, or not fully, present to our minds "when we believed". Others of them may be incapable of such reduction either because no such proofs of their truth or reality exist, or because those proofs are not accessible to us. But our acceptance of them all alike as true rests, not on evidence that they are true, but (in whole or in part) on "some subjective interest" or "consideration of value". Failing "knowledge" we may take these things "on faith"—because we perceive that it would be well if they were true, and we cannot believe that that at least is not true of which it is clear to us that it would be in the highest degree well if it were true.

It is not necessary to deny that many things are accepted by men as true and accordant with reality on grounds of subjective interest or considerations of value; or that men may be properly moved to the acceptance of many things as true and real by such considerations. Considerations of value may be powerful arguments—they may even constitute proofs—of truth and reality. But it appears obvious enough that all of those convictions which we know as "beliefs", "faiths" do not rest on "subjective interests or considerations of value"—either wholly or even in part. Indeed, it would be truer to say that none of them rest on subjective interests or considerations of value as such, but whenever such considerations enter into their grounds they enter in as evidences of reality or as factors of mental movement lending vividness and vitality to elements of proper evidence

before the mind. Men do not mean by their "faiths", "beliefs", things they would fain were true; they mean things they are convinced are true. Their minds are not resting on considerations of value, but on what they take to be evidences of reality. The employment of these terms to designate "acceptances as true and real" on the ground of subjective interest or of considerations of value represents, therefore, no general usage but is purely an affair of the schools, or rather of a school. And it does violence not only to the general convictions of men but also to the underlying idea of the terms. No terms, in fact, lend themselves more reluctantly to the expression of a "voluntary acceptance", in any form, than these. As we have already seen, they carry with them the underlying idea of bindingness, worthiness of acceptance; they express, in Dr. Baldwin's phrase, a "forced consent"; and whenever we employ them there is present to the mind a consciousness of grounds on which they firmly rest as expressive of reality. Whatever may be the differentia of "belief", "faith" as a specific form of conviction, we may be sure, therefore, that desire or will cannot be the determining element of the grounds on which this conviction rests. What we gain from Dr. Ormond's definition then is only the assurance that by "faith" is denoted not all forms of conviction, but a specific form—that this specific form is differentiated from other forms by the nature of the grounds on which the conviction called "faith" rests—and that the grounds on which this form of conviction rests are not those of theoretic certitude. The form of conviction which rests on grounds adapted to give "theoretic certitude" we call "knowledge". What the special character of the grounds on which the form of conviction we call "faith" rests remains yet to seek.

This gain, although we may speak of it as, for the main matter, only negative, is not therefore unimportant. To have learned that in addition to the general usage of "faith", "belief" in which it expresses all "mental endorsement or acceptance of anything as real", and is equipollent with the

parallel term "conviction", there is a more confined usage of it expressing a specific form of "conviction" in contrast with the form of conviction called "knowledge" is itself an important gain. And to learn further that the specific character of the form of conviction which we call "knowledge" is that it rests on grounds which give "theoretic certitude", is an important aid, by way of elimination, in fixing on the specific characteristic of the form of conviction which in contrast to "knowledge" we call "faith". "Faith" we know now is a form of conviction which arises differently to "theoretic certitude"; and if certain bases for its affirmation of reality which have been suggested have been excluded in the discussion—such as that it rests on a volition or a series of volitions, on considerations of value rather than of reality, on evidence only subjectively but not objectively adequate—the way seems pretty well cleared for a positive determination of precisely what it is that it does rest on. We have at least learned that while distinguishing it from "knowledge", which is conviction of the order of "theoretic certitude", we must find some basis for "faith", "belief" which will preserve its full character as "conviction" and not sublimate it into a wish or a will, a conjectural hypothesis or a mistake.

It was long ago suggested that what we call "faith", "belief", as contradistinguished from "knowledge" is conviction grounded in authority, as distinguished from conviction grounded in reason. "We *know*", says Augustine, "what rests upon *reason*; we *believe* what rests upon *authority*"; and Sir William Hamilton pronounces this "accurately" said.⁹ It is not intended of course to represent "faith", "belief" as irrational, any more than it is intended to represent "knowledge" as free from all dependence on taking-on-trust. It was fully recognized by Augustine—as by Sir William Hamilton—that an activity of reason underlies all "faith", and an act of "faith" underlies all knowledge. "But reason itself", says Sir William Hamilton, ex-

⁹ *Reid's Works*: note A, section 5.

pounding Augustine's dictum,¹⁰ "must rest at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, *beliefs*, or *trusts*. Thus it is that in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically admit, that *belief* is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of *belief*." With equal frankness Augustine allows that reason underlies all acts of faith. That mental act which we call faith, he remarks, is one possible only to rational creatures, and of course we act as rational beings in performing it;¹¹ and we never believe anything until we have found it worthy of our belief.¹² As we cannot accord faith, then, without perceiving good grounds for according it, reason as truly underlies faith as faith reason. It is with no intention, then, of denying or even obscuring this interaction of faith and knowledge—what may be justly called their interdependence—that they are distinguished from one another in their secondary applications as designating two distinguishable modes of conviction, the one resting on reason the other on authority. What is intended is to discriminate the proximate grounds on which the mental consent designated by the one and the other rests. When the proximate ground of our conviction is reason, we call it "knowledge"; when it is authority we call it "faith", "belief". Or to put it in other but equivalent terms, we know what we are convinced of on the ground of perception: we believe what we are convinced of on the ground of testimony. "With respect to things we have seen or see", says Augustine,¹³ "we are our own witnesses; but with respect to those we believe, we are moved to faith by other witnesses." We cannot believe, any more than we can know, without adequate grounds; it is

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.*

¹¹ *Epist.* 120: "we should not be able to believe if we did not have rational minds."

¹² *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ii. 5.

¹³ *Epist.* 147.3.8.

not faith but "credulity" to accord credit to insufficient evidence; and an unreasonable faith is no faith at all. But we are moved to this act of conviction by the evidence of testimony, by the force of authority—rationally determined to be trustworthy—and not by the immediate perception of our own rational understandings.¹⁴ In a word, while both knowing and believing are states of conviction, sureness—and the surety may be equally strong—they rest proximately on different grounds. Knowledge is seeing, faith is crediting.¹⁵

It powerfully commends this conception of the distinction between faith and knowledge, that it employs these terms to designate a distinction which is undoubtedly real. Whatever we choose to call these two classes of convictions, these two classes of convictions unquestionably exist. As Augustine puts it, "no one doubts that we are impelled to the acquisition of knowledge by a double impulse—of authority

¹⁴ On Augustine's doctrine of Faith and Reason see "THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW", July, 1907, 389, *sq.*

¹⁵ This conception of "faith" naturally became traditional. Thus, e. g., Reginald Pecock (middle of 15th century) defines faith as "a knowyng wherbi we assenten to eny thing as to trouthe, for as mych as we have sure evydencis gretter than to the contrarie that it is toold and affermid to us to be trewe, bi him of whom we have sure evydencis, or notable likli evydencis, gretter than to the contrarie, that therinne he not lied" (*The Folewer to the Donet*, f. 28). Here we have "faith" resting on evidence; and the specific evidence on which it rests, testimony. Accordingly he defines Christian faith thus: "that feith, of which we speken now, into which we ben bounde, and which is oon of the foundementis of Cristen religioun, is thilke kinde or spice of knowyng, which a man gendrith and getith into his undirstonding, principali bi the telling or denouncing of another persooone, which may not lie, or which is God" (*The Booke of Faith* I. i. f. 9a, Morrison's edition, 1909, p. 123). At the end of the discussion (f. 10a) Pecock plainly adds: "and bi this maner of his geting and gendring, feith is dyvers from other kindis and spices of kunnyngis, which a man gendrith and getith into his understanding bi bisynes and labour of his natural resoun, bi biholding upon the causis or effectis or circumstancis in nature of the conclusioun or treuthe, and withoute eny attendannee maad to eny sure teller or denouncer, that thilk conclusioun is a treuthe."

and of reason."¹⁶ We do possess convictions which are grounded in our own rational apprehension; and we do possess convictions which are grounded in our recognition of authority. We are erecting no artificial categories, then, when we distinguish between these two classes of convictions and label them respectively "knowledges" and "beliefs", "faiths". At the worst we are only applying to real distinctions artificial labels. It may possibly be said that there is no reason in the fitness of things why we should call those convictions which are of the order of "theoretical certitude", knowledge; and those which represent the certitude born of approved testimony, faith. But it cannot be said that no two such categories exist. It is patent to all of us, that some of our convictions rest on our own rational perception of reality, and that others of them rest on the authority exercised over us by tested testimony. The only question which can arise is whether "knowledge", "faith" are appropriate designations by which to call these two classes of convictions.

No one, of course, would think of denying that the two terms "knowledge", and "faith", "belief" are frequently employed as wholly equivalent—each designating simply a conviction, without respect to the nature of its grounds. Augustine already recognized this broad use of both terms to cover the whole ground of convictions. But neither can it be denied that they are often brought into contrast with one another as expressive each of a particular class of convictions, distinguishable from one another. The distinction indicated, no doubt, is often a distinction not in the nature of the evidence on which the several classes of conviction rest but in—shall we say the firmness, the clearness, the force of the conviction? The difficulty of finding the exact word to employ here may perhaps be instructive. When we say, for example, "I do not *know* it,—but I fully *believe* it" is it entirely clear that we are using "knowledge"

¹⁶ *Contr. Acad.* iii 20. 43; cf. *De Ordine*, ii 9. 26.

¹⁷ *Retract.* i, 104. 3.

merely of a higher degree of conviction than "faith" expresses? No doubt such a higher degree of conviction is intimated when, for example, to express the force of our conviction of a matter which nevertheless we are assured of only by testimony, we say emphatically, "I do not merely *believe* it; I *know* it." But may it not be that it would be more precise to say that "knowledge" even here expresses primarily rather a more direct and immediate grounding of conviction, and faith, belief, a more remote and mediate grounding of it—and that it is out of this primary meaning of the two terms that a secondary usage of them has arisen to express what on the surface appears as differing grades of convictions, but in the ultimate analysis is really differing relations of immediacy of the evidence on which the conviction rests? It adds not a little to the commendation of the distinction between "knowledge and faith under discussion, at all events, that it provides a starting point on the assumption of which other current usages of the terms may find ready and significant explanations.

When we come to inquire after the special appropriateness of the employment of the terms "faith", "belief" to designate those convictions which rest on authority or testimony, in distinction from those which rest on our immediate perception—physical or mental—attention should be directed to an element in "faith", "belief" of which we have as yet spoken little but which seems always present and indeed characteristic. This is the element of trust. There is an element of trust lying at the bottom of all our convictions, even those which we designate "knowledge", because, as we say, they are of the order of "theoretic certitude", or "rational assurance". "The original data of reason", says Sir William Hamilton truly, "do not rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself." "These data", he adds, "are, therefore, in rigid propriety, *beliefs*, or *trusts*." The collocation of the terms here, "beliefs or trusts", should be observed; it betrays the propinquity of the two ideas. To

say that an element of trust underlies all our knowledge is therefore equivalent to saying that our knowledge rests on belief. The conceptions of believing and trusting go, then, together; and what we have now to suggest is that it is this open implication of "trust" in the conception of "belief", "faith" which rules the usage of these terms.

There is, we have said, an element of trust in all our convictions, and therefore "faith", "belief" may be employed of them all. And when convictions are distinguished from convictions, the convictions in which the element of trust is most prominent tend to draw to themselves the designations of "faith", "belief". It is not purely arbitrary, therefore, that those convictions which rest on our rational perceptions are called "knowledge" while those which rest on "authority" or "testimony" receive the name of "belief", "faith". It is because the element of trust is, not indeed more really, but more prominently, present in the latter than in the former. We perceive and feel the element of trust in according our mental assent to facts brought to us by the testimony of others and accepted as facts on their authority as we do not in the findings of our own rational understandings. And therefore we designate the former matters of faith, belief, and the latter matters of knowledge. Knowing, we then say, is seeing; believing is crediting. And that is only another way of saying that "knowledge" is the appropriate designation of those convictions which rest on our own mental perceptions, while "faith", "belief" is the appropriate designation of those convictions which rest on testimony or authority. While we may use either term broadly for all convictions, we naturally employ them with this discrimination when they are brought in contrast with one another.

It appears, therefore, not only that we are here in the presence of two classes of convictions—the difference between which is real—but that when these two classes are designated respectively by the terms "knowledge" and "faith", "belief" they are appropriately designated. These

designations suggest the real difference which exists between the two classes of convictions. Matters of faith, matters of belief are different from matters of knowledge—not as convictions less clear, firm or well-grounded, not as convictions resting on grounds less objectively valid, not as convictions determined rather by desire, will, than by evidence—but as convictions resting on grounds less direct and immediate to the soul, and therefore involving a more prominent element of trust, in a word as convictions grounded in authority, testimony as distinguished from convictions grounded in rational proof. The two classes of convictions are psychologically just convictions; they are alike, in Dr. Baldwin's phrase, "forced consents"; they rest equally on evidence and are equally the product of evidence; they may be equally clear, firm and assured; but they rest on differing kinds of evidence and differ, therefore, in accordance with this difference of kind in the evidence on which they rest. In "knowledge" as the mental response to rational considerations, the movement of the intellect is prominent to the obscuration of all else. Of course the whole man is active in "knowledge" too—for it is the man in his complex presentation who is the subject of the knowledge. But it is "reason" which is prominent in the activity which assures itself of reality on grounds of mental perception. In "faith", on the other hand, as the mental response to testimony, authority, the movement of the sensibility in the form of trust is what is thrust forward to observation. Of course, every other faculty is involved in the act of belief—and particularly the intellectual faculties to which the act of "crediting" belongs; but what attracts the attention of the subject is the prominence in this act of crediting, of the element of trust which has retired into the background in those other acts of assent which we know as "knowledge". Faith then emerges as the appropriate name of those acts of mental consent in which the element of trust is prominent. Knowledge is seeing; faith, belief, is trusting.

In what we call religious faith this prominent implication

of trust reaches its height. Religious belief may differ from other belief only in the nature of its objects; religious beliefs are beliefs which have religious conceptions as their contents. But the complex of emotions which accompany acts of assent to propositions of religious content, and form the concrete state of mind of the believer, is of course indefinitely different from that which accompanies any other act of believing. What is prominent in this state of mind is precisely trust. Trust is the active expression of that sense of dependence in which religion largely consists, and it is its presence in these acts of faith, belief, which communicates to them their religious quality and raises them from mere beliefs of propositions the contents of which happen to be of religious purport, to acts possessed of religious character. It is the nature of trust to seek a personal object on which to repose, and it is only natural, therefore, that what we call religious faith does not reach its height in assent to propositions of whatever religious content and however well fitted to call out religious trust, but comes to its rights only when it rests with adoring trust on a person. The extension of the terms, "faith", "belief" to express an attitude of mind towards a person, does not wait, of course, on their religious application. We speak familiarly of believing in, or having faith in, persons in common life; and we perceive at once that our justification in doing so rests on the strong implication of trust resident in the terms. It has been suggested not without justice, that the terms show everywhere a tendency to gravitate towards such an application.¹⁸ This element at all events becomes so prominent in the culminating act of religious faith when it rests on the

¹⁸ "It is the nature and tendency of the word," says Bishop Moule, "to go out towards a person . . . When we speak of having faith we habitually direct the notion either towards a veritable person, or towards something which we personify in the mind . . . I do not attempt to explain the fact, as fact I think it is. Perhaps we may trace in it a far-off echo of that primeval Sanskrit word whose meaning is 'to bind'" . . . (*Faith: its Nature and its Work*, 1909, p. 10).

person of God our benefactor, or of Christ our Saviour, as to absorb the prior implication of crediting almost altogether. Faith in God, and above all, faith in Jesus Christ is just trust in Him in its purity. Thus in its higher applications the element of trust which is present in faith in all its applications, grows more and more prominent until it finishes by becoming well-nigh the entire connotation of the term; and "to believe in" "to have faith in" comes to mean simply "entrust yourself to". When "faith" can come thus to mean just "trust" we cannot wonder that it is the implication of "trust" in the term which rules its usage and determines its applications throughout the whole course of its development.

The justification of the application of the terms "believing", "faith" to these high religious acts of entrusting oneself to a person does not rest, however, entirely upon the circumstance that the element of trust which in these acts absorbs attention is present in all other acts of faith and only here comes into full prominence. It rests also on the circumstance that all the other constituent elements of acts of faith, belief, in the general connotation of these terms, are present in these acts of religious faith. The more general acts of faith, belief and the culminating acts of religious belief, faith, that is, differ from one another only in the relative prominence in each of elements common to both. For example, religious faith at its height—the act by which we turn trustingly to a Being conceived as our Righteous Governor, in whose hands is our destiny, or to a Being conceived as our Divine Saviour, through whom we may be restored from our sin, and entrust ourselves to Him—is as little a matter of "the will" and as truly a "forced" consent as is any other act called faith, belief. The engagement of the whole man in the act—involving the response of all the elements of his nature—is no doubt more observable in these highest acts of faith than in the lower, as it is altogether natural it should be from the mere fact that they are the highest exercises of faith. But the determination of the

response by the appropriate evidence—its dependence on evidence as its ground—is no less stringent or plain. Whenever we obtain a clear conception of the rise in the human soul of religious faith as exercised thus at its apex as saving trust in Christ we perceive with perfect plainness that it rests on evidence as its ground.

It is not unusual for writers who wish to represent religious faith in the form of saving trust in Christ as an act of the will to present the case in the form of a strict alternative. This faith, they say, is an exercise not of the intellect but of the heart. And then they proceed to develop an argument, aiming at a *reductio ad absurdum* of the notion that saving faith can possibly be conceived as a mere assent of the intellect. A simple assent of the mind, we are told, “always depends on the nature and amount of proof” presented, and is in a true sense “involuntary”. When a proposition is presented and sufficiently supported by proof “a mind in a situation to apprehend the proof believes inevitably”. “If the proposition or doctrine is not supported by proof, or if the mind is incapable from any cause, of appreciating the proof, unbelief or doubt is equally certain.” “Such a theory of faith would, therefore, suspend our belief or unbelief, and consequently our salvation or damnation, upon the manner in which truth is presented to our minds, or our intellectual capability of its appreciation.” “To express the whole matter briefly”, concludes the writer whose argument we have been following, “it excludes the whole matter of the will, and makes faith or unbelief a matter of necessity.”¹⁹

It is not necessary to pause to examine this argument in detail. What it is at the moment important to point out is that the fullest agreement that saving faith is a matter not of the intellect but of the heart, that it is “confidence” rather than “conviction”, does not exclude the element of intelligent assent from it altogether, or escape the necessity of recognizing that it rests upon evidence. Is

¹⁹ Dr Richard Beard, *Lectures*, vol. II. pp. 362-363.

the "confidence" which faith in this its highest exercise has become, an ungrounded confidence? A blind and capricious act of the soul's due to a purely arbitrary determination of the will? Must it not rest on a perceived—that is to say a well-grounded—trustworthiness in the object on which it reposes? In a word, it is clear enough that a conviction lies beneath this confidence, a conviction of the trustworthiness of the object; and that this conviction is produced like other convictions, just by evidence. Is it not still true, then, that the confidence in which saving faith consists is inevitable if the proof of the trustworthiness of the object on which it reposes is sufficient—or as we truly phrase it "compelling"—and the mind is in a situation to appreciate this proof; and doubt is inevitable if the proof is insufficient or the mind is incapable from any cause of appreciating the proof? Is not the confidence which is the faith of the heart, therefore, in any case, as truly as the conviction which is the faith of the intellect, suspended "upon the manner in which truth is presented", or "our capability of its appreciation"? In a word, is it not clear that the assent of the intelligence is an inamissible element of faith even in its highest exercises, and it never comes to be an arbitrary "matter of choice", in which I may do "as I choose"?²⁰ For the exercise of this faith must there not then always be present to the mind, (1) the object on which it is to repose in confidence; (2) adequate grounds for the exercise of this confidence in the object? And must not the mind be in a situation to appreciate these grounds? Here, too, faith is, in Dr. Baldwin's phrase, a "forced consent", and is the product of evidence.

The impulse of the writer whose views we have just been considering to make "saving faith" a so-called "act of free volition" is derived from the notion that only thus can man be responsible for his faith. It is a sufficiently odd notion, however, that if our faith be determined by reasons and these reasons are good, we are not responsible for it,

²⁰ Dr. Beard, p. 364.

because forsooth, we then "believe inevitably" and our faith is "a matter of necessity". Are we to hold that responsibility attaches to faith only when it does not rest on good reasons, or in other words is ungrounded, or insufficiently grounded, and is therefore arbitrary? In point of fact, we are responsible for our volitions only because our volitions are never arbitrary acts of a faculty within us called "will", but the determined acts of our whole selves, and therefore represent us. And we are responsible for our faith in precisely the same way because it is *our* faith, and represents us. For it is to be borne in mind that faith, though resting on evidence and thus in a true sense, as Prof. Baldwin calls it, a "forced consent", is not in such a sense the result of evidence that the mind is passive in believing—that the evidence when adequate objectively is always adequate subjectively, or *vice versa*, quite independently of the state of the mind that believes. Faith is an act of the mind, and can come into being only by an act of the mind, expressive of its own state. There are two factors in the production of faith. On the one hand, there is the evidence on the ground of which the faith is yielded. On the other hand, there is the subjective condition by virtue of which the evidence can take effect in the appropriate act of faith. There can be no belief, faith, without evidence; it is on evidence that the mental exercise which we call belief, faith, rests; and this exercise or state of mind cannot exist apart from its ground in evidence. But evidence cannot produce belief, faith, except in a mind open to this evidence, and capable of receiving, weighing and responding to it. A mathematical demonstration is demonstrative proof of the proposition demonstrated. But even such a demonstration cannot produce conviction in a mind incapable of following the demonstration. Where musical taste is lacking, no evidence which derives its force from considerations of melody can work conviction. No conviction, whether of the order of what we call knowledge or of faith, can be produced by considerations to which the mind to be convinced is inhospitable.

Something more, then, is needed to produce belief, faith, besides the evidence which constitutes its ground. The evidence may be objectively sufficient, adequate, overwhelming. The subjective effect of belief, faith is not produced unless this evidence is also adapted to the mind, and to the present state of that mind, which is to be convinced. The mind, itself, therefore,—and the varying states of the mind—have their parts to play in the production of belief, faith; and the effect which is so designated is not the mechanical result of the adduction of the evidence. No faith without evidence; but not, no evidence without faith. There may stand in the way of the proper and objectively inevitable effect of the evidence, the subjective nature or condition to which the evidence is addressed. This is the ground of responsibility for belief, faith; it is not merely a question of evidence but of subjectivity; and subjectivity is the other name for personality. Our action under evidence is the touchstone by which is determined what we are. If evidence which is objectively adequate is not subjectively adequate the fault is in us. If we are not accessible to musical evidence, then we are by nature unmusical, or in a present state of unmusicalness. If we are not accessible to moral evidence, then we are either unmoral, or, being moral beings, immoral. The evidence to which we are accessible is irresistible if adequate, and irresistibly produces belief, faith. And no belief, faith can arise except on the ground of evidence duly apprehended, appreciated, weighed. We may cherish opinions without evidence, or with inadequate evidence; but not possess faith any more than knowledge. All convictions of whatever order, are the products of evidence in a mind accessible to the evidence appropriate to these particular convictions.

These things being so, it is easy to see that the sinful heart—which is enmity towards God—is incapable of that supreme act of trust in God—or rather of entrusting itself to God, its Saviour—which has absorbed into itself the term “faith” in its Christian connotation. And it is to avoid this

conclusion that many have been tempted to make faith not a rational act of conviction passing into confidence, resting on adequate grounds in testimony, but an arbitrary act of sheer will, produced no one knows how. This is not, however, the solution of the difficulty offered by the Christian revelation. The solution it offers is frankly to allow the impossibility of "faith" to the sinful heart and to attribute it, therefore, to the gift of God. Not, of course, as if this gift were communicated to man in some mechanical manner, which would ignore or do violence to his psychological constitution or to the psychological nature of the act of faith. The mode of the divine giving of faith is represented rather as involving the creation by God the Holy Spirit of a capacity for faith under the evidence submitted. It proceeds by the divine illumination of the understanding, softening of the heart and quickening of the will, so that the man so affected may freely and must inevitably perceive the force and yield to the compelling power of the evidence of the trustworthiness of Jesus Christ as Savior submitted to him in the Gospel. In one word the capacity for faith and the inevitable emergence in the heart of faith are attributed by the Christian revelation to that great act of God the Holy Spirit which has come in Christian theology to be called by the significant name of Regeneration. If sinful man as such is incapable of the act of faith, because he is inhabile to the evidence on which alone such an act of confident resting on God the Savior can repose, renewed man is equally incapable of not responding to this evidence, which is objectively compelling, by an act of sincere faith. In this its highest exercise faith thus, though in a true sense the gift of God, is in an equally true sense man's own act, and bears all the character of faith as it is exercised by un-renewed man in its lower manifestations.

It may conduce to a better apprehension of the essential nature of faith and its relation to the evidence in which it is grounded, if we endeavor to form some notion of the effect of this evidence on the minds of men in the three great

stages of their life on earth—as sinless in Paradise, as sinful, as regenerated by the Spirit of God into newness of life. Like every other creature, man is of course absolutely dependent on God. But unlike many other creatures, man, because in his very nature self-conscious, is conscious of his dependence on God; his relation of dependence on God is not merely a fact but a fact of his self-consciousness. This dependence is not confined to any one element of human nature but runs through the whole of man's nature; and as self-conscious being man is conscious of his absolute dependence on God, physically, psychically, morally, spiritually. It is this comprehensive consciousness of dependence on God for and in all the elements of his nature and life, which is the fundamental basis in humanity of faith, in its general religious sense. This faith is but the active aspect of the consciousness of dependence, which, therefore, is the passive aspect of faith. In this sense no man exists, or ever has existed or ever will exist who has not "faith". But this "faith" takes very different characters in man as unfallen and as fallen and as renewed.

In unfallen man, the consciousness of dependence on God is far from a bare recognition of a fact; it has a rich emotional result in the heart. This emotional product of course includes fear, in the sense of awe and reverence. But its peculiar quality is just active and loving trust. Sinless man delights to be dependent on God and trusts Him wholly. He perceives God as his creator, upholder, governor and bountiful benefactor, and finds his joy in living, moving and having his being in Him. All the currents of his life turn to Him for direction and control. In this spontaneous trust of sinless man we have faith at its purest.

Now when man fell, the relation in which he stood to God was fundamentally altered. Not as if he ceased to be dependent on God, in every sphere of his being and activity. Nor even as if he ceased to be conscious of this his comprehensive dependence on God. Even as sinner man cannot but believe in God; the very Devils believe and tremble. He cannot escape the knowledge that he is utterly de-

pendent on God for all that he is and does. But his consciousness of dependence on God no longer takes the form of glad and loving trust. Precisely what sin has done to him is to render this trust impossible. Sin has destroyed the natural relation between God and His creature in which the creature trusts God, and has instituted a new relation, which conditions all his immanent as well as transient activities Godward. The sinner is at enmity with God and can look to God only for punishment. He knows himself absolutely dependent on God, but in knowing this, he knows himself absolutely in the power of his enemy. A fearful looking forward to judgment conditions all his thought of God. Faith has accordingly been transformed into unfaith; trust into distrust. He expects evil and only evil from God. Knowing himself to be dependent on God he seeks to be as independent of Him as he can. As he thinks of God, misery and fear and hatred take the place of joy and trust and love. Instinctively and by his very nature the sinner, not being able to escape from his belief in God, yet cannot possibly have faith in God, that is trust Him, entrust himself to Him.

The reestablishment of *this* faith in the sinner must be the act not of the sinner himself but of God. This because the sinner has no power to render God gracious which is the objective root, or to look to God for favor which is the subjective root of faith in the fiducial sense. Before he can thus believe there must intervene the atoning work of Christ cancelling the guilt by which the sinner is kept under the wrath of God, and the recreative work of the Holy Spirit by which the sinner's heart is renewed in the love of God. There is not required a creation of something entirely new, but only a restoration of an old relation and a renewal therewith of an old disposition. Accordingly although faith in the renewed man bears a different character from faith in unfallen man, inasmuch as it is trust in God not merely for general goodness but for the specific blessing of salvation—that is to say it is soteriological—it yet remains essentially the same thing as in unfallen man.

It is in the one case as in the other just trust—that trust which belongs of nature to man as man in relation to his God. And, therefore, though in renewed man it is a gift of God's grace, it does not come to him as something alien to his nature. It is beyond the powers of his nature as sinful man; but it is something which belongs to human nature as such, which has been lost through sin and which can be restored only by the power of God. In this sense faith remains natural even in the renewed sinner, and the peculiar character which belongs to it as the act of a sinner, namely its soteriological reference, only conditions and does not essentially alter it. Because man is a sinner his faith terminates not immediately on God, but immediately on the mediator, and only through His mediation on God; and it is proximately trust in this mediator for salvation—relief from the guilt and corruption of sin,—and only mediately through this relief for other goods. But it makes its way through these intermediating elements to terminate ultimately on God Himself and to rest on Him for all goods. And thus it manifests its fundamental and universal character as trust in God, recognized by the renewed sinner, as by the unfallen creature, as the inexhaustible fountain to His creatures of all blessedness, in whom to live and move and have his being in the creature's highest felicity.

In accordance with the nature of this faith the Protestant theologians have generally explained that faith includes in itself the three elements of *Notitia*, *Assensus*, *Fiducia*. Their primary object has been, no doubt, to protest against the Romish conception which limits faith to the assent of the understanding. The stress of the Protestant definition lies therefore upon the fiducial element. This stress has not led Protestant theologians generally, however, to eliminate from the conception of faith the elements of understanding and assent. No doubt this has been done by some, and it is perhaps not rare even to-day to hear it asserted that faith is so purely trust that there is no element of assent in it at all. And no doubt theologians have differed among themselves as to whether all these elements are to be counted as included

in faith, or some of them treated rather as preliminary steps to faith or effects of faith. But speaking broadly Protestant theologians have reckoned all these elements as embraced within the mental movement we call faith itself; and they have obviously been right in so doing. Indeed, we may go farther and affirm that all three of these elements are always present in faith,—not only in that culminating form of faith which was in the mind of the theologians in question—saving faith in Christ—but in every movement of faith whatever, from the lowest to the highest instances of its exercise. No true faith has arisen unless there has been a perception of the object to be believed or believed in, an assent to its worthiness to be believed or believed in, and a commitment of ourselves to it as true and trustworthy. We cannot be said to believe or to trust in a thing or person of which we have no knowledge; “implicit faith” in this sense is an absurdity. Of course we cannot be said to believe or to trust the thing or person to whose worthiness of our belief or trust assent has not been obtained. And equally we cannot be said to believe that which we distrust too much to commit ourselves to it. In every movement of faith, therefore, from the lowest to the highest there is an intellectual, an emotional and a voluntary element, though naturally these elements vary in their relative prominence in the several movements of faith. This is only as much as to say that it is the man who believes, who is the subject of faith, and the man in the entirety of his being as man. The central movement in all faith is no doubt the element of assent; it is that which constitutes the mental movement so called a movement of conviction. But the movement of assent must depend, as it always does depend, on a movement, not specifically of the will, but of the intellect; the assensus issues from the notitia. The movement of the sensibilities which we call “trust”, is on the contrary the product of the assent. And it is in this movement of the sensibilities that faith fulfills itself, and it is by it that, as specifically “faith”, it is “formed”.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE CHARACTER AND CLAIMS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ENGLISH BIBLE.

The Bible is a collection of books; it dates from antiquity; it was written in other tongues than English. It need occasion no surprise, therefore, to discover that two English Bibles may differ in these three respects: the number of books they contain, the exact wording of their respective originals, and the phraseology used in their translation.

As a matter of fact, the English Bible authorized by the Roman Catholic Church on the one hand, and the English Bible in use among Protestants on the other hand, do differ in all these three respects. (1) They differ in their *canon*. That is, the Roman Catholic Bible admits into the sacred volume certain books and parts of books that the Protestant Bible excludes. (2) They differ in their *text*. That is, the ancient original from which the one is translated does not coincide in its wording with that from which the other is translated. (3) They differ in their *version*. That is, the translators, in the work of turning those originals into English, had different motives and methods. A Protestant's examination of the Roman Catholic English Bible, therefore, will naturally follow these three lines, the canon, the text and the version.

But first of all, what is the English Bible of the Romanist?

The only English Bible authorized by the Roman Catholic Church is that translation which was made by certain teachers of the English Seminary at Douai in Belgium in the 16th century,¹ and first published by them, the New Testa-

¹For records of this Seminary and its Masters, see the following works: Husenbeth's *English Colleges and Convents on the Continent*", 1849; "*The Records of English Catholics under the Penal Laws*", two volumes, of which the first is "*The Diaries of the English College, Douay*," London, 1878, and the second is "*Letters and Memorials of William, Cardinal Allen*", London, 1882, both volumes being provided with an historical introduction by Thos. Fr. Knox, D.D.; also Dr. Alphons Bellesheim's "*Wilhelm, Cardinal Allen*"; and the general biographies.

ment at Rheims in France in 1582, the entire Bible at Douai in 1609-10. In its successive editions and revisions it has repeatedly received the *imprimatur* of the authorities of the Catholic Church, from its first publication down to the present day.² That Church is committed to it not only positively by this ecclesiastical approval, but also negatively by an unvarying opposition to all other English versions. In so far as the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church on English-speaking soil are unwilling to advocate the entire suppression of vernacular Bibles,³ their opposition to other English versions is obviously the exact measure of their adhesion to the Douai Version. Or, stated in another way, the alternative for an English-speaking Catholic is the Douai Bible in one or another of its editions, or no English Bible, as long as he remains a good Catholic.

² The original editions indeed bore no official *imprimatur*, but the New Testament bore a recommendation signed by four members of the Faculty of Rheims, and the Old Testament a similar recommendation signed by three divines of the University of Douai. Numerous Dublin editions bearing the approval of John Thos. Troy, R. C. Archbishop of Dublin, refer to the Douai Old Testament, the Rheims New Testament, and the Challoner editions (1749, 1750 and 1752), all in one breath, as "*Anglicis jam approbatis versionibus*". Challoner's editions bore the approbation of Green and Walton, and these dignitaries' names were repeated in later reprints of Challoner (as MacMahon's "eighth", 1810). The first issue of MacMahon's Challoner (1783) was approved by James Carpenter, predecessor of Dr. Troy at Dublin. The Scotch editions of Challoner bore the approbation of Dr. Hey, "one of the Vicars Apostolic in Scotland". Haydock's Manchester-Dublin editions were originally approved by Dr. Gibson, Vicar Apostolic, and a Haydock's Bible of 1850 (Husenbeth's reprint) carries the "approbation and sanction" of Bishop Wareing, the editor's ecclesiastical superior, and "the concurrent approbation and sanction of all the Right Rev. Vicars Apostolic of Great Britain". The editions for sale today at American bookshops (many of them Archbishop Kenrick's revision, 1849-1859) are approved by Cardinal Gibbons, the most exalted dignitary of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in this country.

³ See for example Cardinal Gibbons' *Faith of Our Fathers*, pp. 116 117: "The Church, far from being opposed to the reading of the Scriptures, does all she can to encourage their perusal"; "Be assured that if you become a Catholic, you will never be forbidden to read the Bible. It is our earnest wish that every word of the Gospel may be imprinted on your memory and on your heart."

The Canon.

When the Protestant picks up a Catholic Bible for the first time, the most *obvious* difference between it and the Bible with which he is familiar is the greater bulk of the Catholic Bible. In the New Testament they are alike, but in the Old Testament the Catholic Bible contains, mingled with the books of the Protestant canon, a few books that the Protestant Bible excludes. On closer investigation these additions prove to be Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and First and Second Maccabees. There are also sections added by the Catholics to books present in their shorter form in the Protestant Old Testament. So to Esther they add seven chapters at the end;⁴ to Daniel, the Hymn of the Three Children (in Chap. 3), the History of Susanna (Chap. 13), and Bel and the Dragon (Chap. 14); and to Jeremiah, the six chapters under the separate title of Baruch, of which the last is the Epistle of Jeremiah.⁵

Why did the Douai translators admit, and why does the Protestant's Bible exclude, these books and sections?

The Douai translators admitted them, because the Council of Trent had declared in 1546 that they belonged in the canon,⁶ and because for these translators the decrees of the Council of Trent had binding authority.⁷

⁴ Chap. x. 4—chap. xvi.

⁵ The decree of Trent reads: "*Jeremias cum Baruch*"; though arranged in the Douai Bible as a separate book, Baruch is thus officially regarded as an addition to Jeremiah.

⁶ "*Sacrorum librorum indicem huic decreto adscribendum censuit [sc., synodus], ne cui dubitatio suboriri possit, quinam sint qui ab ipsa synodo suscipiuntur. Sunt vero infra scripti. Testamenti veteris: quinque Moysis, id est: Genesis—Deuteronomium; Josuae—Nehemias, Tobias, Judith, Esther, Job—Canticum Canticorum, Sapientia, Ecclesiasticus, Isaias, Jeremias cum Baruch, Ezechiel—Malachias, duo Machabaeorum, primus et secundus. Test. novis: &c. . . . Si quis autem libros ipsos integros cum omnibus suis partibus, prout in ecclesia catholica legi consueverunt, et in veteri vulgata latina editone habentur, pro sacris et canonicis non suscepit, et traditiones praedictas sciens et prudens contempserit, anathema sit. Omnes itaque intelligant, quo ordine et via ipsa synodus post jactum fidei confessionis fundamentum sit progressura, et quibus potissimum testimoniis ac praesidiis*

It should be observed that this answer is in two parts. With the second part the present discussion has nothing to do. If a doubt rise in the mind of any person whether the deliverances of the Council of Trent have binding authority, let him consider, first, that we have here to do only with an historical fact—the Douai translators did feel themselves bound by that Council; and second, that at the present day, even if not in 1582, every Catholic is bound to the canon of Trent, for in 1870 the Vatican Council declared:⁸ “If anyone accept not the books of Holy Scripture, entire with all their parts as they were named by the Holy Synod of Trent, as sacred and canonical, or deny that they were divinely inspired, let him be anathema!”

It is with the first part of the above answer that this discussion is concerned. By what right did the Council of Trent include these books in the canon of the Old Testament? Thus the question is simply pushed one step further back.

Whatever the *motives* that contributed to this decision of the Council,⁹ the only rational *grounds* for the decision in *confirmandis dogmatibus et instaurandis in ecclesia moribus sit usura.*” (*Sessio quarta, Decretum de canonicis scripturis*).

⁷ Referring to the Vulgate, the preface to the Rheims New Testament (§26) says: “The Holy Council of Trent . . . hath declared and defined this only of all other Latin translations, to be authentic, and so only to be used and taken in public lessons, . . . and that no man presume upon any pretence to reject or refuse the same.” The quotation of this decree as authoritative shows that the Rhemists considered themselves bound by the decrees of the Council.

⁸ *Constit. de fide, xi. can. 4*: “*Si quis sac. scrip. libros integros cum omnibus suis partibus, prout illos sac. Trident. synodus recensuit, pro sacris et canonicis non suscepit, aut eos divinitus inspiratos esse negaverit, anathema sit.*” Also, *Constit. de fide, c.ii*: “*Vet. et Nov. Testamen. libri, prout in ejusdem [Trident.] concilii decreto censentur, et in veteri vulgata latina editione habentur, pro sacris et canonicis suscipiendi sunt.*”

⁹ The motives that influenced the Council are displayed in the reports of its debates that have been published by several who were in attendance. For even among the few prelates (about thirty) who participated in these debates, there was considerable diversity of opinion. Johannes Delitzsch (“*Lehrsystem der römischen Kirche*”) summarizes these motives under the four following heads: (1) the serviceable-

were the existence of these books in the Greek Old Testament side by side with those belonging to the Hebrew canon, their presence in the canonical lists of earlier Councils, and their place for centuries in the manuscripts and liturgies of the Latin Church. Were these grounds sufficient to justify the course adopted at Trent?

(1) It is the Old Testament canon of Protestants and not that of Rome, which coincides exactly with the canon of the Jews. The Old Testament of the Jews was the Old Testament of our Lord and His Apostles. Whatever authority, therefore, is possessed by Christ and the Apostles to decide for the Christian Church the extent of the Old Testament, that authority attaches to the Old Testament *minus* the Catholic additions.

These assertions of the Protestants are attacked by Romanists. The disputed books, they say, were in the Septuagint at the time of Christ and the Apostles, who quote the Old Testament generally according to the Septuagint version, thus sanctioning it. There are even some citations of these books in the New Testament writings. Does not this prove that the New Testament guarantees the authority of the larger canon of Catholicism?

This "Septuagint", of which so much is thus made, used to be regarded as a version of Scripture definite and fixed with respect to its date, its authors and its text. So ran that

ness of the Apocrypha for proving Romish dogmas that the canonical books do not prove. (So angelic intercession Tob. xii. 12, and that of the dead II Macc. xv. 14ff, Baruch iii. 4; purgatory, and intercession of the living for the dead II Macc. xii. 42ff; the merit of good works Tob. iv. 7). Tanner, the Catholic controversialist, (*"Das cath. Traditions- und das prot. Schriftprincip"*) admits: "The Church declared these books canonical for the reason that . . . the Church found her own spirit in these books." (2) In order not to weaken the respect for the Vulgate by sundering out the Apocrypha. (3) To strengthen in every way the contrast with the Protestants, who had committed themselves to the Hebrew canon. (4) To fill the gap in the continuous inspiration of the Church, which otherwise would yawn between the Old and New Testaments, and would thus create a presumption against the Catholic doctrine of inspiration continued in the Church after the Apostles.

ancient tradition of the seventy-two scribes working seventy-two days, which gave to the Septuagint its name. But modern scholarship has shown that the sacred books of the Jews were given their vulgar Greek dress in quite a different manner. Under the pressure of Alexandrian influence, Greek-speaking Jews turned their Scriptures into the Hellenistic Greek of the day, not all at once nor even in one generation. It was a slow work, performed by many hands and exhibiting all the unevenness of such a process. The revered Law of Moses was rendered first and best, probably before the middle of the 3d century B.C. The prophetic, poetical and historical books followed in the course of about a century. From the Prologue to the Greek translation of Ecclesiasticus, about 132 B.C., we learn that before that time "the Law and the Prophets and the rest of the books" had already been translated. But not alone those "books of the fathers",¹⁰ revered as divine by the whole Jewish nation, received a Greek dress. This same Prologue shows how other books, like Ecclesiasticus itself, "profitable to those who love learning,"¹¹ came also to be translated into Greek or written in Greek. Such "profitable" compositions, based upon Israel's religion and history, came not unnaturally to be cherished by Jews of a later age, and, when the Christian Church took over the Greek Old Testament from the Jews, it took with it these "profitable" writings of kindred spirit.

Yet the point at issue is not touched when certain of these books are pointed out to us in the most ancient codices of the Septuagint and in the versions made from it.¹² Presence in

¹⁰ Quoted from the Prologue to Ecclesiasticus.

¹¹ By "learning" the author of the Prologue means the Scriptures.

¹² The Vatican manuscript, B, contains the books of the Roman Catholic canon, except I and II Maccabees, and adds III (I) Esdras. The Sinaitic manuscript, \aleph , omits II Maccabees but adds IV Maccabees. Manuscript A, nearly as old as these, adds III Esdras, III and IV Maccabees, and the Prayer of Manasses. The Old Latin version of the African Church (2nd century), being made from the Greek and not the Hebrew, translated the Greek Apocrypha along with the Greek Old Testament. All these sources are Christian.

a manuscript does not prove canonicity; not even the opinion of the scribe or owner of the manuscript can be argued therefrom, much less the opinion of his age or country. To be "in the Septuagint" means really no more than to be a popularly cherished Jewish book in Greek, circulated with the Old Testament among the early Christians. Not among the Jews of Christ's time, be it noted. For we have no evidence whatever that the Jews had been in the habit of mingling these "profitable" writings indiscriminately with "the books of the fathers"; all our Septuagint codices and versions are from Christian sources. On the contrary, as will presently appear, there is most positive testimony to the unique place that the genuine Scriptures held in the esteem of the Greek-speaking Jews contemporary with Christ and the Apostles. And down to the 4th century there seems to have lived on in the best-instructed Christian circles the opinion that the twenty-two¹³ books of the true Old Testament were all that constituted the Old Testament even in the Septuagint. For the list of the "books of the Old Covenant" received by Melito from the Jewish Christians of Palestine in the 2nd century¹⁴ follows the order of the Septuagint, as well as exhibiting the Septuagint titles and adopting the Septuagint divisions: that is, it is *the canon of the Palestinian Septuagint as it circulated in sub-apostolic times*. And Cyril, Bishop of Jerusalem (died 386) says:¹⁵ "Learn from the Church what are the books of the Old Covenant . . . and I pray you read nothing of the Apocryphal books . . .

¹³ As will appear presently, the numbers twenty-two and twenty-four always indicate the shorter canon of the Jews. In the Protestant Old Testament count the double books (Samuel, Kings, Chronicles, and Ezra-Nehemiah) as single books, and unite the twelve minor prophets in one book, and twenty-four is the sum; attach Ruth to Judges and Lamentations to Jeremiah, and the total is twenty-two. The canon of Trent cannot possibly be so reckoned as to yield these numbers, nor does anyone claim that it can be.

¹⁴ See page 576.

¹⁵ In his instructions to catechumens, (*Catechesis* IV, "*De decem dogmatibus*"), §§ 33ff, "On the divine Scriptures"; quoted by Westcott, "The Bible in the Church", pp. 168f. See also page 578, note 28.

Read the divine Scriptures, the twenty-two books of the Old Covenant, which were translated by the seventy-two translators . . . For the translation of the divine Scriptures which were spoken by the Holy Spirit was accomplished through the Holy Spirit. Read the twenty-two books which these rendered, but have nothing to do with the Apocryphal writings."

Again, the fact that in the New Testament the Old Testament is frequently (by no means always) quoted according to its wording in the Septuagint, has clearly no bearing upon the extent of the canon. The New Testament writers wrote in Greek for Hellenistic readers, and when they quoted the Old Testament it was most natural for them to quote it as it lay at hand in this old Hellenistic version long familiar to all Greek-speaking Jews.

As for allusions in the New Testament to apocryphal writings, the argument, if it proved anything, would prove too much to suit the Roman Catholic. For the clearest cases of such allusions¹⁶ to books not in the Hebrew canon concern books not even in the Roman Catholic canon.¹⁷ Such references in fact lend no more authority to these apocryphal Jewish productions, than Paul's quotations from heathen poets¹⁸ serve to make their writings canonical.

On the other hand, the Protestant can point to indisputable contemporary evidence that his canon contains no more and no less than that Old Testament of which our Lord said that "the Scripture cannot be broken."¹⁹

Without appealing to the uniform and repeated but un-

¹⁶ "Allusions", "traces of acquaintance", "reminiscences", not citations; see admissions of this by friends of the Apocrypha, as Bleek, in *"Studien und Kritiken"* for 1853, pp. 267-354, and Stier, quoted by Oehler in Herzog's *"Real-Encyclopaedie"*, vol. vii, p. 257.

¹⁷ As, for example, Jude 14, (compare the "Book of Enoch", chap. ii), and Jude 9 (compare the "Assumption of Moses", as recorded by Origen *De principiis*, iii. 2, 1).

¹⁸ Titus i. 12 from Epimenides, a Cretan of the 6th century B. C. Acts xvii. 28 from Aratus, a Cilician of the 2nd century B. C. 1 Cor. xv. 33 from the celebrated comedian Menander, of the 3d century B. C.

¹⁹ John x. 35.

dated testimony of the Talmud to the twenty-four constituent elements of the Jewish canon,²⁰ the Protestant can summon two witnesses who establish his case beyond question. These are Josephus and Philo. They are admirably adapted to supplement each other's testimony. That of Josephus is affirmative, that of Philo negative; Josephus was a contemporary of the Apostles only, Philo of our Lord also; Josephus was a Palestinian Jew, Philo an Alexandrian Jew. Both were of priestly origin, well-read in the sacred books of their nation, and anxious to commend them to the world.

Now Josephus, in his work against Apion, explicitly states²¹ that the Jews have not an indefinite number of sacred writings, "but only twenty-two, containing the record of all time, which have been justly believed to be divine." He proceeds to divide these twenty-two books into three classes, consisting respectively of five, thirteen and four, and to describe each division in such a way that the Protestant Old Testament, no more and no less, is evidently intended. But as if there might be any remaining doubt concerning his attitude towards the books whose cononicity is maintained by the Roman Catholic Church, he adds: "From the time of Artaxerxes to our own time each event has been recorded; but the records have not been deemed worthy of the same credit as those of earlier date . . . Though so long a time has now passed, no one has dared either to add anything to them [that is, to the true sacred writings], or to take anything from them, or to alter anything." Whatever may be held true concerning the formation of the Old Testament

²⁰ These Jewish writings record for us the discussions carried on between rival schools and doctors of the Law, concerning the right of certain books that were in the canon to remain in it. There was never any question of admitting other books, such as Ecclesiasticus, and the canonicity of those already in the canon was never in serious danger of being disproved. In IV (II) Esdras, however, which dates from the end of the first century of our era, the canon already consists of twenty-four books; this is the number obtained by deducting the seventy secret books of tradition from the total of ninety-four written by Ezra (chap. xiv. verses 44-46).

²¹ Against Apion i. 8.

canon, no doubt can be entertained as to what was thought to be true concerning it in the first century of our era, both in Palestine, and in Alexandria where Apion lived.

Philo flourished half a century earlier, and is the representative writer of Alexandrian Judaism. If anywhere, surely in Alexandria, the apocryphal writings received a regard that might be mistaken for canonization. Yet in Philo's voluminous works, in which he quotes largely from the canonical Scriptures of his nation, he does not once quote from the apocryphal writings. This negative testimony is all the more striking because we know that Philo must have been familiar with at least a part of the Apocrypha, and because its spirit is often singularly akin to his own.²²

The assertion, therefore, that at the time of our Lord the canon of the Jews included these disputed writings, can only be made in the face of unchallenged and unmistakable opposing evidence.

(2) It is the Old Testament canon of Protestants that coincides with the Old Testament canon of the early Christian Church. This would naturally be expected after the proof of the first proposition. But there is ample evidence to prove it independently.

The evidence begins with Melito, Bishop of Sardis about 175 A.D. Eusebius, the historian of the early Church, has happily preserved for us (*Hist. Eccles.* iv. 26) Melito's list of the sacred books, which he learned, we are told, "by exact inquiry on a journey to the East" (Palestine). His canon, save for the omission of Esther,²³ is the canon of

²² "The greatest Philo scholar of the present day, C. Siegfried, says of Philo (in his '*Philo*', Jena, 1875, p. 161): 'His canon is already essentially our own' [that is, the Protestant canon]. Strack, in Herzog-Plitt "*Real-Encyclopaedie*", vol. vii., p. 425.

²³ This may be an accidental omission, like that of the Minor Prophets from Origen's list in Eusebius; for Esther's place at the end of the list, following Esdras (Ezra), a name that so much resembles Esther, was very precarious. Some have thought that, like Nehemiah, Esther was included in one book with Esdras, but this is improbable. It is probable that the Palestinian Christians, like Athanasius at a later time,

the Jews, of the Apostles, and of the Protestants. To the same century and probably to a date earlier than Melito, though naturally indefinite, must be referred the earliest Syriac translation. The Old Testament was translated directly from the Hebrew and included only the Jewish canon. The apocryphal books were not added to it till much later. In the Western Church, Justin Martyr (about A.D. 150), though writing in Greek and quoting the Old Testament according to the Septuagint, never quotes from the Apocrypha;²⁴ and Tertullian in North Africa, however much he quotes the Apocrypha with a respect justly due only to Holy Scripture, yet preserves the true tradition of the canon by giving the number of the Old Testament books as twenty-four.

All these witnesses belong to the 2nd century, the age of the primitive Church. In the next generation, Origen at Alexandria continues the chain of evidence by a list of the Old Testament books, preserved, like Melito's list, in Eusebius' history,²⁵ and, in a more perfect form, in a Latin translation by Ruffinus. It numbers the familiar twenty-two. In North Africa, Cyprian proves the authority of a passage that he quotes from the Apocrypha, by appealing to "the testimony of truth", the Book of Acts.

In the 4th and 5th centuries there are many lists naming twenty-two books, differing slightly in their treatment of Esther and the additions to Jeremiah, and differing considerably in the order of the books, but all of them presenting the shorter canon of Protestantism, not the larger canon of Roman Catholicism, as the true canon of Scrip-

were misled into rejecting Esther as apocryphal because of its apocryphal additions. Thus the early "Synopsis of Divine Scriptures" (wrongly attributed to Athanasius and printed with his works, ed. Migne, vol. iv., col. 283) says that Esther "begins with the dream of Mordecai"; but this is in fact the beginning of the apocryphal section.

²⁴ In debating with Trypho, an Ephesian Jew, the differences between the Jews and the Christians, Justin never alludes to a different canon.

²⁵ Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* vi. 25. He omits the Minor Prophets (but this is a copyist's error), and includes the "Epistle of Jeremiah", which is probably the same as chap. vi. of Baruch in the Vulgate.

ture. The names of the authors of these lists are the most distinguished names in Church History, and are distributed over the whole Church: in the Eastern Church, Athanasius in Egypt,²⁶ Gregory Nazianzen at Constantinople,²⁷ Cyril in Palestine,²⁸ Epiphanius in Cyprus,²⁹ and Amphilochius in Asia Minor;³⁰ in the Western Church, Hilary in Gaul,³¹ Ruffinus in Italy,³² and, at once the most distinguished, the most competent, and the most emphatic witness of them all, Jerome, the Roman Presbyter, father of the Latin Vulgate Bible. This learned Biblical scholar of antiquity writes in the "*Prologus Galeatus*" prefixed to his

²⁶ *Epist. fest.*, 39. He omits Esther, reckons Ruth separately, and adds to Jeremiah not only Lamentations but also Baruch and the Epistle.

²⁷ *Carmina lib.* I, § 1, 12. He counts Ruth separately and omits Esther.

²⁸ *Catech.* iv 35 (compare page 573). He adds to Jeremiah his Epistle and Baruch, as well as Lamentations. The same list, perhaps derived from Cyril, is usually appended to the decrees of the Council of Laodicea (A. D. 363), but is a later interpolation.

²⁹ He gives three lists. Two of these (*De mens. et pond.*, § 4 and § 23) are identical with the Hebrew canon. The third (*Haer.* viii. 6) adds to Jeremiah his Epistle and that of Baruch, as well as Lamentations.

³⁰ *Iambi ad Seleuc.*, 2. He counts Ruth instead of Esther, but at the end says: "Some add Esther."

³¹ *Prol. in lib. Psalmorum*, 15. The same canon as that of Origen, without the omission of the Minor Prophets.

³² *Comm. in symb. apost.*, 37, 38. His list is exactly the Jewish canon. His added remarks are worthy of notice: "These are the books which the Fathers included within the canon, and from which it was their will that the dogmas of our faith should be maintained. Yet it must be known that there are other books which have been called by the ancients not canonical, but ecclesiastical, that is, the Wisdom (as it is called) of Solomon, and the other Wisdom of the Son of Sirach . . . The Book of Tobias is of the same class, and Judith, and the Book of the Maccabees . . . all which they willed should be read in the churches, but not alleged to support any article of faith" (Tr. by Westcott). In general, from the formal lists of all these Fathers, we know how to interpret their use of the Apocrypha. Their informal, uncritical habit of promiscuous quotation when writing controversially or didactically on other topics, is to be checked by these formal expressions of their true belief when writing specifically on the subject of the canon.

translation of the Old Testament: "This prologue to the Scriptures may serve as a sort of helmeted front for all the books that we have translated from Hebrew into Latin, in order that we may know that whatever is outside of these must be put among the Apocrypha. Hence Wisdom, commonly called that of Solomon, and the Book of Jesus son of Sirach (*Ecclesiasticus*) and Judith and Tobias and the Shepherd are not in the canon." And this is but one of many declarations by Jerome to the same effect.³³

Against all this, Roman Catholics allege the presence of these books in the canonical lists of certain Councils, and the sanction given them by certain Fathers. The only Councils previous to Trent that have left authentic canonical lists³⁴ embodying the larger Old Testament canon are two

³³ So, for example, in the preface to the books of Solomon: "As the Church reads the books of Judith and Tobias and Maccabees, but does not receive them among the canonical Scriptures, so also it reads Wisdom and *Ecclesiasticus* for the edification of the people, not for the authoritative confirmation of doctrine" (Westcott's transl.). At first Jerome intended to pass by the apocryphal books in his Biblical labors, but on the entreaty of others he hastily revised Tobias and Judith.

³⁴ The Council of Carthage 397 revised and ratified the decrees of an earlier Council of Hippo 393 (Augustine's see), in which the canon had been one of the subjects debated and decided. All these African Councils expressly submitted their decisions to the judgment of the European Churches and the Bishop of Rome. But papal lists, such as those of Innocent I and Gelasius, which used to be appealed to in confirmation of the larger canon, are probably not genuine; whereas Pope Gregory's remark about Maccabees (quoted on page 581) gives a papal verdict against the equality of the Apocrypha. The Council of Constantinople called the "Quini-sexstine" or "Trullan" (A. D. 692) ratified the decrees of Carthage with their longer Augustinian canon; but it also confirmed in the same breath the shorter canonical list contained in the so-called "Apostolical Constitutions"; and finally, by erecting the canons of Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen and Amphilochius into unalterable ecclesiastical law, it sanctioned also their testimony to the shorter Old Testament canon. Hence its voice is uncertain and appeal is no longer made to it by Romanists. The canonical list ascribed to the late Council of Florence (A. D. 1439) is not found in the older collection of the decrees of this Council, but only in the Caranza collection of 1633; there is no evidence to prove that the Council ever sanctioned the list. A canonical list printed at the end of the decrees of the Council of Laodicea (A. D. 363) is identical with that of Cyril (see page 578, note 28), but it is undoubtedly an early interpolation.

Councils of the North African clergy in the time of Augustine: Carthage A.D. 397, and Carthage A.D. 419. And the only notable instance of a Church Father who not merely quotes from the disputed books but expressly includes them in a formal list, is Augustine. It will be observed, then, that these three testimonies are in fact not three but one, inasmuch as Augustine's influence was paramount in these Councils of his African fellow-Bishops. What is to be thought of this apparent contradiction between Augustine on the one hand, and the mass of emphatic testimony against canonicity on the other hand? Does not common-sense suggest in advance the answer that there must be some simple solution?³⁵

Let Cardinal Cajetan answer for us, that famous scholar of the 16th century appointed by the Pope to argue against Luther. At the end of his commentary on the historical books he formulates as clearly as any Protestant writer the true significance of Augustine's canon. "Here", he writes, "we terminate the commentaries on the historical books of the Old Testament. For the rest, (namely Judith, Tobias and the Maccabees), are accounted by St. Jerome as outside of the canonical books, and placed among the Apocrypha with Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus, as appears in the *Prologus Galcatus*. But be not disturbed, young scholar, if anywhere either in sacred Councils or in sacred Doctors you find those books counted among the canonical. For to the correction of Jerome must be subjected the judgment both of Councils and of Doctors; and according to his opinion addressed to the Bishops Chromatius and Heliodorus, those books (and any similar books that may be in the canon of the Bible) are not canonical, that is, are not a standard for establishing matters of faith; nevertheless they may be

³⁵ Is it likely that the Bible of the Church of North Africa differed radically from the Bible of the rest of the Church, especially when in this very province we find Tertullian before Augustine and Primasius after Augustine limiting the Old Testament to 24 books, and when we find Cyprian before Augustine and Junilius after Augustine rating the authority of some books in their larger canon below the authority of other books?

termed canonical in the sense that they are standards for the edification of believers, having been for this purpose received and authorized in the canon of the Bible. With this distinction you will be able to understand Augustine's expressions and what is written in the Provincial Council of Carthage." For these natural, sensible remarks the learned Cardinal was abused by later Roman Catholic writers,³⁶ but the abuse might have been spared him if these words of Pope Gregory the Great had been given their due weight: "We do not act unduly," he says,³⁷ "if we adduce in this connection testimony drawn from books not canonical, yet put forth for the edification of the Church," and he proceeds to quote from the Maccabees. And Pope Gregory lived more than a century after Augustine and his African Councils.

But there is grave danger in such a question that the debate may degenerate into a mere strife about a word. The Protestant feels no deep concern in attaching a particular meaning to the word "canonical", no real quarrel with the Romanist who prefers to call some of the apocryphal books canonical, following a custom ancient and honorable, though unfortunate. The real point at issue is of far greater importance. When Augustine and the forty-four Bishops of the North African Church, when the Council of Trent, when Catholics to-day, call these books canonical, do they or do they not mean that all are equally the inspired Word of God? Every Protestant who holds to the fundamental principle of the Reformation, the supreme authority of the Word of God as the rule of faith and practise, is interested to know the limits of that Word of God. He may bind in the same volume with those sacred books a dozen, a score or a hundred other books. The old Geneva Bible, the most Protestant of all the English versions, contains the Apocrypha. But there is a distinction. All are of use for pur-

³⁶ For example, by Catharinus, afterwards a member of the Council of Trent, in his *"Annotations on the Commentary by Cajetan"*, book i.

³⁷ Commentary on Job ("Morals"), Book xix, § 34.

poses of edification and worship; not all are God's Word. But to the Catholic Church of to-day all alike are divinely inspired. Witness the deliverance of the Vatican Council of 1870 already quoted,³⁸ with its anathema upon all who hold otherwise. Catholic writers have differed in their interpretation of the Tridentine decree on the canon, some writers denying that the Council intended not only to admit the disputed books, but also to declare all equally canonical.³⁹ Yet only those writers do justice to the evident intent of the decree of Trent who say, with Perrone:⁴⁰ "The authority of both classes of books, the protocanonical and the deuterocanonical, is the same in the Catholic Church, which recognizes no distinction among them."

On the other hand hear Augustine:⁴¹ "In the matter of the canonical Scriptures, let him (that is, the student of the divine Scriptures) follow the authority of the largest possible number of the Catholic Churches, among which are clearly those that were held worthy of the honor to possess the Sees and receive the Epistles of the Apostles. He will adhere, therefore, to this principle in the matter of the canonical Scriptures, that he should *prefer* those accepted by all Catholic Churches to those that some Churches do

³⁸ See page 570, note 8.

³⁹ So Lamy, "*Appar. ad Bibl.*", II, 5, p. 383; Jahn, "*Einleitung in die göttl. Bücher des alten Bundes*", 2nd ed., Vienna 1802, pp. 119ff, 140ff; Möhler, "*Symbolik*", p. 376.

⁴⁰ *Praelectiones*, Part II, Sect. I, chap. I. Compare also the "Declaration of an Assembly of Cardinals to Interpret the Tridentine Council" (Jan. 17, 1576), which sanctioned the infallibility of every syllable and every jot of the Vulgate-text (Van Ess, "*Geschichte der Vulgata*", pp. 208-212, 401f).

⁴¹ *De doctr. christ.* ii. 8. Compare also *De civ. Dei*, xviii. 36, where Augustine denies to II Maccabees the authority of Scripture. The Donatist sect drew from this book the Scriptural sanction that they claimed for suicide, but Augustine distinctly places it outside the canon to which Christ gave His authoritative witness; however, on account of its narratives of heroic martyrs "it is received by the Church not unprofitably, if it is read and heard soberly" (*Contra Gaudentium*, i. 38). Are such limitations as these, "not unprofitably" and "soberly", appropriate to any book of the Hebrew canon, the canon of Christ? Do they not show clearly Augustine's broad conception of "canonicity"?

not accept: and that in the case of the Scriptures not accepted by all, he should *prefer* those accepted by Churches of greater number or dignity to those held by Churches of less number or authority". This weighty utterance, which immediately precedes his list of "the entire canon of Scriptures within which the above principle is to be applied", shows clearly the error of those who would have us suppose that Augustine is on the side of the Roman Catholic Church of to-day in the matter of the canon. Where there is perfect equality there can be no preference; where there is preference there is no longer perfect equality. The authority of Augustine and his Provincial Councils may justly be cited for including the Apocrypha in the canon; it may not be cited to support the equality of the books in the Roman Catholic canon, as that doctrine is implied in the decree of Trent and formulated by the Vatican Council.

Generally, Protestants go one step further and affirm the *inadvisability* of binding these disputed books in the same volume with the Word of God. For the heresy of the Roman Church of to-day is the culmination of an historic process that began in this same innocent custom of mere external incorporation, grew next into the Augustine custom, still innocent yet dangerous, of including the Apocrypha in the term "canonical", passed next into the indiscriminate use of all the "canonical" books as if all were equally the Word of God, and ended by the positive declaration, capped with an anathema on all dissenters, that all these "canonical" Scriptures alike, with all their parts, are sacred and divinely inspired. If Church History has lessons of value for the Church of to-day, surely one of them is, that it is *better* not to print and bind any apocryphal books with the Scriptures of our Lord, the Apostles and the early Christian Church.

The Text.

While the most obvious difference between the Catholic Bible and the Bibles with which the Protestant is familiar

is in their canon, the most *surprising* difference is that which lies in their text.

To the average man Genesis is just Genesis, and Matthew is just Matthew. The mere suggestion of "various readings" is for him a perplexity; when he learns that these variations mount up into the tens of thousands he is confounded. Yet how could the centuries during which his Bible was transmitted to him through the manual toil of innumerable copyists, many ignorant, all fallible, fail to leave their stamp upon the sacred text in mistaken words, distorted phrases, errors of eye, of ear, of hand, omissions, transpositions, additions, even a few intentional alterations? After due reflection on all these possible sources of corruption through the long ages of manuscripts, and after comparison of the condition of the Biblical text with the text of classical authors, it is probable that the first feeling of consternation will change to wonder—a wonder now no longer that there are myriads of various readings, but that there are no more than there are, and particularly that they are so comparatively trivial as to leave the entire body of Biblical doctrine and history unaffected by the issue.

Comparatively trivial; yes, for what Christian, Catholic or Protestant, can regard the preservation and restoration of the sacred text as quite trivial? Though no fundamental truths of his religion are at stake, yet the words of divine utterance are not as man's words. If scholars devote their lives to the toilsome task of establishing the genuine text of a Greek tragedian or a Latin historian, what excuse could the Church of to-day find to give to her Lord, if she used less than her highest skill, learning, patience and industry, in restoring the very words of Prophet and Apostle, and of Him who "spake as never man spake"!

With all the progress of theological studies during the past century or two, it is safe to assert that no department has made more rapid strides than that of textual criticism. Indeed before that time there seems scarcely to have been a textual criticism worthy of the name. The Biblical schol-

ars of the 16th and 17th centuries, both Catholic and Protestant, hardly saw the outlines of the problem facing them. As textual critics, Erasmus, Ximenes and Beza are dwarfed by contrast even with Origen, Lucian and Jerome of the ancient Church. We may say that in part it was the fault of the time: a Tischendorf had yet to discover, a Vercellone to publish, a Hort to classify, and many others to contribute their share of aid, before the materials of criticism should be available for use. But also in part it was the fault of those earlier scholars themselves, who lacked the scientific principles and methods, without which even all the material now available would be a meaningless mass.

It must be confessed, however, that we at the present day are far from seeing the completion of the great task of undoing the mischief of the centuries. Not only are the original autographs of the sacred writers unfound and beyond all hope of finding, but certainty as to their exact text, the goal of textual criticism, is yet unattainable. This is especially true in the Old Testament books, where the problem presents features of peculiar difficulty. In the New Testament there is a bewildering multiplicity of readings of great antiquity, drawn from Greek manuscripts, from ancient versions, and from quotations by the Fathers. But in the Old Testament there is an almost complete uniformity in the Hebrew manuscripts, which are all late; there is only one version, the Septuagint, really ancient, and the text of this stands in as great need of purification as the text of the New Testament, yet with fewer materials for its accomplishment; and finally, there are very few ancient quotations.

Keeping in view both the progress already made and the problems yet to be solved, in what spirit ought the Christian of to-day to approach the subject of the Biblical text? The following principles ought to command the immediate assent of all who value the Bible as the Word of God. (1) Biblical scholarship should make every effort to ascertain as nearly as possible the very words of the original authors. (2) Our Bibles should be purged of every element that by

the gradual progress of the science of textual criticism is demonstrated to be a corruption. (3) Wherever the evidence is not sufficiently decisive to demonstrate which is the original reading, our Bibles should present to their readers, by means of marginal notes, the most important variations.

Passing from these considerations to our investigation of the Roman Catholic Bible, the contrast would be amusing if it were not so serious.

In the Douai Bible we are still in the atmosphere of the 16th century. It would be unfair to say, of the Middle Ages, for Gregory Martin and his Rhemish brethren were no mean scholars, and those are no idle boasts on the title-pages of their version: "diligently conferred with the Greek", "diligently conferred with the Hebrew, Greek and other Editions". Vigorously as they defend the Latin Vulgate in their prefaces, and closely as they adhere to it in their entire work, they nevertheless produce a version quite different from Wicklif's, for example, or that of any other translator who had only the Latin and not the original tongues before him. Yet if we decline to do injustice to the men of Douai by exaggerating their dependence on the Vulgate, we are the more emphatic in characterizing this Catholic version a Bible of the 16th century. The basis of the text of the Douai Bibles circulated to-day is still the same as that of the first editions. The prefaces have been omitted, the English rendering has been considerably modernized and even assimilated to the phraseology of the Authorized Version, and the marginal notes have been toned down. All these are improvements. But the text itself is the same. All the progress of the centuries between is unrecorded for the Catholic reader.⁴²

⁴² The estimate of these later editions of the Douai Bible, ("most improperly so called", according to Mgr. Ward in art. "Douay Bible" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*), expressed by the distinguished English Cardinal Wiseman, (*Essays*, vol. i, pp.73-100), is anything but favorable. "So far as simplicity and energy of style are concerned, the changes are generally for the worse." "Challoner's alterations were far from giving stability to the text." He calls for a definite revision conducted by competent scholars, and endeavors to show the great

Thus far in general. More particularly, the "type of text" represented by the Catholic Bible calls for remarks.

The basis of the Douai text is avowedly and actually "the old vulgar approved Latin", "the authentical Latin according to the best corrected copies of the same." Not only do the men of Douai in their prefaces announce and defend this their position while attacking the text used by Protestant translators, but they even throw down this bold challenge: "What then do our countrymen that refuse this Latin but deprive themselves of the best?" Even in our own day we find some Catholic writers maintaining the same position. Thus Heinrich, the German theologian:⁴³ "In declaring the Vulgate authentic, the Council of Trent did a thing

need of it. This paper was called forth by the publication of Dr. Lingard's "revision" of the Rhemish Gospels, but extended in its suggestions far beyond the limits of an ordinary review. It is interesting, as furnishing a fair estimate of what ought to have been done, but has not been done, in the direction of improving and fixing the form of the modern English Catholic Bible. "Our principal object at present", he writes (p. 79), "is to turn the attention of the Catholic clergy, and particularly the Bishops of Ireland and the Vicars Apostolic of England and Scotland, to the want of a complete revision of the [Douai] version itself, for the purpose of settling a standard text, from which editors in future will not be allowed to depart . . . It is far from our purpose to undertake a complete exposure of the many passages which want emendation—such a task would require a treatise. In order to confine ourselves within reasonable limits, we will only consider the necessity which a new revision would impose on those who should undertake it, of a minute and often complicated study of the original texts. We have selected this view of the matter, because we think it the point most neglected in the past, and most likely to be overlooked, and to form the great stumbling-block in any future revision. For, at first sight, it must appear an almost superfluous task to proceed, in such an undertaking, beyond the accurate study of the work immediately translated. The Vulgate is written in Latin, and it would therefore appear sufficient to possess an accurate knowledge of the Latin language, in order to translate any work written in it into our own. It is our wish to prove the fallacy of such reasoning, and, on the contrary, to show what varied, and often delicate, questions of philology the translation may involve; and how impossible it is to correct or discover the mistakes of our Douai version, without a constant recourse to the original Hebrew and Greek texts. The object of such reference will be, to decide the true meaning of expressions obscure or doubtful in the Latin."

which no doubt is easily explicable from the ecclesiastical standpoint and according to the Catholic principle of tradition; but at the same time its choice was from the scientific-critical standpoint the best. For critical science has steadily become more and more convinced that the text of the Vulgate is on the whole the best and most trustworthy text, surpassing not only other versions but even the existing original-texts⁴⁴ in correctness and truthworthiness: for evidently there stood at the command of the framers of the Itala, as of St. Jerome, far older and better original-texts than the oldest and best of the manuscripts preserved to us, even as a similar fact is true of the text of the Septuagint received by the Church, over against the Massora that is often influenced by Jewish polemic."

Beside this boast, put this admission of the same writer:⁴⁵ "By no means is the possibility of textual errors and mistakes in translation hereby excluded, in matters that do not touch Christian doctrine of faith and morals".

The best, then, without being perfect—this is precisely what many Catholics claim for their Latin text declared "authentic" by the Council of Trent. We say, many; for there are other Catholic writers who are more distrustful of the Vulgate. Nearly a century ago, Leander van Ess, a Catholic priest and professor at Marburg, published an extended treatise on the history of the Vulgate, whose double object was to show his fellow-churchmen that "the Catholic is not legally bound to the Vulgate", and that the Vulgate of to-day is a badly corrupted form of a mixture of faulty translations made in large part from a degenerate text.

In the light of the further textual studies of the last century, it is hard to see how van Ess's verdict on the value of the Vulgate⁴⁶ can be disputed by any unprejudiced

⁴⁴ "*Dogmatik*", vol. i, p. 820f.

⁴⁵ By "original-texts" this writer means the text in the original languages, Hebrew in the Old Testament and Greek in the New.

⁴⁶ "*Dogmatik*", p. 824.

⁴⁷ The distinction should always be observed, between a good text in the absolute and ecclesiastical sense, and a valuable text from the standpoint of the textual critic. For example, the New Testament

thinker. A few paragraphs will suffice to show the basis of this unfavorable estimate of the current Vulgate-text.

(1) Its history has been a career of increasing corruption, only aggravated by repeated attempts to correct it. "On account of its constant and frequent use, it has had as many and as unfortunate experiences as other manuscripts and books have had, and from its very cradle it has been so uncritically handled in even its better parts that later attempts at improvement have not been able, and will not be able, to restore it to purity."⁴⁷

(2) The circumstances of its origin were not favorable for producing a faithful version. Briefly, these circumstances were as follows.

The Old Latin version, at least in its African form, dated back to the 2nd century, as quotations by Tertullian and Cyprian prove. Besides this African version, there existed one or more versions or revisions current in Europe in the 3d and 4th centuries.⁴⁸ These became so mixed and the confusion of text thereby produced became so great, that Augustine believed there must have been innumerable in-

text of Tischendorf's famous manuscript Aleph is an exceedingly valuable text, but it is not a good text to put into the hands of the Church as her New Testament. A textual critic, for his scientific purposes, prefers a manuscript embodying a degenerate text, even an almost unintelligible text, which has escaped some ecclesiastical recension, to another manuscript that reflects that recension, even though this latter be more ancient, more homogeneous, and altogether better adapted for ecclesiastical use. Illustrations might be drawn from the history of almost any of the versions. In the case of the Latin version, the current Vulgate has preserved in the New Testament many a reading derived from the Old Latin text, and thus representing the Greek text of the 2nd century; here lies its value from the standpoint of the textual critic. But in the same chapter with such a critical prize as one of these readings, there may stand some worthless interpolation or scribal corruption that mars the version for Church purposes. In a word, the critic can pick the good and leave the bad; the Church has to take all indiscriminately.

⁴⁷Van Ess, "*Geschichte der Vulgata*", p. 472f.

⁴⁸Scholars are still uncertain as to the exact relationship of the three different types of Old Latin, which it is customary to designate as the African, the European and the Italian. This at least is their true chronological order.

dependent translators,⁴⁹ and Jerome could say,⁵⁰ "there are almost as many versions as manuscripts". To remedy this intolerable state of affairs Jerome, at the request of Pope Damasus (about 382), set himself to bring order out of the chaos. His first work was the revision of the New Testament, beginning with the Gospels. He next produced two editions of the Psalter, one revised according to that text of the Septuagint which was commonly current in the Church, and the other according to the corrected text of Origen's great critical edition of the Old Testament known as the Hexapla. Then Jerome revised, with the help of the Hexapla, the books of Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon, Chronicles, and probably all the Old Testament.⁵¹ Of the Apocrypha he rendered Tobias, Judith, and the additions to Esther and Daniel. Finally—the crowning achievement of this ancient Biblical scholar—Jerome issued a fresh translation of the Old Testament made directly from the Hebrew original.

Not all these labors found complete or unanimous acceptance. Ruffinus and other men of influence were uncompromisingly opposed to Jerome and his work. Even Augustine, with his more profound but less critical mind, failed for a time to understand and appreciate. The various parts of Holy Scripture thus translated or revised were received differently: some readily, as the New Testament revision, some slowly, as the so-called "Gallican" Psalter (that revised from the Hexapla), and some not at all, as the Psalter

⁴⁹ *De doctr. christ.*, ii. 11.

⁵⁰ Preface to the Four Gospels, addressed to Damasus. "*Tot sunt enim exemplaria pene quot codices.*" As Van Ess urges, p. 16, Jerome must have intended by *exemplaria* something more than mere corruptions in the *codices*. Whether rightly or wrongly, Jerome had in mind nothing less than divergent texts.

⁵¹ Compare the expression in the well-known passage (*Comm. in Titum* c. III), "*omnes veteris legis libros emendare*". If this "all" is literally true, the rest of the books so revised have been lost; but then, Jerome complains to Augustine of this very thing: "*Pleraque prioris laboris amissimus*".

translated from the Hebrew.⁵² Side by side with these products of Jerome's scholarship, there lived on in the Church for centuries the Old Latin versions, until at length, by the 7th century, the great reviser's triumph was complete, though dearly bought by much admixture of elements incorporated from the earlier versions.

The Vulgate declared authentic by the Council of Trent, "that old and vulgar edition which has been approved by long use through so many centuries in the Church", the Vulgate of the official Clementine edition, is made up, therefore, of the following heterogeneous elements:

The Old Testament translated from the Hebrew by Jerome, but with considerable importations from the Old Latin versions and from Jerome's own earlier revisions according to the Greek (notably the entire Psalter, which is his second revision, according to the Hexaplaric text).

The Apocrypha, partly from Jerome's version, partly from the Old Latin versions.

The New Testament according to Jerome's restricted revision of the old versions.⁵³

Such being, in brief, the origin of the Vulgate, it is not hard to see how unfavorable were the conditions for attaining the best possible Latin text. Damasus, in whose pontificate Jerome commenced his task, died in 384. The Old Testament translation was not finished until 405. During all that time, as we learn from his letters, Jerome's work was being issued, frequently (so he says) snatched up be-

⁵² It is a curious fact that those parts of Jerome's work which the Church received apparently with the greatest readiness, were just the parts that were latest in finding universal acceptance. On the contrary, his Old Testament from the Hebrew, against which the whole Church at first seemed to be arrayed, attained general currency far earlier than his New Testament revision, and as a consequence the former escaped much of the corruption that overtook the latter through long-continued use side by side with the Old Latin.

⁵³ How restricted this revision was, may be learned from what is said below of the ecclesiastical criticism that Jerome dreaded, and likewise from many expressions in his works, such as the following: "*Ut his tantum, quae sensum videbantur mutare, correctis, reliqua manere pateremur, ut fuerunt*" (from the Preface to the Gospels).

fore he was through with its correction. Long passages were often executed in incredible haste. Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Solomon were completed in three days, Tobit in one day; "sometimes", he writes, "I reach the total of a thousand verses a day".⁵⁴ He used an amanuensis.⁵⁵ His eyesight was feeble.⁵⁶ Many Hebrew words he failed to understand. For his Latin Jerome himself apologizes:⁵⁷ "I beg of you, reader, not to demand that finished style which through long study of the Hebrew tongue I have lost."

But the greatest hindrance of all to an exact version was the stubbornness of the Latin Church in holding to what was familiar even though wrong. This prevented Jerome from exercising to the full his critical gifts or using the critical material that he possessed. Again and again he complains of this opposition to all change; indeed it was only the same spirit of obscurantism and envy of superior learning that culminated in the bitter invectives of Ruffinus, Palladius and his other personal enemies. He undertook the New Testament revision and all his earlier work in this fear of offending. The well-known passage in his preface to the Gospels addressed to Damasus shows the rigor and ignorance of the criticism he dreaded: "Who is there," he asks, "learned or unlearned, that will not break out with charges of forgery and sacrilege, if I dare to add, alter or amend anything in the ancient books?" This applies to his earlier work. But that the same dread affected even his latest work, his Old Testament translation, is shown where he says of it:⁵⁸ "Following the old interpretation, we have been unwilling to change anything that was not doing actual harm."

(3) But, besides the history of the Vulgate, and the cir-

⁵⁴ Comm. on Eph., book ii (at the beginning).

⁵⁵ Comm. on Gal., book iii (at the beginning): "*propter oculorum et totius corpusculi infirmitatem, manu mea ipse non scribo.*"

⁵⁶ On Ezekiel, xx.

⁵⁷ On Haggai, at the end.

⁵⁸ Epist. to Sun. and Fretel., he writes: "*De Hebraeo transferens magis me LXX interpretum consuetudine captavi.*"

cumstances attending its origin, there is one other reason for the unfavorable verdict passed upon it. The Greek texts from which much of it was made were corrupt.

In the New Testament there stood at Jerome's command a good Greek text. But it was particularly in the New Testament that Jerome was bound most closely to the Latin text already current in the Church. Now these Old Latin versions were early in their origin, and for purposes of textual criticism to-day they rank very high as a means of confirming the earliest readings of the best Greek manuscripts. But as current in the Church in Jerome's day, these did not present what could in any sense be called a good text. They were faulty in three ways, through errors in translation, errors in transmission, and mixture with one another. The Fathers frequently point out their shortcomings. Jerome's and Augustine's complaints of them are well-known. Hilary's complaint is less often quoted:⁵⁹ "The Latin translation, ignorant of the real force of what is said, has introduced great obscurity, not discerning the right meaning of an ambiguous expression." And Tertullian⁶⁰ punningly calls the current version an "eversion", so completely does it destroy the force of the original. Yet it was to this Old Latin text that Jerome must needs adhere in his New Testament, altering as little as possible and curbing his critical powers lest he offend through novelty.⁶¹

In the Old Testament there existed three different texts among which the Latin translator might choose his original: the Hebrew, the old Greek Septuagint, and the Greek text of Origen's Hexapla, with its asterisks and obelisks to indicate divergences between the Hebrew and the Septuagint readings. As has been seen, Jerome made use of each of

⁵⁹ *Tract. in Psalm. 138* (43), quoted by Van Ess, p. 9.

⁶⁰ *De monogam., c. xi*, quoted by Van Ess, p. 9.

⁶¹ Jerome says that he selected for his revision of the Gospels Greek manuscripts "that were old, but did not differ much from the form of the Latin text". "*Veterum, nec quae multum a lectionis latinae consuetudinis discreparent*" (from Preface to Gospels).

these at different times. Where he used the first, the Hebrew, he had before him almost precisely the same text as that of our Hebrew Bibles to-day, a good text, altogether the best attainable even with the means now at our command or then at the command of Jerome.⁶² Where he used the Septuagint, he had but a corrupted text, vitiated by centuries of transmission, and even in its best state often unintelligible in Psalm and Prophet. It was undoubtedly due to its inherent obscurity that the "Roman" Psalter (that made first and from the Septuagint), "was soon corrupted by scribes and became more defective than the former unrevised text".⁶³ Finally, where Jerome used the Hexaplaric Greek text, he had one that was theoretically good, but practically the worst of all. Both in the Greek and in the Latin manuscripts, the asterisks and obelisks became hopelessly displaced through the error, ignorance or indifference of the scribes, and "the last state was worse than the first". While intending the best for the Biblical text, Origen actually introduced more confusion than that which he set about his laborious task to remedy. The obscurity of the Psalter in the Vulgate of to-day, and in the Douai Version made from it, is due to the fact that it is the Old Latin Psalter of the first ages of the Church, translated originally from the Septuagint manuscripts current in the Western Church, then revised in accordance with the Hexapla, then mixed with readings from Jerome's earlier Psalter, and finally corrupted by scribal errors through centuries of transmission in the Latin.⁶⁴

⁶² The old charges of intentional Jewish corruptions, pressed by earlier Catholic writers, have long since been exploded, unless possibly in one or two passages.

⁶³ Van Ess, p. 105, who quotes Jerome's Prologue to Psalm ii: "*Quod rursum videtur scriptorum vitio depravatum, plusque antiquum errorem, quam novam emendationem valere.*"

⁶⁴ What wonder, then, is it that we find in the Douai Psalter such monstrosities as the following:

Ps. lxx (lxiv). 10 (11), for "Thou makest it soft with showers: Thou blessest the springing thereof,"

Douai reads: "Inebriate her rivers; in her drops so she shall rejoice springing".

In the light of these historical facts, drawn from the writings of the Fathers, confirmed by examination of the Vulgate itself, and marshalled by a Catholic writer, what is to be said of Heinrich's boast quoted above, that in the Vulgate we have "on the whole the best and most trustworthy text, surpassing not only other versions, but even the existing original-texts in correctness and trustworthiness?"

Such then is the text that formed the basis of the Douai Version. The comparison of it with the Hebrew and Greek originals was, as has been remarked, no idle boast, for evidences are forthcoming throughout, but particularly in the New Testament, that these translators felt free to have recourse to the Greek because of the multiplicity of Latin readings.⁶⁵ "We bind not ourselves", say they, "to the points of any one copy, print or edition of the vulgar Latin, in places of no controversy, but follow the pointing most agreeable to the Greek and to the Fathers' commentaries." "We translate sometime the word that is in the Latin margin, and not that in the text, when by the Greek or the Fathers we see it is a manifest fault of the writers hereto-

Ps. lxviii (lxvii). 15 (16), "A mountain of God is the mountain of Bashan; A high mountain is the mountain of Bashan."

Douai reads: "A mountain crudded as cheese, a fat mountain."

Ps. lxxii (ixxi). 16, "There shall be abundance (margin, a handful) of grain in the earth upon the top of the mountains."

Douai reads: "There shall be a firmament in the earth in the tops of the mountains."

(From Eadie, "The English Bible", vol. ii., p. 144, where see numerous other examples.)

⁶⁵ Bellarmine, the leading Jesuit theologian of the 16th century, allows recourse to the text in the original tongues under these four conditions: when the Latin text (1) seems to show an error of copyists; (2) exhibits uncertainty of reading through variation in the Latin codices; (3) contains an expression of double signification; or (4) may receive a fuller understanding by comparison of the original. It should not be forgotten that the first edition of the Rhemish Testament (1582) appeared a decade before the publication of those official editions of the Vulgate which had been called for by the Council of Trent. The New Testament text of the Douai Bible (1609-10), however, is said to be conformed to the text of the official Clementine Vulgate.

fore, that mistook one word for another." In a word, their practice was better than their theory, for, as has been well pointed out, their "critical rules and opinions are characterized by a peculiar lubricity. Their statement is that the Latin does usually agree with the Greek text; that any disagreement is often found to be coincident with some old copy, 'as may be seen in Stephens' margin', and that the adversaries sometimes accept such marginal readings; that where Greek copies exhibit a different text, the Vulgate is found to agree with patristic quotations; that emendations may be resorted to if such authority be wanting, or recourse may be had to the Latin Fathers, and if in this appeal discrepancy should be found, the blame is to be laid to 'the great diversity and multitude' of Latin copies. So that in this easy and incoherent way of moving from post to pillar, as often as their position is felt to be untenable, the superiority of the Latin translation to the Greek original is demonstrated."⁶⁶

The Version.

The most immediately obvious difference which the Protestant notices between the Catholic Bible and his own Bible is in their canon; the most surprising difference is in their text; the most *pervasive* and *characteristic* difference is to be found in the motives and methods of their version, that is, in the actual work of translating into the English tongue their respective originals.

The motives and methods of translators may be compared both abstractly, as formulated in the principles avowed in their prefaces and other explanatory writings, and concretely, as exhibited in their practice, their actual productions. As just intimated, the translators of the Catholic Bible differ from the translators of the Protestant Bible in both motives and methods, both avowed principles and evident practice.

First, their motives.

The long prefaces originally published with the Rheims

⁶⁶ Eadie, vol. ii., p. 128.

New Testament and the Douai Old Testament set forth the intention of those English exiles who, "having compassion to see our beloved countrymen, with extreme danger of their souls, use only such profane translations, and erroneous men's mere phantasies, for the pure and blessed word of truth, much also moved thereunto by the desires of many devout persons: have set forth, for you (benign readers) the New Testament to begin withal, trusting that it may give occasion to you, after diligent perusing thereof, to lay away at least such of their impure versions as hitherto you have been forced to occupy." Now the many sections of these prefaces devoted to an elaborate attack upon the general circulation of vernacular Bibles seem to prepare the way but ill for any vernacular Bible, but they at least serve this purpose: to underscore with a hundred-fold emphasis this statement of motive when at length it is given. The evident hostility to all vulgarizing of this esoteric treasure of God's Word (this "pearl" that must not be "cast before swine"),⁶⁷ is in fact the exact measure of the compelling force that urged these translators to what was in itself an unwelcome task. So strong, then, was this purpose in them, to undo the harm that existing English versions were doing.

The impression thus openly created in the prefaces is only deepened by the study of what they produced. The character of its numerous controversial notes may be judged from this estimate passed upon them by the Roman Catholic priest, Alexander Geddes (1787):⁶⁸ "The translation is accompanied with virulent annotations against the Protestant religion, and is manifestly calculated to support a system, not of genuine catholicity, but of transalpine popery."⁶⁹

⁶⁷Similarly, Cardinal Hosius, "*De expresso verbo Dei*," I, p. 640: "*Laicis lectionem Scr. permittere est sanctum canibus dare et margaritas ante porcos projicere.*"

⁶⁸Author of the learned treatise "*De vulgariis S. Scr. versionum vitiis*", freely cited by Van Ess, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹The original New Testament notes were prepared by Richard Bristow. Their character may be judged from this latest chapter in their history: when reprinted at Dublin a century ago (by McNamara-Coyne, 1816, with Archbishop Troy's approbation), they aroused so

On the other hand, a careful inspection of the text of their version reveals the substantial truthfulness of that solemn asseveration with which their preface to the New Testament closes: "Thus we have endeavoured . . . to deal most sincerely before God and man, in translating and expounding the most sacred text of the Holy Testament." Allow them their uncritical Vulgate-text, with its variety of readings to support whatever was most congenial to the Romish system; grant them the methods of translating which they adopt and defend; and one must admit that on the whole they have "dealt most sincerely in translating the most sacred text". While distinctively Romish ecclesiastical terms are retained, such as sacrament, penance, priest, this is in line with an avowed principle of their method. If "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" (John 2:4) is rendered: "What is to me and thee, woman?" in order to avoid even the appearance of a slight to the Blessed Virgin, this also is but a literalism and in accord with another principle laid down in the preface.⁷⁰ Thus motive and method are intermingled in such a way that while the method is defended on independent grounds, the real reason for its

much indignation in Great Britain that the matter was brought up in Parliament, and the Archbishop of Dublin and the rest of the Roman Clergy were constrained to withdraw their approbation. These annotations frequently descend from doctrines to personalities; for example, the "two masters" of Matt. vi. 24 are explained as "Christ and Calvin", with more alliterative skill than exegetical soundness. Some notes that do not assail the Protestants maintain peculiar Roman Catholic doctrines, in a spirit that may be judged from the following examples (cited by Dr. Eadie, vol. ii, p. 145):—On II Tim. iv: "The parable also of the men sent into the vineyard proveth that heaven is our own right, bargained for and wrought for, and accordingly paid unto us as our hire at the day of judgment." On Rev. vi. 9: "Saints be present at their tombs and relics." On Rev. xvii. 6: "Putting heretics to death is not to shed the blood of the saints." "Heresy and apostasy from the Catholic faith punishable by death."

⁷⁰ Later Catholic editors are less fair than the Rhemists in this passage. Both Haydock's and Troy's Bibles read: "Woman, what is that to me and to thee?" Of the alternative interpretations permitted by the wording of the original edition (and so explained in an accompanying note), these editors have thus adopted unreservedly the inferior choice, simply because it better agrees with Roman Catholic dogma.

adoption is to be sought in the motive. Every point is to be made, in the text, that can honestly be made, against Protestantism and for Roman Catholicism.

Of the motives of later editors of the Douai Bible the following may be said. In accordance with the changed spirit of the times, the English Catholic Bible was to be made less virulent, less strikingly sectarian and partisan. Yet in accordance with the purpose of its original translators, this "minority Bible" was not to lose its identity by yielding its distinctive features, nor fail in its mission of counteracting the baleful influence of Protestant Bibles. The approved English Bibles of Catholic America to-day show the working of both these motives. No concession is made on the canon, and practically none on the text; the changes in translation are more to modernize the language than to broaden the spirit; the chief concession lies wholly outside the version as such, in the omission of the now indefensible prefaces and in the alteration of the original annotations. Yet it is emphatically to-day, as it was three centuries ago, the Bible of a sect; as we have had a Unitarian Bible, and a Baptist Bible, so in the Douai Version we have a Roman Catholic Bible.⁷¹

But, second, different motives have led to the adoption of different methods. It is therefore to the consideration of these methods of the Catholic translators that we are now

⁷¹It is customary now to print on the fly-leaf of Catholic Bibles, together with the certified approbation of the ecclesiastics having jurisdiction, two papal pronouncements of the 18th century in favor of vernacular Bibles: (1) the decree of Benedict XIV (1757) which permits "to all the faithful to read the Holy Scriptures in their mother-tongue, if the translations are approved by the Apostolic See, or provided with notes from the Fathers or from Catholic scholars"; and (2) the letter of Pius VI to Archbishop Martini (1778) commending his Italian version of the Bible. It may be remarked in passing that this Italian Bible appeared in 23 quarto volumes. Hardly a popular Bible, this! A later edition of it, without notes (1818), was at once put "on the index" of prohibited books. "Furthermore, the Encyclical of Leo XII (1824) makes no exceptions in its denunciation of the "poisonous pastures" of vernacular Bibles, by whose publication "more evil than advantage will arise because of the rashness of men".

brought; first, to their avowed principles, and second, to the faithlessness and success with which these principles are carried out.

"We are very precise and religious", say the Rhemists, "in following our copy, the old vulgar approved Latin: not only in sense, which we hope we always do, but sometimes in the very words also and phrases." Again, "we have used no partiality for the disadvantage of our adversaries, nor no more license than is sufferable in translating: . . . acknowledging with St. Jerome, that in other writings it is enough to give in translation, sense for sense, but that in Scriptures, lest we miss the sense, we must keep the very words." And again, "knowing that the good and simple may easily be seduced by some few obstinate persons of perdition, . . . and finding by experience this same saying of St. Augustine to be most true, 'If the prejudice of any erroneous persuasion preoccupate the mind, whatsoever the Scripture hath to the contrary, men take it for a figurative speech': for these causes, and somewhat to help the faithful reader in the difficulties of divers places, we have also set forth reasonable large annotations."

Here is a profession of three principles in the method of making a version: first, honest rendering; second, literal rendering; and third, polemic and doctrinal notes. Does a candid examination of the version show actual adherence to the principles thus advertised?

It does. In treating of the motives we have already seen the sincerity of the Rhemists in the rendering of their text such as it was. Through all the violent attacks of English Protestants, this boast has never been proved idle. If the English form in which, for example, they clothed Christ's language to Mary in John 2:4 is an expression less offensive to ears accustomed to hearing Mary's name coupled with the attributes of divinity, it is at least no falsification of the original; it is too literal, it is un-English, its Catholic motive is transparent; but it is not dishonest.

Literalism is the most marked characteristic of the Douai

Bible. Being made from the Latin, this literalism means Latinity of phraseology, and as it is carried to an extreme, it means Latinity of diction to a degree unequalled by any popular book in our tongue. There are, it is true, many good Saxon words and phrases. A few of these are even used in this version for the first time; the bulk of them are borrowed from earlier English versions: in the Old Testament mainly from Coverdale, who like the Catholics translated this Testament from the Latin, and in the New Testament, strange to say, predominatingly from the men of Geneva, the most Protestant of all the translators.⁷² Yet the distinctive tone of the Douai Bible is its excessive use of Latin words carried over bodily into English, either graced with an English termination, or sometimes quite unchanged, like *gratis* and *depositum*. Master Fulke makes fun of their professed intention to transfer into English the Greek words retained by the Latin translators and so present in the Vulgate. "As for Greek terms", he writes,⁷³ "which may well enough be expressed in the English tongue, we see no cause why we should retain them, as *Parasceve*, *azymes*, *neophyte*. And if you had so religious a care to use all the Greek words in your English translation which you find in your vulgar Latin text, then you would as well have translated these and such like Greek words as your Latin text hath: *Magi*, Mages, and not as you have done, Sages; *Ecclesia*, Ecclese, not Church; *Architrichlinus*, Architrichline, not Chief Steward; *Encoenia*, Encenes, not Dedication;

⁷² It is but very recently that systematic comparison has revealed the closeness of the bonds by which the Rhemish Testament is bound, on the one side to the 16th century versions that preceded it, and on the other side to the Authorized Version of 1611. See "*The Part of Rheims in the Making of the English Bible*", by J. G. Carleton, D.D., Oxford, 1902. This writer gives a table containing over six hundred passages in the New Testament common to the Authorized, Rheims and Geneva versions. And besides these, there are doubtless some others common to Rheims and Geneva, that were not subsequently adopted by the Authorized Version.

⁷³ "*A Confutation of the Rhemish Testament*", Preface. A little freedom has been used in recasting Fulke's sentences for greater clearness.

Dyscolis, Discoles, not Wayward; *Pyra*, Pyre, not Fire; *Naclerus*, Naclere, not Master of the Ship; *Typhonicus*, Typhonic, not Tempestuous; *Bolis*, Bole, not Sound; *Artemon*, Artemon, not Mainsail; *Dithalassus*, Dithalass, not a Place between the Two Seas: where, if we should pick quarrels as you do against us, we should make ourselves to all wise people ridiculous, as you are."

A selected example will show to readers unfamiliar with the Rheims Testament the practical effect of this principle of literalism. In the Epistle to the Ephesians, chapter three, Paul is made to say: "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace, among the Gentiles to evangelize the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to illuminate all men what is the dispensation of the sacrament hidden from worlds in God, who created all things: that the manifold wisdom of God may be notified to the Princes and Potestats in the celestial by the Church, according to the prefinition of worlds." What wonder that the Protestants of their day were tempted to taunt them with intentional obscurity for the simple English reader, as where in the address prefixed to the Authorized Version we read: "We have shunned the obscurity of the Papists, in their *azymes*, *tunike*, *rationall*, *holocausts*, *prepuce*, *pasche*, and a number of such like, whereof their late translation is full, and that of purpose to darken the sense, that since they must needs translate the Bible, yet by the language thereof it may be kept from being understood." Fulke, blunt as always, says:^{73a} "Not the desire of sincerity, but rather of obscurity, hath made you thrust in a great number of words, not only Hebrew or Syriac, which are found in the Greek text, but also Greek and Latin words, leaving the English words of the same, which by long use are well known and familiar in the English tongue." Severe as are these arraignments, it cannot be denied that the Rhemish translators threw themselves open to them by their slavish adherence to the Latin before them. It is no discredit to their skill in English, for many a felicitous turn

^{73a} *Op. cit.*

proves mastery of their mother-tongue. Rather, it is but another evidence of that cramped and illiberal view of the uses of Scripture which is openly avowed in their preface, but which Catholics of this later day are at great pains, if not to contradict, at least to modify and explain away.

Such was, and such remains, an all-pervasive, obtrusive blemish of a version of which a distinguished Protestant like Alford could say:⁷⁴ "With many great defects, it is by far the most carefully made of all in our language", (that is, up till 1868, the year he wrote these words); and of which an authority on the English Bible like Dr. Moulton of Cambridge could write:⁷⁵ "Every other English version is to be preferred to this, if it must be taken as a whole; no other English version will prove more instructive to the student who will take the pains to separate what is good and useful from what is ill-advised and wrong".

Of the third principle, the association of polemic and doctrinal notes with the sacred Scripture, enough has perhaps been said already. Catholics have taken a step in the right direction, in modifying the tone of the original notes. It remains for them to acknowledge the justice of that principle upon which Protestants now firmly stand: an unmixed Word of God; a Bible without note, interpretative heading, controversial preface or appendix; a volume that in its canon, text and rendering presents to its reader as nearly as possible that, and only that, which "men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit".

If there is any *unity* discoverable in the complex impression left by the detailed exhibition of these differences between the English Bible of the Catholic and that of the Protestant, is it not to be found in that one great outstanding contrast between the Romish and the Protestant interpretations of Christianity? Romanism seeks to save the world by the spread of a single, infallible, visible Church; Protestantism, by the spread of the Gospel of God's grace in Christ.

⁷⁴ *Contemporary Review*, 1868, VIII, 332.

⁷⁵ *"History of the English Bible"*, p. 188.

The two views of the vernacular Bible spring from these contrasted views of the essence of Christianity.

To the Romanist, the Bible is one of the sources of the Church's doctrine, written by men of the Church (of course under the Spirit's inspiration), committed to the care of the Church, authenticated by the Church, interpreted infallibly through the head of the Church, designed for the uses of the Church. As such, the Bible for the men of Rheims and Douai numbered such books in its canon as the Church of Rome pronounced divine. It existed in its only authentic form in a (hypothetical) perfect edition of the Vulgate, the text of the Roman Church. It was to be translated and issued in the vernacular, if at all, only in such forms of speech, at such times, and with such interpretative accompaniments, as might best serve the Church's immediate need.

On the other hand, the Bible is to the Protestant the message of God to mankind about salvation, promised and prepared for, granted and urged. As such, the Bible for the makers of the Protestant version, in all its various editions, is the book of the Saviour, containing the books vouched for, where possible, by Christ Himself, where that was chronologically impossible, by those who lived nearest to Him. Its only authentic form is that given it primitively by its divine Author, while present editions are more or less authentic only according as they more or less exactly reproduce that form. And it is to be faithfully translated into every tongue of earth, left quite unmixed with the words of men, and by the most practical form given the widest possible circulation. It is by such means, the Protestant believes, that the salvation of God can best be spread, which lies indeed in a "kingdom", but one that is "not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit".

Too much, however, must not be made of this contrast in ultimate *principia* as determining necessarily the attitude of Catholic and Protestant respectively toward these problems of Biblical scholarship and dissemination. For there have been not a few in the Roman Catholic Church, like Leander

van Ess, who, as right in their conclusions as they were illogical in their processes, have come out squarely for a vernacular Bible constructed wholly, in canon, text and version, on the principles that have yielded us our Protestant Bible. To the words of van Ess⁷⁶ would that all Christians, Catholic and Protestant, could say a hearty amen!—"As sure as it is that the hostile assertion by each Christian confession that it alone possesses the true Bible, has done much to sunder Christian from Christian and to break the bond of love and peace; just so surely will it come to pass that Christians will draw nearer to each other, if the belief becomes more general that all Christian confessions have one and the same Bible, and at length even one and the same version in their own tongue, and not, like children, childishly quarrel about rival Church-versions; if in the Catholic Church the distribution of the Bible becomes more wide-spread, while in the Protestant Church there returns that old pious belief in the Bible, which the unchristian spirit of the age is striving to destroy."

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

⁷⁶ In the preface to his "*Geschichte der Vulgata*".

THE RELIGION OF THE EMPEROR JULIAN.

Julian the Emperor, of the dynasty of the "Great" Constantine whose nephew he was, will always be an object of wide concern and curious interest. The student of the History of Christianity no less than the philosopher, the politician and historian as well as the classicist, cannot but approach his figure and personality with many questions. Apostasy from Christianity is indeed not nearly so common as is the quiet denial or the practical renunciation of its noble and transcendental postulates, but here we deal with one who after some substantial acquaintance with historical Christianity, a pupil of Eusebius, though probably never more than a very young and merely academic Christian, was won for paganism largely through philosophical influences as well as by the glamor which overwhelmed his young and eager mind and by the power inherent in what he certainly considered a surpassing and triumphant culture.

"Paganism"—how easily do we pen the word, how glibly often do we utter the term! Many years of earnest and exact reading have at last taught the present writer to disabuse his mind and to redeem his historical vision from much of the idealizing glamor which like an iridescent film—but still a film—has somehow come to cling to the surface of the classical world in its distant reflection. Fine letters and exquisite marbles and bronzes and architecture, as well as the dead mechanism of sheer tradition, have much to do with this artificial and grossly unhistorical perversion of perspective.

From the fine and wearisome theories spun out by archaeologists and other aesthetical persons concerning Greek Religion so called, let us turn back for a moment, to certain data furnished by an earnest devotee of both that culture and that religion, Pausanias.¹ In him we have a

¹ Cf. the writer's *Testimonium Animae* 1908, pp. sqq.

veritable exemplar of the renaissance generally associated with Hadrian—Pausanias, I say, type of the positive and affirmative side of that wide movement, the negative side of which is so admirably represented by those crackling thorns under the pot, *viz.*, Lucian of Samosata. Pausanias is a positive admirer of old things Greek, their ritual and their temples, their lore and their legends. His appropriation of Herodotus as model is not at all artificial and shallow; rather is it due to a genuine affinity. For Pausanias too believed in the Anger and Envy of the gods, and all the data of current and actual worship in older Greece he gathered with his own ears, with his own eyes, preferring to spread in his notebooks the lore and legend delivered by the local *ἐξηγηταί* such as he could find wherever he went. The grosser forms of sin and evil as well as cleansing rites (*καθαρμοί*) were to him very real and very important things.

The most impressive lesson of his detailed and precise account is this, that the crass and gross conception of Nature-forces, embellished indeed and curiously intertwined with local and dynastic legends of great age, had not even, in the practical tradition of the people at large, been touched by the refinements and the allegories of Greek Philosophy or by a few forms of esoteric rites such as those of Eleusis or the Orphic mysteries. Worship and the very justification of temples and shrines were clearly bound up with the preservation and presence of the idol or *agalma*. Anniversaries of a kind of pantomimic reënactment of certain legends in the tradition or original story of the tutelary or particular local deity had an important place in this so-called religion. The oldest idol everywhere was also held the most genuine, and therefore the most potent and the most trustworthy for the worshipper. Those then most highly prized for genuine prayer and sacrifice were not as a rule the splendid sculptures of Pheidias and Skopas, Polykleitos, Lysippos and Praxiteles, but the venerable figures of old, carved (and polished) wood (*ξύανα*). We deal, in Pausanias, with a

motley variety of local cults and institutions, that reveal but the faintest contact with conscience or conduct or spiritual things of any sort.

From this cursory survey of the Hadrianic epoch let us advance, roughly two hundred years further, into the generation of the Constantines, of Athanasius and Basil the Great, of the boyhood of Jerome, and of the emperor Julian. I propose to submit to my readers an outline of Julian's Fourth Oration, on the theme of the regal Helios, or strictly, to the king the Sun, or Sungod (*εἰς τὸν βασιλέα Ἡλίου*).

"I am," says he (p. 130, c Ed. Spanheim), "a follower of Helios the king." From childhood on, he said, he had entertained a deep craving for the faculty of looking straight at the Sun. All the constellations of the firmament had engrossed his soul in those tender years. Of the Christian training of his youth he speaks scornfully: "Let there be oblivion of that darkness."² At the present time (he was about thirty when he wrote this) his highest ideal of character and life is the philosopher to whom the treasures of wisdom and sacred lore are open; but he is content with his own albeit inferior lot in life, that of a regent and ruler.

The Sun (i. e., the precosmic archetype of the sun) is the creator of souls which men choose³ before incarnation. May Hermes and the Muses and Apollo Musagetes guide me in my eulogy. This Universe (132, c) held together by the providence of God is eternal both as to beginning and future. Julian now enters upon a distinctly Neoplatonic delineation of things.

The primal and absolute ruler of all, whether one may call him that which is beyond sense-perception, or the Idea of the Actual World, or The One, or The Good, with Plato, is the cause of all, being a simple (non-composite) substance in itself. Now of the creations or productions of the primal One we must consider the Sun, central amid the

² λήθη δὲ ἔστω τοῦ σκότους ἐκείνου (131, a).

³ προαιρούντας 131, c.

sensuous and creative causes, as something which issued out of the Divine Substance, in all ways resembling it. This Plato too⁴ calls "the offspring of the Good, which the Good begot as rationally commensurate with itself; exactly what it is in the sphere of intelligence as related to intelligence and the objects of intelligence, such too is the Sun in the sphere of sight as related to the faculty of sight and to the objects of sight."

As the Idea of the Good rules in the Intelligible World, so in the world of sense-perception. The Good endows the gods of the Intelligible World with beauty, substance and perfection. Now this disk, our Sun, two removes from its creator and itself in the Third Category of Being, holds an analogous position in the world of sense-phenomena.

At this point (134, a) Julian cites with commendation the doctrine of the Phenicians, "wise and knowing in matters of divinity," that the all-prevailing luminosity of the Sun is elemental energy. It bestows not only the power of sight but also the visibility of objects. It makes night and day and is the moving power of the universe, specifically among the planets. And we assume by a parity of reasoning that in the world of pure intelligence and of the gods of that pure intelligence⁵ there is some such central and dominating body of which our Sun is a mere material image. We see then, Julian's reasons; why the priests of Cyprus allot joint altars to the Sun and to Zeus. Really these are identical. Zeus, Sarapis, Hades: three terms for one substance. By Sarapis or Hades (136, a) we mean that Being invisible and comprehensible to Intelligence alone, to whom Plato says that the Souls ascend, viz. the souls of those who have led the best and most righteous life on earth. We must conceive of that Judge, not that one which the myths persuade us to shiver at, but the gentle and gracious one, who utterly frees the soul from incarnation—the power indeed,

⁴ Rep. 6, 508 b.

⁵ ἐν τοῖς νοεροῖς θεοῖς διακόσμησιν ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἀνάλογον ἔχειν τῇ τοιάντῃ τάξει. 134 c.

which draws the Souls upward into the universe of the Intelligible (ἐπὶ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον). Julian claims to find this doctrine even in Hesiod and Homer, where (Il. 8, 24) Zeus single-handed threatens and defies the collective and united Olympians. "Does he not, in these words, endow the Sun, in addition to the quality of absolute power, with that of the faculty of accomplishment?"⁶

Next he takes up the central position of the Sun, then its Unity, its power of Unification. While the creator is one (140, a), the creative divinities in heaven are many. One of these is the creative force of the Sun. The purity of its light is patterned after its analogous prototype in the Intelligible World.

Next Julian discourses upon (142, c) the powers and potencies of the divine Sun. "Zeus, then, the creative force, is merely another side or property of the Sun. So too Apollo, i. e. the knowledge of the divine Sun about his own essence and substance is likely to be better: it is here that the Sun thinks with exquisite clearness. As for Dionysos, his service and function really is not anything distinct from the Sun. Dionysos is the interpreter for us of the fairest ideas connected with the Sun-god. Again the Sun is Apollo Musagetes in containing within himself all the principles of the most beautiful intellectual blending."⁷ Further (144, b) since the Sun perfects for us the life of good order, it begets Asklepios in the Universe, and it has him with himself even in the precosmic world of Ideas.⁸

Next Julian takes up the Seven Spheres. To these the

⁶ The reader here has a specimen of that religious and speculative interpretation of Homer, which Porphyry practiced and which may be observed in the Vergilian exegesis of Servius and Macrobius.

⁷ We see the Neoplatonists of that generation were a fervid sect; much of this stuff was incessantly rehearsed and was significant for the sectaries of that cult, to us remote ones it is often barely intelligible.

⁸ Plato indeed is "great" to the imperial Neoplatonist, but the "renowned demigod Iamblichus" is held by Julian in even higher esteem. It is to him that the nephew of Constantine and former pupil of Eusebius credits his own initiation into the doctrine of the sect.

movement of Heaven itself is added as the eighth and the eternal cycle of Birth and Death as the ninth.

What are the Dioscuri? They are the beginnings of Hellenic myths, who see light and life on alternate days. The deeper meaning is that the Antipodes see the Sun alternately with ourselves. Okeanos, as Homer has it (Il. 14, 246)

Ὠκεανῶν, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται

is the source both of mortal men and blessed gods. Further on, Julian turns to the twelve constellations of the Zodiac. These again, each of them, may be divided by Three: thus we have the deeper meaning of the Three Graces (*Charites*): "these too on earth (148, d) imitate the Cycle through their figures (*ἀγάλματα*). But why traverse the entire list of Olympian names, since all these appellations belong to the Sun? For men perceived his divinity from his works and from the benefactions which he bestowed upon men, *benefactions which to their perception were the individual gods.*" And the host of these are collected and unified and led by being assigned to the control of Athena Pronoia (Providence). The myth says that she came from the head of Zeus, but we say that Providence entirely issues from the entirety of king Sun, we differing from the myth in this that we assign the issue of Providence to his entire Being, "whereas in the other respects we hold that the Sun differs not at all from Zeus, we agree with the ancient legend" (149, b). And Athena bestows upon mankind these boons: Wisdom, and the Faculty of Perception, and the Crafts. Her favorite abode are the citadels because she has established political life through wisdom.

Aphrodite—here he cites with commendation Phenician mythology—is that side and faculty of the Sun, which endows the earth with productiveness and causes the maintenance of organic life. In Edessa (150, c) the figures of Monimos and Arzizos are placed with Helios: thereby as

Iamblichus⁹ says they intimate (*αἰνίττεσθαι*) that Monimos is Hermes and Arzizos Ares, assessors of the Sun.

Further as to the specific souls, individual men in fact, Helios causes their spiritual blessings in this way: he endows them with judgment and justice, and he leads them to their true aim and end. For Aristotle¹⁰ says: "To the Sun too we owe showers and winds and the beneficent activities of the skies."

But these benefactions are merely physical and terrestrial. Still greater are these: the Sun frees the souls from their bodies (152, b) and leads them upward to those substances which are kin to God. The Heavens, Plato¹¹ said, have come to be for us a teacher of wisdom. They teach us the science of numbers and magnitudes. We learn much from the light of the Moon which is given to this goddess from the Sun. From this observation we advance, aiming at ever greater harmony with the source of light. Again the Sun's fellow-ruler Apollo raised up oracles everywhere on the earth and furnished wise statutes to commonwealths. It was he who through the Greek colonies civilized the greater part of the civilized world and caused it that the Romans were more readily obeyed.¹² The same emanating forces and potencies of the Sun have blessed Rome likewise, viz. Aesculapius, Venus, Minerva—Venus joined to Minerva, for thus the wise Romans in their historical progression perpetuated their own kind.

Now not only *Jupiter* dwells among us (153, d) on the

⁹ The emperor here avows himself directly a follower of Iamblichus, if not a mere excerptor of his works: *παρ' οὗ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἐκ πολλῶν μικρὰ ἐλάβομεν.*

¹⁰ Physic. II 2, p. 194, b 13: *ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος.*

¹¹ Epinomis 977 a.

¹² At this point Julian in whom many things were fused, fervently though quite unhistorically claims for the Romans in matters of religion a close adoption of things Greek "from beginning to end." (153, a). The very quality and feature of Rome which assuredly was her own, viz. her political system and efficiency was to the glowing enthusiasm of the young emperor a further proof of the essential Hellenism of Rome.

Capitol with Minerva and Venus, but Apollo too has a special habitation on the Palatine. All these are merely diversified appellations of the Sun. Now we descendants of Romulus and Aeneas have a particular relation to him, through Venus and through Mars, with the legend of the she-wolf. Our Founder indeed was a martial deity who is said to have consorted with Silvia when she brought water for ablutions for Vesta: the Soul of the god Quirinus descended¹³ from the Sungod. So the ascent or return likewise of the same Romulus is quite plausible to Julian.

As for Numa the vestals by his ordination preserve the fire which the Earth owes to the Sun. Only we (the Romans) and the Egyptians measure the segments of the year not by the moon but by the movements of the Sun. So too Numa set the beginning of the civil year for the month of March when the regal Sun again rises higher in the heavens. And may the Sungod truly make our Rome an eternal city! Not less fervid was Julian's final turn to Iamblichus, who for the young Hellenist and Neoplatonist was as one who had found the finality and the consummation of human wisdom.

The "oration," which has many formal points of contact with a sermon, closes with a prayer which may profitably be set down here with particular precision:

"And let me bring worship to the immortal gods, to the extent of my power¹⁴ not in connection with the sacrifices alone, but also in his (the Sun's) acceptance of the pious acclamations directed toward the Gods. And thirdly I do pray that in return for this devotion, the king of all, the Sun, may become gracious unto me and grant me a good life and more perfect understanding and a divine intelligence and a fated quittance most gentle from life, at the proper time, and ascent to him after this life, and a sojourn with him, by preference for all eternity: but if this

¹³κατήλθεν: (I54, c). We see here the facile theory of Emanations in a concrete case.

¹⁴A reminiscence of Hesiod, Works and Days 336: "καδ' δύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἰέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι . ."

should be greater than my career in life shall warrant, then (he may grant me) very many periods¹⁵ and for many years' duration each."

In this discourse of the young emperor we have a veritable microcosm, in which Religion, Science, History, Culture, Art, Philosophy as well as foreign pagan cults are curiously compounded and blended, *the essence indeed in which the pagan world in its last, its Neoplatonic phase once more seemed to summarize and to reaffirm all that it had so long held precious*. And this is the world in which Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose lived and labored.

But with all the fine gossamer of the new Platonism the young imperial enthusiast still strove to lead in the traditional forms of pagan ritual and worship. When his cousin Constantius, the senior emperor and real source of power, died at Mopsukrēnē in Cilicia, late in the autumn of 361 A. D., the throne was to be Julian's but for a little more than one year and a half. Now even as recently as February 356 there has been issued an imperial decree (or "*constitutio*"), issued indeed with Julian (the cryptopagan) named as junior co-regent—a decree imposing capital punishment for sacrificing to, or worshipping, the idols of the past.¹⁶ When at last Julian was able to throw off the mask he forbade to the Christians even the work of gaining adherents from among the pagans still remaining. His efforts to restore the temple of Jerusalem (Ammianus 23, 1, 2) with lavish appropriations and under the curatorship of a man who had governed great provinces—are familiar. The aim of this measure was quite obvious. A curious foil to this was the other decree, to deprive Christian *grammatici* and *rhetores* of their professional posts.¹⁷ Perhaps he sought to bring to bear his strong desire to have them abandon Christianity: at least he intended to confine higher edu-

¹⁵ *I. e.*, of incarnation.

¹⁶ Cod. Theodos. xvi, 10, 5: *Pœna capitis subiugari præcipimus eos, quos operam Sacrificiis dare et colere simulacra constiterit.*

¹⁷ Even Ammian 22, 10, 7 cites it in a censorious manner: "*Illud autem erat inclemens, observandum perenni silentio, quo arcebat docere rhetoricos et grammaticos ritus Christiani cultores.*"

cation to positive non-Christian minds and lips. Perhaps he naïvely believed that Christianity doomed to non-culture would ultimately perish of itself, or that at least it would become enfeebled and impotent in the actual struggle of irreconcilable systems. His conviction that Hellenic culture in this fusion with paganism and in this finality of Neoplatonism might spread once more over the Mediterranean world was obviously held firmly. Whatever an imperial purse and an elemental enthusiasm could ordain, he ordained. The altars were fairly flooded¹⁸ with the blood of victims: the imperial Neoplatonist strove to make the great change impressive to his day and to his world. Sometimes genuine hetacombs were offered together, white victims being preferred, an obvious symbolism of his devotion to the Sungod.

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Note. While Symmachus, Servius and Macrobius in the old capital flourished one generation after the meteoric reign of Julian, their cult and culture and dearest ideals were quite the same. It may seem appropriate to append a few data which illustrate further this "Dusk of the Gods" and the practical evaporation of the old Nature-religion through allegory and physical interpretation. Porphyry particularly had led the way with this elastic and ductile exegesis: e. g. on Il, I, 399, the binding of Zeus: "One must assume in this passage rather a kind of physical meaning. For by Zeus he means strong Heat which is the cause of our living and being. By Hera he means the Air, by Athena, the Earth. By Briareos he means the Sun, by Thetis the Pose (θέσις) and nature of the Universe;" at the end of this scholion: "By Apollo he means the Sun."—Or again, on Il. 4, 2. "Ganymede serves Zeus alone, because Zeus is the finest Intelligence, and it is a quality of Intelligence alone to rejoice in plannings: τὸ τοῖς μῆδεσι γάνυσθαι. τοῦτο γὰρ γανυμῆδης."

Servius on Verg. Aen. 4, 239 (*Talaria nectit*): "Mercurius ideo dicitur habere pennas quia citius ab omnibus planetis in ortum suum recurrit: unde et velox et errans dicitur."

Idem. on Aen. 5, 735: "Elysium est, ubi piorum animae habitant post corporis animaeque discretionem: unde et interitus dicitur, ubi inter animam et corpus venient, ergo Elysium ἀπὸ τῆς λύσεως.

Idem. on Aen. I, 394 Jovis ales, aquila, quae in tutela Jovis est, quae dicitur dimicanti ei contra gigantes fulmina ministrasse, *quod ideo fingitur* quia per naturam nimii caloris est, etc. But these illustrations could be multiplied indefinitely.

¹⁸ Ammianus 22, 12, 6.

A LIST OF THE WRITINGS
OF
SAMUEL MILLER, D.D., LL.D., 1769-1850
SECOND PROFESSOR IN PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY 1813-1850*

- Christianity the Grand Source and the Surest Basis of Political Liberty. A sermon before the Tammany Society, New York, July Fourth, 1793. New York, 38 pp., 8°.
- Discourse before the Grand Lodge of the State of New York, New York, June 24, 1795. New York, 1795, 32 pp., 8°.
- Sermon, at the Request of, and before, the Mechanic, Tammany, and Democratic Societies, and the Military Officers, on July Fourth, 1795, New York. New York, [n. d.] 33 pp., 8°.
- Discourse before the New York Society for Promoting the Manumission of Slaves, and Protecting such of them as have been or may be liberated, Apr. 12, 1797. New York, 1797, 33 pp., 8°.
- Sermon, on May 9, 1798, a Day of General Humiliation, Fasting, and Prayer, [New York]. New York, 1798, 46 pp., 8°.
- Sermon, in New York, Feb. 5, 1799, a Day of Thanksgiving, Humiliation, and Prayer, on account of the removal of a malignant and mortal disease. New York, 1799, 36 pp., 8°.
- Sermon occasioned by the Death of General George Washington, late President of the United States. [New York], Dec. 29, 1799. New York, 1800, 39 pp., 8°.
- Sermon before the New York Missionary Society, at their annual meeting, Apr. 6, 1802. New York, 1802, 71 pp., 8°.
- Annual Report of the Directors [of New York Missionary Society], Apr. 6. 1802. Bound with above sermon. New York, 1802, 10 pp., 8°.
- Two letters concerning Thomas Jefferson, to Rev. Mr. Gem-

* Prepared by his granddaughter, Margaret Miller—Ed.

mil, [personal], New York, Dec. 7, [and Dec. x], 1800. Printed, without permission, in *The American Mercury*, Jan. 6, 1803. Hartford.

———— The same. Reprinted in various papers. 1803.

———— Extract from one of same, of Dec. 7, 1800, reprinted in *The Columbian Centinel*, [Jan.], 1803. Boston.

———— The same. Reprinted in *New York Evening Post*, Feb. 25, 1803.

———— The same. Reprinted in various other papers. 1803.

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———— [The same. In various other papers, 1803.]

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Two Discourses: The Guilt, Folly, and Sources of Suicide, New York, Feb., 1805. New York, 1805, 72 pp., 8°.

Address of the Presbytery of New York, as to the education of candidates for the ministry [in conjunction with Mr. Griffin], Oct., 1805. A circular, 8°.

LETTERS CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION AND ORDER OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY, AS DEDUCED FROM SCRIPTURE AND PRIMATIVE USAGE: Addressed to the members of the United Presbyterian churches of the city of New York. New York, 1807, 355 pp., 16°.

A CONTINUATION OF LETTERS CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION AND ORDER OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY: Addressed to the Members of the Presbyterian churches in the City of New York. New York, 1809, 434 pp., 16°.

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Henry Hudson: before the New York Historical Society, Sept. 4, 1809, being the completion of the second century since that event. "Collections of New York Historical Society," vol. I, pp. 17-45. New York, 1811.

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———— The same. 2nd edition. New York and Boston, 1832, 322 pp., 12°.

———— The same. With Introductory Essay by the Rev. William Lindsay, Glasgow. Glasgow, Edinburgh, London, and Dublin, 1835, 290 pp., 12°.

———— The same. 3rd edition. Philadelphia, 1840, 324 pp., 24°.

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Sketch of the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the United States: To which is Subjoined a Copy of the Constitution of the Seminary. Elizabethtown, 1817, 19 pp. 12°.

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- Extract from a sermon at the funeral of Rev. James F. Armstrong, in Jan., 1816. In "Memoirs of the Rev. Robert Finley, D.D.," by Isaac V. Brown, pp. 200-203. New Brunswick, 1819.
- Open Letter to Rev. Dr. James Richards. [Signed also by Dr. Archibald Alexander, but apparently Samuel Miller's.] A circular. Princeton, Feb. 12, 1819. 3 pp., folio.
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- Constitution of the Education Society of the Presbytery of New Brunswick. [In conjunction with Dr. Alexander.] Adopted at Pennington, Oct. 6, 1819. Trenton, 1821, 5 pp., 16°.
- The Doctrine and Order of the Waldenses. Signed, *Historicus*. Five articles in *The Virginia Evangelical and Literary Magazine*, pp. 259-264, 297-301, 370-374, 514-520, of 1820, and pp. 57-63 of 1821. Richmond.
- Speech [portion of] on Free Masonry, before the General Assembly, May, 1821. In "Life of Samuel Miller," vol. II, p. 56. Philadelphia, 1869.
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- A Latin Address, being a charge to the Rev. Dr. James Carnahan at his inauguration as President of the College of New Jersey, August, 1823. MS.
- Sermon, before the Synod of New Jersey, for the benefit of the African School under the care of the Synod, Oct. 22, 1823. Trenton, 1823, 28 pp., 8°.
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- THE ETERNAL SONSHIP OF CHRIST, LETTERS ON: addressed to the Rev. Professor Stuart of Andover. Philadelphia, 1823, 295 pp., 12°.
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- The same. Ibid. Philadelphia, 1840.
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- Review of "Sermons by the late Edward D. Griffin, D.D., [etc.]." *Ibid.*, vol. XI, 1839, pp. 404-415.
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- Book-notice of "Memoranda of Foreign Travel," by Robert J. Breckinridge. *Ibid.*, vol. XII, 1840, p. 464.
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- The Importance of a Thorough and Adequate Course of Preparatory Study for the Holy Ministry. In "Annual of the Board of Education," vol. I, pp. 55-95. Philadelphia, 1832.
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- Letters to Presbyterians on the Present Crisis in the Presbyterian Church in the United States. Being sixteen open letters. *The Presbyterian*, Philadelphia, 1833:
- Introductory Remarks. Early Rupture in the Presbyterian Church, Jan. 16.
- Voluntary Associations, Jan. 30.
- Voluntary Associations and Ecclesiastical Boards, Feb. 6.
- The same, continued, Feb. 13.
- The same, concluded, Feb. 20.
- Adherence to our Doctrinal Standards, Feb. 27.
- The same, continued, Mar. 6.
- The same, continued, Mar. 13.
- Revivals of Religion, Mar. 20.
- The same, concluded, Mar. 27.
- Adherence to Presbyterial Order, Apr. 3.
- The same, concluded, Apr. 10.
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- Religious Education of the Children of the Church, Apr. 24.
- Doing Good as a Church, May 1.
- Sectarianism: Conclusion, May 8.
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- THE SAME. Philadelphia, 1833, 314 pp., 12°.
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- An Introductory Essay to "Essay on the Spirit and Influence of the Reformation," by G. Villers, "Christian Library," vol. I, pp. 248-251. Philadelphia, 1833.
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- The same. In "Life of Samuel Miller," vol. II, pp. 140, 141. Philadelphia, 1869.
- Open Letter: Reply to Dr. Luther Halsey (on his "Exceptions to the Confession"), Princeton, Mar. 16, 1836. *The Presbyterian*, Mar. 24, 1836. Philadelphia.
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- Protest concerning the Western Foreign Missionary Society, June 9, 1836. *Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church*, 1836, p. 280. Philadelphia, 1836.
- The same. In "The Acts, [etc.] of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church," by S. J. Baird, pp. 352, 353. Philadelphia, 1856.
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- Micæ Ecclesiasticae*, signed *Biblicus*. Three open letters. *The Presbyterian*, Feb. 9, 16, 23, 1839. Philadelphia and New York.
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- Letter to the Members of the Cincinnati Society of Religious Inquiry, Princeton, Jan. 24, 1849. In "Constitution of the Cincinnati Society of Religious Inquiry," pp. 7-12. Cincinnati, 1849.
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- Church Attachment and Sectarianism. Tract No. 167, Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia, [n. d.], 8 pp., 12°.

The Worship of the Presbyterian Church. Tract No. 197 of vol. X, Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia, [n. d.], 34 pp., 12°.

Theatrical Exhibitions. Tract No. 130 of vol. V, American Tract Society. Philadelphia, [n. d.], 12 pp., 16°.

Atoning Blood. Tract No. 361 of vol. X, American Tract Society. Philadelphia, [n. d.], 12 pp., 16°.

"An Introduction to 'A History of Popery by Harvey'" is enumerated in a list of Samuel Miller's works in his "Life," vol. II, p. 507, (Philadelphia, 1869); but the book has not been traced.

Dr. Miller's frequent articles in periodicals (including *The Princeton Repertory*) cannot all be identified. Also, it is impossible to specify all editions and reprints of his books; the Presbyterian Board of Publication having republished a number of them repeatedly; in some cases, even to this day.

Many of his letters are printed in his "Life."

A manuscript Introductory Letter to "A Memoir of Rev. Robert Gibson, by Robert Baird and John Breckinridge," [1835], signed "Samuel Miller," apparently never published, is in the possession of the Gibson family.

At the University of Pennsylvania, his *alma mater*, there are several volumes of his manuscript "Notes," upon lectures attended there as a student, in 1788-89.

His collection of letters received is in the Library of Princeton University.

Dr. Miller wrote the epitaphs for the tombs of: Rev. Robert Finley, D.D., Rev. Samuel Stanhope Smith, S.T.D., LL.D., Chief Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick, The Hon. James Sheafe, and Rev. George S. Woodhull. This last was probably not used.

There is a practically complete collection of this writer's works, including manuscripts and a few letters, in the Library of Princeton Theological Seminary.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

DAS ERKENNEN UND DIE WERTURTEILE. VON DR. HERMANN LÜDERMANN, ordentlichem Professor der Theologie an der Universität Bern. Leipzig. Verlag von M. Heinsius Nachfolger. 1910.

In a small compass of 201 pages the learned author presents to his readers an extensive discussion of knowledge (das Erkennen, meaning the process of getting knowledge) and the judgments of value. In a brief preface he informs us, that his present publication stands in interrelation to former writings, viz. Epistemology and Theology; Individuality and Personality; the Theory of Argumentation; the Arguments for the Existence of God and Monistic and Christian World and Lifeview. The results of his investigations, laid down in those books, he does not deduce anew in the book now before us, but it is assumed that we know them.

All this is interesting to know, and in order to give a satisfactory review of the book before us, one stands in need of a thorough study of all the books mentioned. It is difficult for a reviewer, who is not acquainted with the author's former writings, to write a review, satisfactory to his readers and to himself. We confess, that we find the development of the author's subject too brief to be clear in all particulars. The framework, i. e. the disposition of the subjectmatter is clear enough, but his treatment of it in detail makes us exclaim now and then, what a pity, that we cannot listen to the author in his lectureroom, when he develops his statements more fully to his hearers. In his introduction Dr. Lüdermann sketches the present philosophical and theological trend of thought in Germany. He finds, that notwithstanding the conflict of opinion and the modification of positions, the idea of (value-judgments as guides to knowledge, is still prevalent both in philosophical and theological circles. The conclusion of the matter, wherein many seem to find rest, is "Weil Wert für mich—darum Sein an sich," which means, freely translated, There is no reality for me, unless it has value for me, or, my valuation of things gives them existence. Very instructive, I think, is the following statement, "Handelte es sich früher bis auf *Schleiermacher* vorwiegend um den Fehler einer intellectualistischen Theologisierung der Religion, so handelt sich es jetzt um den entgegengesetzten Fehler einer individualistischen Religionisierung der Theologie, die ihrem Wesen als Wissenschaft widerstreitet, und die von *Schleiermacher* gefundene richtige Unterscheidung

der Theologie von der Religion als dem positivgegebenen Gegenstande ihrer Erforschung, kritischen Reinigung und Darstellung nicht weniger gefährdet als der Zustand, dem seine Entdeckung des Wesens der Religion ein Ende machte." This long German sentence is almost untranslatable in English. In former times, our author maintains, religion was transformed into an intellectualistic system of theology; in our times theology is being metamorphosed into a kind of individualistic religion. In this his judgment is correct. On this account he thinks it timely to reopen the problem of the significance of the value-judgements in the realm of knowledge.

The subjectmatter is divided into two parts. The first is of a positive, the second of a critical nature.

In the first part the author builds up his own view. In order to do this systematically, and to prevent misunderstandings, he separates two investigations. In the first he tries to establish the significance of the judgments of value for the knowledge of value, and in the second the significance of them for the knowledge of being.

In order to understand the first of these questions, the author deems it necessary to preface it with an elementary psychology and logic, which results in judgments of value.

He distinguishes two values, "Der Bedürfnis-Wert" and "der Normen-Wert", i. e. values, which are considered as such, because we need or want them, and values, which are acknowledged as such, when they are measured by a certain rule.

With regard to the former the author speaks first of the origin of the conception of value. He comes to the conclusion, that the conception of value, as far as its genesis and contents are concerned, is a subjectively conditioned notion of relation. From the consideration of the notion of value he proceeds to the judgment of value. His analysis of the several kinds of judgments of value, as far as they are based on "die Bedürfnis-Werte," is complete. I concur in his judgment, that they all are of a purely subjective character. The individual need and desire determine, as it were, the quality of the value.

The norm-values are of a different kind. There is a subjective element in them too, because the judgment about them rests upon man's knowledge of the norms. But after all the values of this kind are determined not exclusively by man's arbitrary desires or needs, but by certain rules, by which they are measured not only in practical life but also in the realm of science in general and natural science in particular.

After this discussion the author enters upon the difference and connection between "Werturteil und Seinserkenntnis," i. e. judgment of value and the knowledge of being. This part of the subject is also divided into two subdivisions, viz. "Der Gegenstand real gegeben: Qualitäts-Erkenntnis" and "Der Gegenstand in der Vorstellung gegeben." Only in the former case there is a connection between value and being, in the latter every thing is hypothetical and leads to no true knowledge. The result of all this is, that anything which exists only

in our conception, is at its best hypothetical knowledge; values are only valuables, if the value is a quality of a subject which exists.

The second part, which is of a critical nature, deals with the current philosophical and theological use of the value-judgments. The author deals only with German philosophers and theologians. Many of the positions of these men have gained currency among us. We are growing more cosmopolitan also in philosophy and theology. The author combats in this part the following positions of his opponents.

1. Their opinion of the scientific impossibility of metaphysics, which prevails in philosophical and theological circles.
2. The position of philosophers, who, having rejected metaphysical convictions, find a substitute for them either in the mechanically-causal world view of natural science, which does not concern itself about values, or in the knowledge of last and highest "values".
3. Theologians find such a substitute in the possession of convictions of faith regarding last and highest realities, which enables them to look upon the mechanically-causal nature as a subordinate reality, as a world of means for the purposes of the spirit.
4. Both, philosophers and theologians, have for their foundation the needs of man as apparent in his consciousness of the necessity of values.
5. Philosophers distinguish between relative and absolute values of need, but they look upon the latter as a reflection of the unknowable.
6. Theologians conversely look upon the values of need as a reliable proof of the existence and quality of transcendent realities.
7. Philosophers however forget, that they in speaking of absolute values enter upon the metaphysical knowledge of being.
8. While theologians forget, that it is impossible to derive knowledge of being from any of the value-judgments, and that they move in a circle, presupposing as they do the knowledge of being, which they try to derive from judgments of value.
9. Both forget that determinations of value ought to rest upon the conception of being, and that values as real and absolute can only be derived from knowledge of being.
10. As a matter of fact even philosophers endeavor to derive knowledge of value from knowledge of being, and the author thinks, that they are, unconsciously as it may seem, on the right track.
11. Theologians on the contrary try to reach knowledge of being by means of knowledge of value, which leads them as it were, into a blind alley.

In the following discussion he joins issue on these points first with the philosophers Windelband, Rickert, Groos and Riehl, and finally with the theologians Rithl, Lipsius, Scheiße, Hermann, Reischle and Haering. Space and time forbids us to follow the author in detail.

In conclusion let me say, that he presents a fine case in favor of his position. Values are of great importance, but they must be valuable, and they are valuable only when they are found in things that exist. We value Christ highly, because He is, and is what He is; an idea of Christ may be found in our estimation, but if there is no reality back of it, then—Christ is a dream. And the whole of the beyond sinks into nothingness.

Holland, Mich.

NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

GENERAL THEOLOGY.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, M.A., D.D., Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute; Member of the Council of the Palestine Exploration Fund; Editor of *Dictionary of the Bible*, and *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. With the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., and other scholars. VOLUME III: BURIAL-CONFESSIONS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911. 4to, pp. xvi, 901.

It is not necessary on the appearance of this third volume of Dr. Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, to describe again the general scope and character of the work. For this, the reader must be referred to the notices of the first and second volumes, printed in this REVIEW for April 1909, p. 326, and April 1910, p. 271, respectively. Suffice it to say, the third volume carries forward this great undertaking—the greatness of which is increasingly manifest as the work progresses—in the same spirit and with the same large success with which it was inaugurated in the former volumes. Some hundred and sixty-seven contributors have been at work on this volume (of whom some twenty-four are Americans) and their work is throughout painstaking and careful. The long articles in the volume are those constituting the groups on "Calendar" (80 pages), "Charms and Amulets" (80 pages), "Communion with Deity" (40 pages), "Church" (40 pages), and the long discussion—the longest single article—on "Confessions". But many others approach these in length and it is not always the longest articles which are the best. The alphabet seems to be fairly complete for the section covered, and it will be seldom that one in search of guidance on a matter of ethical or religious lore will go away from this Encyclopaedia disappointed.

We shall attempt only a few desultory remarks on points which have attracted our attention as we have turned over the pages of the book.

In an editorial note printed in *The Expository Times*, it is said that it is the policy of the Encyclopaedia to have its articles written from the inside. Accordingly we have "Christian Science" treated by a member of the sect (3 pages). No doubt, from her own point of view, the author has contributed a good article. But it sharply raises the question whether the policy of having subjects treated "from the inside" is a good one in the case of "strong delusions". If it enters into the purpose of the Encyclopaedia to give its readers reliable information concerning religious phenomena and trustworthy scientific guidance in estimating their significance, obviously this policy may be pushed too far. It might give us an Encyclopaedia of unique interest to have "Crime" treated by the greatest criminal accessible, "Falsehood" dealt with by a consummate liar, "Lunacy" by a thoroughly deranged person; but such a collection of human documents would hardly serve the purpose of scientific digests of what is known on these subjects. Why should not the readers of this Encyclopaedia have a sane, critical account

of the movement which calls itself "Christian Science"? The best thing about the article we are given is that it is short. It is shorter, for example, than the article on "Christianity", to which is given twenty-one pages. Proportionate emphasis in this Encyclopaedia has not always been on this side: there has been observable a tendency, which is far from unnatural, but which should, we think, be resisted, to give fuller treatment to obscure and little-known topics in the ethical and religious world, than to matters of real importance but already generally known. No doubt an Encyclopaedia is the place to record items of curious information; but surely it has a higher function also,—and it need not be misleading. We may agree, for example, that "Christianity" is seven times as important as "Christian Science", but shall we agree that "Charms and Amulets" are four times as important as Christianity? The illustration we have chanced on is a bad one; for Christianity finds treatment elsewhere than in the article specifically devoted to it—there are numerous subordinate articles on Christian subjects; the whole Encyclopaedia is filled with them—whereas "Charms and Amulets" scarcely stray out of their own article. But the general fault complained of is real.

We may as well say at once, we do not like the article on "Christianity". Not merely because we are not in full agreement with Dr. Garvie's standpoint. We are not in full agreement with it; but our disagreement with the standpoint of many other articles which we like better is greater. It seems to us a wooden article, joined together with pegs, and to jolt along very much on the surface of things. We should like to have had a non-apologetical article, "written from the inside" in the deepest sense of that phrase. Could not some Christian be found who would do for Christianity just what Miss Ramsay has done for "Christian Science"—tell positively what it is and let it speak for itself? Surely it has enough to say for itself, if it is only permitted to say it. Such an article, we take it, is Dr. Orr's article on "Calvinism". We have faults to find with this article, too; but they concern details. The substance is all here, taken up into a rich and sympathetic mind, and given out in a clear and illuminating account. The bibliographers have misled Dr. Orr as to the existence of Greek and Arabic versions of the *Institutes* (p. 147), and he himself (or his printers) may mislead his readers by a sentence in his own Bibliography like this (p. 155): "A good edition of the *Institutes* is that by Tholuck (2nd ed. 1846, re-edited by Baur, Cunitz and Reuss in 2 vols. 1869)." "Baur" is, of course, a misprint for Baum (there are other misprints in this "Literature"). But, of course, Dr. Orr did not mean to say that the Baum, Cunitz and Reuss edition of 1869 was a re-editing of Tholuck's second edition of 1846; it is simply the separate issue of the two volumes containing the *Institutes* of the Brunswick *Opera*, mentioned immediately before, but assigned to 1860-1900 instead of 1869-1900. Dr. Orr is in error in supposing that Augustine does not teach the *pre-destinatio bipartita* (p. 151a), in attributing the doctrine of "mediate imputation" to Calvin (150a), and supposing him to have held to an

"indefinite atonement" (p. 150b), as well as in representing the Westminster Confession as attempting a compromise "between 'Supralapsarian' and 'Sublapsarian' modes of statement—only with the result, however, of introducing inconsistency into the total presentation" (p. 154b). There are modes of statement of his own also (e. g. p. 151b, bottom of page) which are scarcely perfectly exact. But the article in its general presentation is thoroughly good.

If the editor's policy is to have the articles "written from the inside", one wonders why an American Lutheran pastor was selected to write the article on the Heidelberg and Westminster Catechisms (pp. 255-256). Dr Horn is a man of a fine and varied culture; but he has no particular interest in, or special knowledge of these Catechisms. The result is what might have been expected. The information given concerning them is meagre, antiquated and inaccurate. Of the extensive literature which has grown up about them, he seems to know nothing. There is not even mention made of the critical studies of Gooszen and A. Lang on the Heidelberg Catechism or of the work of Mitchell and Carruthers on the Shorter Catechism. We are still told that the Larger Catechism "was chiefly the work of Anthony Tuckney and is based on Usher's *Body of Divinity* and Wollebius' *Compendium Theologiae*", and that the "concise and severely logical answers" of the Shorter Catechism "are traced to" John Wallis,—for none of which statements is there the least justification. Nor is it true that the two Catechisms were "approved by Parliament, 15. Sept. 1648." Having said this of Dr. Horn's unfortunate article, candor compels us to go on and say that when these Catechisms come up again for treatment later in the volume, under the head of "Confessions", by a Presbyterian writer, we get very little better accounts of them. This article is by Professor W. A. Curtis of Aberdeen, and is written fluently and interestingly. As a whole, it offers a good survey of its subject. But its treatment of the Westminster Catechisms is very superficial. Dr. Curtis tells us, quite erroneously in both items, that the Larger Catechism was composed in "1647", "simultaneously with the Confession", and adds with no warrant that it was "drafted by Herbert Palmer and Anthony Tuckney"; and later connects Tuckney's and Wallis' names with the composition of the Shorter Catechism with as little justification. The accompanying account of the Westminster Assembly and Confession is no more exact. The status of the Scottish Commissioners is not clearly set forth. The protestation taken by the members is inaccurately given. Only three (instead of four) "parts of uniformity" are enumerated as constituting the work of the Assembly. It is erroneously said that the Confession was issued in 1648 by Parliament in both English and Latin (the Latin version was not issued until 1656, and then, not by Parliament and not in the Parliamentary form). It is strangely remarked that the Confession "anticipates" a modern order of topics. It is wrongly asserted that it is "strictly infralapsarian" in theology. Dr. Orr declares, as we will remember, that it unsuccessfully attempted to compromise between

"Supra-" and "Sublapasarianism." Neither is true—the Confession states the fundamental doctrine in which both parties agree and leaves this dispute untouched. The Amyraldians are spoken of as preferring the term "preterition" to "reprobation", a matter in which they had no difference with other Calvinists; and it is absurdly said that the Confession "seems to halt" "between 'particular election' and 'hypothetical universalism'"—as if all "hypothetical universalists" did not believe in "particular election". Already at p. 864 b, however, the Amyraldians are said to have taught "at variance from accepted views on 'particular' Predestination", "that the decree of Divine grace was of conditional universality." Amyraut would rise in his grave to protest, could he hear these things said of him; no one could be more emphatic in his assertions of his faith in "particular election", or "particular Predestination", and that, the *predestinatio bipartita*. Professor Curtis appears to be confusing "particular redemption" (cf. Orr, p. 150b.) with "particular election", and so de-Calvinizing the Amyraldians despite their strongest protest. The history of the "Covenant" idea is also misconceived,—but we forbear. To speak quite frankly, the treatment of the Westminster formularies by Drs. Horn and Curtis falls below the standard of accuracy which one has the right to expect in such an Encyclopaedia, and it is much to be hoped that under some such head as "Westminster Assembly and Formularies" the editor will give us later something more adequate as well as more accurate on the subject.

This volume is not rich in biographical articles. There is, of course, some account of Calvin's life and influence incorporated in Dr. Orr's "Calvinism". Then we have good but short articles—among the moderns on Bushnell, Butler, Carlyle, Chalmers, Coleridge,—the last by a Roman Catholic divine, but fair and judicious in tone. Professor Davidson of Aberdeen writes admirable articles on Cleanthes and Chrysippus. There is a careful short account of Cerinthus. The orientals are represented only by Chaitanga and Chandragupta. If we add Cecrops we have the whole list of separate biographical articles, although the articles on Cambridge Platonists and Cappadocian Theology need to be kept in mind if we would survey the whole biographical material.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

Based on the Third Edition of the Realencyklopädie founded by J. J. HERZOG and edited by ALBERT HAUCK. Prepared by more than six hundred scholars and specialists under the supervision of SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON, D.D., LL.D., with a distinguished staff of associate and department editors. To be complete in twelve volumes, large quarto. Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York and London. \$5. per volume in cloth. Volume IX. Petri-Reuchlin.

According to the "statistics" given by the publishers the number of

pages in this volume is 518, the number of collaborators 170, the number of topics treated 687. In the earlier pages is the usual bibliographical appendix, bringing up to date the literature of the subjects treated in the first nine volumes. There are also tables of addenda and corrigenda, and of biographical addenda, the latter showing deaths and other changes, occurring in 1910, in the case of persons whose biographies have appeared in the Encyclopedia. The effort to keep the successive volumes up to date makes its mark also on many of the articles, for example those on Portugal, Pragmatism, Psychotherapy, Religious Dramas, Religious Education Association.

A noticeable feature in the present volume is the number of articles, some of them important, that are treated by reference to other articles in the Encyclopedia. Instances are Philemon, Philippians, Postmillenarianism, Premillenarianism, Quakers. Of course, this is good method, securing for a topic adequate treatment in one place instead of inadequate treatment in several places.

Of biblical articles those on the Proverbs and the Psalms are the most important. The article on Proverbs is by Kittel. He regards the contents of the book as at least in part preëxilic, and the date of the book itself as at least as early as "the third or fourth pre-Christian century".

In his discussion of the date of the Psalms, Dr. Kittel betrays a consciousness that his reputation for loyalty to the so-called Modern View is at stake. The Psalms to such an extent presuppose the Pentateuch that one who dates Deuteronomy in Josiah's time, and the priestly legislation some generations later, is compelled to regard practically all the psalms as postexilic. For twenty years past this has been the current doctrine of critics of this type. Dr. Kittel's correct literary perceptions go far toward leading him to the old-fashioned position that David was the great originator of the Psalms, but he is reluctant to break away from the traditions in which he has been educated. Nevertheless, he raises several successive questions. Had Israel a recognized body of religious songs before the exile? Cautiously but firmly he answers this question in the affirmative. Did their preëxilic psalmody include some of our existing psalms? Yet more cautiously and somewhat less firmly, he answers this question also in the affirmative. In answer he says concerning certain of the psalms:

"When the originality and freshness of these compositions are taken into account, and also the poetic strength, it becomes difficult to attribute them to a late period."

At this point there is an editorial note in expostulation. It says that there may have been originality in Israelitish writing after the exile. The note shows that Dr. Kittel's apprehensions are not groundless. He proceeds, however, to raise other questions. Did David write religious songs? Yes, probably. Did he write some of our existing psalms? "The attribution to David of seventy-three psalms cannot be wholly without some historic basis." Dr. Kittel is also

cautious in regard to assigning any of the psalms to a very late date. He opposes the idea that some of them are as late as the first century B. C.; and while he mentions respectfully the opinion that some are of Maccabaeen date, he avoids fully committing himself to it.

In view of Dr. Kittel's reputation and ability, these utterances of his are significant. The significance does not mainly consist in the fact of his returning part way toward the older tradition, but rather in the fact that he recognizes the genuine literary values in the case, and the value of the testimony, in contrast with the merely theoretic values that enter into the criticism now in vogue. Logically, one who takes Dr. Kittel's position cannot stop short of accepting the New Testament doctrine that David is the principal author of the Psalms.

The article on the Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament, extending to nearly twenty columns, is as full as it is compact, with a bibliography that is remarkably complete. Of like fullness and character is the article on the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals and other Forgeries.

Certain great religious words occur in this part of the alphabet—among others Polytheism, Predestination, Providence, Rationalism and Supernaturalism, Redemption, Regeneration, Religion in its General Treatment and Special Methods of Study, Religion and Literature, Philosophy of Religion, Resurrection. These articles are full, some of them very full. As a rule they are able and valuable. It is noticeable, however, that they treat religion mainly as one class of the phenomena of human habits. The idea of God as an actual Being they leave in the background, and they have still less to say of God's revealing Himself to men, or of Christ or the Holy Spirit or the Scriptures.

To illustrate by a specific instance, the article that comes nearest to being an exception to what has just been said is Dr. Zöckler's article on Polytheism. He holds that polytheism is a degeneration from monotheism, a turning away from the one true God as he makes himself known to men, and he supports this by many citations from the Scriptures. To us who believe that the Scriptures are truthful his position seems a reasonable one. We see nothing absurd in the Bible testimony to the effect that Abraham was a monotheist from the time when God called him, and that all worship of other gods by Israel was apostasy. It seems different to the scholar who supplements Dr. Zöckler's article in the encyclopedia. He repudiates this view, and by implication the scriptural testimony by which it is supported. He asserts, that there is a consensus of anthropologists and of "the entire critical school" to the effect that monotheism is an evolution from polytheism, and polytheism from animism; that Jacob was in the animistic stage; that when a monotheistic people practices polytheism it is a case of "reversion and not degeneration".

It is not by way of adverse criticism on the encyclopedia that attention is thus called to these facts. It is a correct thing for an encyclopedia to present a subject from different points of view. Our

generation is much given to the study of religion as a matter of human habit, and such study is legitimate. The fact that a dozen men, writing articles, have written mainly from this point of view does not necessarily indicate that any of them would reject the idea of God as an actual Being who reveals himself to his children. It suggests, however, certain serious questions as to the trend of much of the thinking now current. Religion loses both its truth and its power just in proportion as we come to think of God as the creation of the human mind instead of its Creator.

Religious practices and institutions are also prominent in this volume—Ecclesiastical Polity, Practical Theology, Prayer, sixty-two columns on the History of Preaching, Presbyterate, Priest and Priesthood, Ecclesiastical Property, Prophecy and the Prophetic Office, Psalmody. Equally prominent are articles on the great movements in religious history—Pharisees and Sadducees, twenty-nine columns of Pietism, Platonism and Christianity, Plymouth Brethren, Christianity in Poland, Pope, Papacy, Papal System, Positivism, seventy-seven columns on Presbyterians, Protestant Episcopalians, Protestantism, Puritans, the Reformation, the various Reformed churches. The article on Pope and Papacy, with its list of the popes, is a model of compactness and fitness for use.

The article on Pius is a series of biographies of the ten popes of that name. That on Ptolemy is an account of the fifteen Egyptian kings so named, while the Ptolemy who is distinguished as a philosopher and astronomer and chronologer is left out. Within the scope of the volume come such subjects as Phenicia and the Phenicians, Philip of Hesse, Philistines, Philo of Alexandria, Photius, Precious Stones, Prison Reform, Proselytes, Prussia, and many others equally interesting. For persons interested in religious study, the work has the character of a well selected library.

Auburn.

WILLIS J. BEECHER.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE ICE AGE IN NORTH AMERICA, and its Bearings upon the Antiquity of Man. By G. FREDERICK WRIGHT, D.D., LL.D., &c. Oberlin Ohio: Bibliotheca Sacra Company, Fifth Edition, Dec. 1910.

We can recommend this fine book to every person who desires to understand, and thereby to appreciate the natural scenery of this North American Wonderland; for all its more important characteristics bear more or less deeply the stamp of the glacial mill. Starting from one side with Greenland the book conducts you on the other side to Alaska, and leads you across the Northern continent in a serpentine way, generally between the 40th and 50th degree of latitude, explaining every feature that is explainable by the help of the ice, and you find that glaciers are like animals, born at a particular time, and under special influences, growing and at last in their "re-

cession" and ultimately dying; and during their active life themselves moving, and helping to move and change the face of the earth, and sometimes leaving behind them singular memorials of their presence and power.

After astonishing us by a description of subglacial Greenland which is found to have mighty rivers partly frozen, partly fluid, hidden out of sight far below the icy floor of the broad peninsula, and carrying water and ice-masses away to the ocean, the author takes us onward upon a transcontinental tour, telling us about Plymouth Rock, and Bunker Hill, and Martha's Vineyard, and the other New England relics of glaciation, and through Long Island, and Hell-Gate; then we are led to Trenton, and the Delaware Watergap, and round by the Great Lakes, and down the Ohio River, the whole geography being illuminated at every stage by the explanation of every point, from what we may call its "life-history" in the presence and under the influence of glaciers. And we learn of the metamorphoses of the different parts of our country, of the explanations presented by different investigators, and the pros and cons for each view that has been advocated, often with striking explanations of puzzling problems, which show that the evolution of our beautiful continent is frequently as curious as the explanations offered for the evolution of animal or vegetable species.

Very often Professor Wright makes his book a clearing-house for the different explanations offered to account for interesting phenomena. North America has been blessed with a large number of high-class geologists, and we have their views set forth, and due credit accorded for their service: so that whilst its author has been himself a good worker, and an original thinker, justice is accorded to all; and the result here reached is in most cases the consensus of the numerous specialists who have worked for the common cause.

An interesting feature in this large subject, is the considerable number of lakes which existed in glacial times, and united to form the plains and prairies, by afterwards disappearing, or becoming reduced in size. At one time Erie and Ontario were conjoined as a single lake, with no Niagara between them; Southern Canada, above what is now the Red River region, had a huge lake, recently named Lake Agassiz, and now represented by the comparatively small Lake Winnipeg; and Utah rejoiced in a Lake Bonneville (as it is now called) fully ten times as large as the Great Salt Lake. (In this connection Dr. Wright goes aside to inform us of the probability that the Dead Sea of Palestine, was somehow related to the development of glaciers in the Lebanon Mountains; and that I. C. Russell of the U. S. Geological Survey, is of opinion that some of its gravel deposits, at various elevations, are relics of the glacial period.)

Professor Wright is probably our best man for offering an opinion on the problem of human antiquity. And this must be determined in some measure by the lapse of time since the close of the ice-age; for there are evidences that man was living in America as well as in

Europe before the ice had withdrawn from the Delaware River and from the English and Scottish Highlands. Wright appeals to three classes of facts for light as to the date of the glacial period: (1) the time required for erosion, since its close, as of the Niagara gorge, which is seven miles long; (2) the extent to which lakes have been filled with sediment; (3) the apparent freshness of remains of animals and plants in glacial deposits. Dr Wright himself has been engaged in estimating the age of Niagara gorge since its beginning; and he cites the opinions of others, with the general result that Prof. N. H. Winchell gives, of approximately eight thousand years as having elapsed during post-glacial erosions of the Falls of St. Anthony, in the Upper Mississippi; Dr. Andrews estimates seven thousand five hundred years for erosion of shores of Lake Michigan; Professor Wright gives the same estimate for erosions at Lake Erie; and only seven thousand years have been required, according to Mr. G. K. Gilbert, for the erosion of Niagara. Similarly in judging by palaeolithic implements, as chipped implements from various kinds of hard rock, and skulls, thigh-bones and other parts of human skeletons. Whilst no precise estimate can be reached on such a question, it appears to me to favor a result so closely approaching what the Old Testament suggests as to be a substantial confirmation. We know that since Abraham's time somewhat more than four thousand years have elapsed; and we have no means of deciding how long it was before Abraham that man was created, just as we cannot decide as to the exact mode of his creation, whether it was or was not such as to involve some sort of Evolution. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that man may have been in existence at least as long time before Abraham as since, perhaps the Egyptian and Oriental records may point to a still longer pre-Abrahamic age. Dr. Wright does not discuss this aspect of the case, but he leads us to a conclusion which appears to us very closely in harmony with the ideas which have been reached on independent grounds from the Bible itself.

We can easily recall the time, forty or fifty years ago, when there was some controversy, even at times acrimonious, over the Bible-Science opinions; and we thought that neither side had a monopoly of the right or the wrong on these topics: but now there is substantial peace all along the line, much to the benefit of both science and the cause of the Bible. We are very largely indebted to Professor Wright for helping to bring a change for the better, and we heartily wish him much success with this new edition of his excellent book.

Princeton.

GEORGE MACLOSIE.

PSYCHIC PHENOMENA, SCIENCE AND IMMORTALITY. By HENRY FRANK.
Boston: Sherman French and Company. 1911. \$2.25 net.

Here we have what might be an entertaining and profitable book, if it had a right setting; all about body and its components, plasms, and cells, and infinitesimal corpuscles, and their inter-relations with ether,

and emanations, lower and lower in the order of vanishing into smallness; with theories annexed as to their relations to life and spirit, and soul, and hearing, seeing, thinking and willing; rather clumsily mixed in one part with demi-science about table-turning, and telepathy, and ghosts and such stuff; but on the whole done carefully, with a knack of happily expressing what has been got from great speculators.

The setting, however, is horrible; soul as well as body, are presented as material entities or their derivatives; even human will as only the etherial waves; and after the wonders are eloquently detailed, the writer faces the question of their Author, and declares that it is only ignorant persons who conclude that they demonstrate the superintending activity of a Supreme Being. For his part he cannot accept this solution, as the Agent so described cannot be found in the chemical or biological laboratory. In another part he bravely declares his conviction that Nature cannot fail; and follows this up by showing how terribly it has failed with ourselves, filling our little life with disappointment and dismay: and he even confesses that if he were questioned as to the desirability of immortality, he would answer negatively; and thus he gives away the subject and title of his book, concluding that immortality is doubtful at best, with the probabilities against it, and that at all events, it is of small importance whether we shall exist after death or not.

Princeton.

G. MACLOSKIE.

MODERN THOUGHT AND TRADITIONAL FAITH. By GEORGE PRESTON MAINS. Pp. xxi, 279. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. Copyright, 1911. Price \$1.50 net.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE MODERN MIND. By SAMUEL McCOMB, co-author of "Religion and Medicine" and "The Christian Religion as a Healing Power"; author of "The Making of the English Bible". Pp. xvi, 343. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 1910.

THE FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. Six Lectures by WILLIAM TEMPLE, Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. Pp. xi, 172. Macmillan & Co., Limited: St. Martin's Street, London. 1910.

Modernism, in the strict sense, is a movement within the Roman Catholic Church, but it has a near equivalent among Protestants in "modern thought" or "the modern mind". This rather vague but formidable abstraction, like the spiritual man of Scripture, judgeth all things but is judged by no man. Certainly the adjective "modern", as these volumes and others of similar title show, is at present a favorite one with author and publisher (Dr. Mains is both), and holds out to the prospective buyer or reader the alluring promise of something new. We all wish to be up-to-date in our thinking as well as in apparel, and it is necessary to know the "spring styles" in theology which are said to originate in Berlin just as the fashions in men's and women's attire are dictated from London and Paris.

Such books as these before us are intended to interpret theological opinion rather than to form it. Dr. Mains says that in dealing with critical questions he acts "far more in the capacity of a reporter than

as an original investigator"; while Dr. McComb declares his function to be "that of a kind of theological middleman, who would mediate to thoughtful but non-academic persons the main conclusions about the origin and meaning of the Christian religion, to which the general body of scholars have come or are coming". The rôle of prophet has of course its risks, and even the reporter of what Dr. Mains calls "the general consensus of devout and special scholarship" is in some danger of regarding a debate as closed just when the special scholarship in question realizes that it must be re-opened. While there is no claim in these volumes to any great degree of unity, to depth of research, or to any well organized body of thought, yet each of them deserves and will repay careful reading. Dr. Main's manner is rhetorical and at times a little repetitious; Dr. McComb writes with the polished pen of a trained essayist; while Mr. Temple's lectures preserve the direct and pointed style of the spoken appeal.

Dr. Mains feels that he has a message for his own denomination, in which there has not as yet been reached "a desirable adjustment to the critical movement". Recalling the broad and tolerant scholarship of its founder, he utters a warning cry against the organization of Methodism "into an ecclesiasticism repressive of, not to say menacing to, the spirit of freest intellectual investigation on the part of its teaching faculties, its ministry, and its scholarly laity". In the opening chapters he sketches in a rapid but luminous way the intellectual movements of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and more recent times, which have created what is called modern thought. The central chapters are taken up with an account of Biblical criticism and its results; and the author tells of the modification of his own opinions, and of the "great mental restfulness" which he has found through his study of the critic. Genesis, he believes, "in its compilation and present form is one of the most recent books of the Old Testament"; the narratives of its early chapters are "borrowed from the older traditions of Babylon"; patriarchal events "are clothed more in a traditional than in an historic drapery;" Isaiah, as seems indubitable, "cannot be the work of a single author, but was the product of different and of distinct periods"; the critical process "is just as certainly of divine purpose as was the selection and installation of the books themselves, or the preservation of their text in its integrity;" and the "documentary theory of the Old Testament" is comparable in the method of its establishment and in the improbability of its ever being displaced with the laws of planetary motion formulated by Kepler. In the New Testament field Dr. Mains finds that critical conclusions are more in agreement with tradition. While doubts are expressed as to the authorship of James, II Peter and Jude, and as to whether the Fourth Gospel was written by John or merely contains his teachings, we are assured, that "as to the genuineness of the Synoptic Gospels there is substantial unanimity of opinion"; that the authors of the New Testament "have given us genuine and faithful portrayal of the teachings of both Christ and his apostles"; and that "the New Testament as a whole gives us an

unimpeachable record of the vital beginnings of Christian history". Many readers will find in Dr. Mains' critical views taken as a whole a certain lack of homogeneity or consistency, not conducive to mental restfulness. Has not Dr. Cheyne, to take an extreme example, recently said (in the *Hibbert Journal*): "The 'Twelve Apostles,' too, are to me . . . as unhistorical as the seventy disciples"? It is not clear that we can continue to hold the New Testament and its history intact, and yet dissolve the Old Testament history so largely into myth. In his closing chapters Dr. Mains writes with enthusiasm and sometimes with eloquence of the meaning and growth of the kingdom, and the influence of Christ upon the modern age. "Christ is not a literary creation." "He was not a child of evolution. He is the Lord of life who himself directed the very process of evolution." "The most luminous light spot in this surge of modern thought, the center to which converge the most serious interests and the profoundest thinking of our times, is that which is marked by the cross of Jesus Christ." "From every Calvary and every sepulchre prepared by his foes Christ has emerged with richer laurels and with a more fully acknowledged sovereignty."

Dr. McComb has made a readable and attractive book by bringing together, with no very strong thread of connection but with every evidence of wide reading and serious reflection upon the subjects treated, some essays published in periodicals, with the addition of several new chapters. He discusses both the difficulties which the modern mind finds in Christianity and the help which it brings to the understanding of it. As was to be expected, he emphasizes the mission of Christianity to promote health and happiness and to abolish oppressive social conditions. While he argues for the Resurrection as alone accounting for the growth and influence of the Church, his modernism appears in the treatment of the Gospel miracles, which he can accept only in case some modern scientific analogy can be found. Thus the cure of the demoniac of Gerasa, "a sad crux for the commentators", is thought to be relieved from difficulties when it is discovered to be a plain case of hysteria. The sufferer, convinced that the evil powers which have ruled him are about to depart into the swine, "is caught in a final paroxysm. He utters piercing cries. His gestures are wild and terrifying. Some animals, catching sight of him, stampede, communicate their panic to the rest, and they all blindly rush to their death." We wonder whether the animal psychologists would think the occurrence to be "in harmony with analogy", especially as it happened at the precise moment when the man (and Jesus himself, we are told) thought that the demons were entering the swine. The chapters on prayer are suggestive, although the case for prayer is scarcely strengthened when in the search for analogy the author seemingly reduces intercessory prayer to a matter of thought transference between human beings. The closing chapter discusses the motive for missions as it is felt in the Church to-day, and finds that it consists in a sense of debt to give to others what we enjoy, in a belief in the universality of the Gospel ("If the Gospel is not a message for all

men, it is a message for no man"), and in its utility as the only means whereby not so much the individual as the race and its civilization and progress can be saved. We may compare another statement of the missionary motive in Dr. Mackenzie's recent book, "The Final Faith": "This fact of the Incarnation concerns all men infinitely more even than food and drink. It must be the will of God that it should be known to all men."

Mr. Temple, in his little book of lectures, is very bold in defense of the faith. His thesis is that "this ideal of reason [the demand for coherence] and the facts of experience stand over against one another in hopeless and irreconcilable antagonism unless all the essential points of the whole of dogmatic Christianity are true." As an evidence for theistic belief Mr. Temple emphasizes the argument from religious experience. But experience, our own or that of others, is a precarious basis for our faith unless supported by objective fact. We need the historic fact of the life and character of Christ. The exquisite flower of His character is an evidence of the nature of the root-principle of reality. But are we sure that the governing Power of the world is more interested in this instance of spiritual pre-eminence than in any other being? "If we are to be on sure ground in taking Him as the revelation of the Divine, it is necessary that the Divine Power should be seen clearly coöperating with Him, carrying Him through His ultimate self-surrender and bringing Him out victorious. We need the Resurrection." The candor and directness of the argument wins the reader's confidence. He feels, as is suggested in the Introduction, that he is following a guide who knows his way up the mountain, although there may be other paths by which the ascent may be made. Not every reader of the interesting chapter on "The Atonement and the Problem of Evil" will agree, however, that the lecturer, even "by a wise use of the conceptions of Personality and Evolution, which play so large a part in our modern thought", has been able to solve the mystery of the Atonement or has sounded the depths of the great doctrines of Paul and of John.

Modern science and culture have raised many difficult and, to some, distressing questions about the details or even the fundamentals of the Christian faith, but the study of the relation of Christianity to the "modern mind" inspires in all three of our authors a feeling of reverent wonder that the Teacher of Nazareth should after nineteen centuries more than ever dominate the thought and guide the progress of the world. The influence of Jesus, says Dr. Mains, is the miracle of history, and he can account for it only on the hypothesis of the Divine Sonship; while Mr. Temple believes that "apart from the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Spirit, the whole experience of Christendom is absolutely unintelligible."

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WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

ORPHEUS, a General History of Religions, from the French of Salomon Reinach by FLORENCE SIMMONS, Revised by the Author. New

York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; London: William Heinemann. 1909.
pp. xiv, 439. \$3.00 net.

M. Reinach is well known to the students of the phenomenology of religions by his *Cultes, mythes et religions*, 3 vols., Paris, 1904-1908, and by his contributions to the journals devoted to the subject. The volume at present under review, in its English translation, deserves attention because of the discussion which the publication of the French original aroused on the continent and because of the indisputable learning of the author. While no account can be given here of the numerous controversial articles which it called forth in the appropriate journals, J. Bricout's *L'histoire des religions et la foi chrétienne, à propos de l'Orpheus*, Paris, 1910 and P. Batiffol's *Orpheus et l'évangile*, Paris, 1910, may be mentioned among the monographs which seriously take issue with M. Reinach's facts as well as with his construction of the history of religions. His learning is sufficiently established by the comprehensive bibliography with which each of the twelve chapters is furnished; and the captions of the chapters display a wide range of subjects. The captions must needs be various; for M. Reinach calls his book *Orpheus* merely to invoke the patronage of the son of Apollo and a Muse who was "poet, musician, theologian, mystagogue, authorized interpreter of the gods", while he really regards it, as the sub-title rather leads us to anticipate, as "a little book destined to summarize religions and their histories". This is no easy task, particularly as M. Reinach does not intend to follow the example of Conrad von Orelli and Chantepie de la Saussaye in omitting Christianity from the history of religions. He sees no reason for isolating Christianity. "It has fewer adherents than Buddhism; it is less ancient." And the task is no easier because M. Reinach designs to be popular. Even a due admiration for Voltaire's "incomparable gifts as a narrator" will not make it easy. No doubt the translator has been well advised in omitting from the preface the plea for popularity which the French edition makes, "J'affirme aux mamans qu'elles peuvent donner ce livre à leurs filles, pour peu que la lumière de l'histoire ne les effraie pas", and the promise some day, if the public is kind, to provide "une édition plus complète—pour les mamans". If the task which M. Reinach sets himself is not easy, he has himself made it impossible by his definition of religion. Religion, he says, (p. 3) is, "A sum of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties" (Un ensemble de scrupules qui font obstacle au libre exercice de nos facultés). And the next paragraph promptly though innocently admits that the author need write no further; for it asserts that his definition "eliminates from the fundamental concept of religion, God, spiritual beings, the infinite, in a word, all we are accustomed to consider the true objects of religious sentiment", that is to say, it eliminates from the fundamental concept of religion precisely the fundamental concept of religion, the concept of a superior spiritual Other. This is not a minimum definition of religion: it is no

definition of religion at all. It may be brilliant and even shocking—it is nevertheless useless. Taylor's definition of religion as "a belief in spiritual beings", which Reinach criticizes, is at least a definition of religion. Religion without the concept of a spiritual Other or others, whose existence is presupposed—whether it is real or not, is another question—is not religion. As modest a book as F. B. Jevons' *The Idea of God in Early Religions*, issued from the Cambridge University Press in 1910, might be of no inconsiderable value to M. Reinach. There is no possible objection to M. Reinach's attempting to write a natural history of religion, but any attempt which does not realize that the essence of religion is a belief, whether right or wrong, in superhuman spiritual beings, is foredoomed to failure. Our author next remarks that "scruple" is too vague a word and somewhat over-secular. *Taboo* is better. Religion is a sum of *taboos*, a compilation of all the barriers opposed to the destructive and sanguinary appetites of men; it is, moreover, a heritage transmitted to man by beast. And it is not the only one; nor is religion, we are surprised to learn after M. Reinach's concise definition, summed up in *taboos*. Animism must be added. Animals are animists. So are men and their animism is a part of their religion. It is difficult to stretch the previously propounded definition of religion to include animism and we must be content with the declaration (p. 7), "Animism on the one hand, and *taboos* on the other, such are the essential factors of religion." They are the essential factors, but they are not the only ones. Totemism and magic, though less primitive, have been no less general in their action. M. Reinach is tireless in the pursuit of *totems*. The fish is an ancient Syrian *totem*. The practice of eating sacred fish to sanctify themselves was adopted by the early Christians. "The eating of the sacred fish was a primitive form of the Eucharistic meal"—such is his historical method. M. Reinach now addresses himself to the detection of his fundamental factors in the historic religions. He passes in review the Egyptians, Babylonians and Syrians, the Aryans, Hindus and Persians, the Greeks and Romans, the Celts, Germans and Slavs, the Chinese, Japanese, Mongolians, Finns, Africans, Oceanians and Americans, the Musulmans, the Hebrews, Israelites and Jews, and finds among all of them evidence that *taboos*, animism, totemism and magic are the somewhat misty and inchoate depths out of which their religions rise. Indeed, the chief service of *Orpheus* to ethnological science is in connection with its display of *survivals* in the more developed religions. It need hardly be re-affirmed, however, that neither the discovery of these *survivals*, nor even the demonstration that these peoples have passed through periods of religious history in which *taboos*, animism, totemism and magic were important factors, can ever by any possibility serve to justify M. Reinach's definition of religion. The problem of Christian origins (chap. 8) is then approached. Here the Abbé Loisy is his most frequently cited authority. The succeeding chapters deal with four epochs of Christian history: from St. Paul to Justinian, from Justinian to Charles V, from Luther to the

Encyclopedia, from the Encyclopedia to the condemnation of Modernism. In M. Reinach's estimation these are the sign-posts of the "infinitely curious products of man's imagination and of man's reason in its infancy" (p. vii), but M. Reinach has grown up and lost his way.

Princeton.

HAROLD MCA. ROBINSON.

TRUTH IN RELIGION. STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHRISTIAN CERTAINTY.

By DUGALD MACFADYEN, M.A. Macmillan & Co., Limited, St. Martin's Street, London. 1911.

"This book aims at setting in relation to one another, two movements which threaten to divide christian thought in England; but which together ought to issue in a great strengthening of its hold upon the public mind. One is a movement towards the use of larger generalizations and wider categories in religious thought. It is largely in the hands of men trained in the methods of science who see that in the debate between science and religion, religion commands the fuller truth, and owns the larger categories. The other movement is toward more exact study and more careful definition of Christian experience; and clear vision of the historic facts on which that experience rests.

The line of reconciliation suggested is that the first movement may be welcomed as an expansion and enlargement of the truth on which all spiritual religion rests. The second movement is a definition of the exact contribution to religion which comes through Jesus Christ and creates the specific Christian experience. The first movement emphasizes the Incarnation, the second centers around the Atonement.

The first section traces the action of the consciousness of God in the race. Its object is to outline the categories which the religious mind brings to Jesus Christ, and is intended to suggest that His life, teaching, death and rising again, are a final answer to the perennial questions which the human spirit asks about life in its relation to God. The conclusion of the section is that the universality and potency of religion finds its best explanation in the declaration of our Lord that the world is really a Kingdom of God.

The Second Section deals exclusively with the place and function which religion assigns to Jesus Christ. This is necessarily critical of any estimate which sets Him in any history or theory other than a history of religion. Its purpose is to point out that we must bring to the Person and Life of Christ the postulates which belong to the history of religion. We must deal with man as we find him—as a being in whom the consciousness of God is a fact, in whose history that consciousness is a supreme factor, a being to whom sin is a reality, and in whose experience the knowledge of a Redeemer, and the experience of an upholding and perfecting Divine Life is one of Life's chief necessities."

This extended quotation from the preface is given, since the author has there most admirably outlined all that he attempts to do. The task which he has set before him is a very large one and naturally the time and space at his disposal have been greatly limited; but in

this volume, while we find no exhaustive consideration of the subject and no demonstration of the truths for which the author contends, yet there is much, there is very much, to stimulate thought and to aid the reader in looking at Spiritual truth from a new and fresh view point. The book is divided into three parts. First—"The Historical Method in Religion"; second—"Facts and Factors in Religion"; and, third—"The Gospel is Jesus Christ."

In the first part Mr. Macfadyen notes the advantage which the student now possesses in the historical method of studying religion, and all the wealth of material which recent study has brought to light, and then goes on to show how religion has been liberated from the burden of subjection to other masters. Religion had been made a department of philosophy and cramped into the narrow forms and categories of systems of thought. From this it is now happily freed by the realization that in "its sphere it is autonomous. The facts with which it deals belong to the deepest sphere of reality which comes within our knowledge." Then follows a discussion of the relation of faith to history as illustrated in different modern teachers and after a short note on the rise and fall of religion comes a very important discussion of the categories of religion.

The author's contention is that "comparative religion supplies the student with a number of terms and ideas belonging to the history of the relations of God and man as they have been conceived from time to time, such as priest, prophet, Son of God—holiness . . . redemption . . . justification, etc. . . . Ideas of this order are the categories of religion." And so "religious criticism must deal with these or similar categories employing a relationship between man and God." That is, all religions and Christianity in particular must be studied from this point of view with these characteristics of man understood and appreciated. No general denial of any of these or similar categories can serve as a basis for any fair or profitable study. We are told to note that "Jesus does not offer himself historically as a character: He offers himself in history as a Saviour." All His teaching and all His ethics are from this view point and from this they must be judged.

Truth in religion may be considered in many ways but the best test is whether it produces the true fruits of religion "to interpret truly God's relation to man and to bring man into a right relation with God." This part closes with a few words on orientation and on religious experience.

By this first section the way has thus been cleared for the consideration of the religion of Jesus on the basis of the categories common to all religions and as dealing with truth vital to the life of man and not to be arbitrarily bounded by theories of philosophy. The method of study is that of the religious nature of man in race and individual.

Under the "Facts and Factors" in religion the author briefly discusses religious personality, illumination, personality and conscious-

ness, the background of personality the Mystic Experience of God and the Natural and Moral orders. He only has time to touch on these as they bear on the greater theme. Then he turns to historical religions and the religion of Israel and shows how the religious consciousness of the people was awakened and ever widened. The classic religions are all recognized as being founded on some revelation of God but their weaknesses are clearly shown. The author in his summary of this part says: "We find man endowed with a nature which fits him to enter into fuller relations with God—capable of receiving God. We find God so revealing Himself in history that we may expect continuous revelation in days to come. It is His nature and His character to make Himself known." The historic meeting-point of human inspiration and divine revelation is Jesus Christ.

There is neither time nor opportunity in this place to even outline the author's admirable manner of showing how the historic Jesus Christ is the perfect fulfillment of all that man has longed and hoped for and is the perfect and all satisfying revelation of God to man. Particularly helpful is the section on the appeal of Jesus to man, but all through is the evidence of deep thought and a deep spirituality. Naturally many will not agree with some of the conclusions reached by the author, but the view point and the method call for much praise.

In the brief compass of this book are to be found very many thoughts on the whole round of theological truth. Many are only suggestions not yet fully considered or amplified, many seem to be in little apparent relation to the rest of the discussion; but the book is so well written, its spirit is so irenic while it remains ever loyal to the Master, that it deserves a wide and thoughtful reading.

Cranford.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

THE GLEAM. By HELEN R. ALBEE, author of "Hardy Plants for Cottage Gardens," "Mountain Playmates," etc. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1911. \$1.35 net.

Autobiography, if true and directly told, is always interesting to any thoughtful student of human nature. That history of a life which deals with the awakening of a human soul and describes its search after truth may well merit our sympathetic study. "The Gleam" claims to be such an autobiography. It sketches the search of the authoress for spiritual certainty. Orthodoxy fails to give relief; certain branches of science also prove useless; but finally there comes a direct consciousness of the influence of the Spirit and with it the awakening of the Higher Self.

The strength of the book is in its manifest sincerity. The style is clear and the subject matter made interesting. The weakness, on the other hand, is also very noticeable. The attempt to found spiritual instruction for others on the peculiar psychical experiences of an abnormal personality cannot prove successful.

Most of the readers of this work will have neither the artistic tem-

perament nor the extreme mystical tendency expressed by the writer. Most people who think are very unwilling to commit their religious life to the safe keeping of inward feelings and to a confidence in their own inherent greatness. The criticism of the orthodox position as made by Mrs. Albee is to some extent justified. There are cold churches and there is far too much formalism. But it still seems that most of these criticisms arise from a spirit of real ignorance of the inherent truths which underlie all our Theology—a sinful fallen race and a salvation through God alone. This is and must ever remain foolishness to all those who are ruled by the Spirit of the Greeks, to all who worship mankind and expect such salvation, as is needed, to arise from within man himself.

Cranford.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

THE ETERNAL RIDDLE. By JOHN WIRT DUNNING. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.20 net.

Sixteen of the greatest questions that can confront the mind of man are here considered and briefly but very helpfully answered. With a spirit deeply religious and conservative and yet wideawake and progressive Mr. Dunning leads the thought of his readers to strong, healthy, and inspiring convictions on such great subjects as the nature of man, his immortality, God, suffering, the Bible, prayer and the opportunity and conditions of Salvation. The book is popular in style, abounding in illustration, but still thoughtful and convincing. The most conservative may fail to agree with certain minor points, but the whole work is so full of the Spirit of the Gospel that it can only prove helpful and refreshing to all who are fortunate enough to read it.

Cranford.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

THE VOLITIONAL ELEMENT IN KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF and Other Essays in Philosophy and Religion. By DELO CORYDON GROVER, S.T.B., Dean of Scio College, Professor of Philosophy and Religion. Introduction by FRANCIS J. McCONNELL, D.D., LL.D., President De Pauw University. 8vo; pp. ix, 168. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.20 net.

These essays, seventeen in number, are exceedingly, we had almost said, excessively brief; but there is not one of them that is not worth while. The wide range of subjects treated is indicated by such titles as "The Higher Criticism," "The Theological Education demanded by the Times of Jesus," "In Christ," "The Philosophy of Christian Prayer," "The Bible—What is claimed for It," "Origin of the New Testament and the Fixing of the Canon," "A Brief Examination of Spencer's Definition of Evolution." These and the remaining papers are written consistently from the Arminian position; but they would and do magnify the guilt and pollution of sin, the grace of God in Christ, and the supernaturalness and consequent authority of the

Scriptures. Some of the author's conclusions are as important as they are sound. Such, for example, is that with which he closes his paper on "The Theological Education demanded by the Times"; viz., "The doors of the theological school should be wide open; the doors of the Christian ministry should be well guarded."

The first essay, which is on "The Volitional Element in Knowledge and Belief," both gives the title to the volume as a whole and presents the philosophy on which its several papers are based. This philosophy is in the main that of Prof. James in "The Will to Believe" and especially that of Prof. Bowne in "The Theory of Thought and Knowledge." With much in this philosophy we find ourselves in accord, but from what is most characteristic of it we cannot too strongly dissent. It is true that faith and feeling are often inseparable; but it is not always the case; as Dr. Chas. Hodge says (Sys. Theol. III, p. 51), "when the object of faith is a speculative truth, or some historical event past or future; or when the evidence or testimony on which faith is founded is addressed only to the understanding and not to the conscience or our emotional or religious nature, then faith does not involve feeling." It is also true that feeling has much influence in determining our faith: "but it is not so of all kinds even of religious faith; there is belief of which, as in the case of a dead orthodoxy, it is not the fact that love or congeniality is an element. And, finally, it is true that saving faith always involves the will to believe: but this will is not that which is ultimate in such faith; the Christian wishes and wills to believe on Christ as his Saviour, but the reason why he so believes is not in his inclination or even in his resolution, but in the evidence that Christ is his Saviour, even "the witness of the Spirit" within him. In a word, faith is a voluntary conviction. This, however, is not the essence of it. It is a voluntary conviction produced by testimony; it is consent constrained by evidence: and this may evince its primacy by compelling consent against inclination. We cannot believe without the will as consent, but we may and often must believe against the will as inclination. That is, while the subjective element by itself explains the unbelief in Christ of those to whom he has been presented, saving faith in him demands an objective cause. We do not believe on him only or chiefly because we wish and will to, but we wish and will to because, in view of the revelation which he has made to us who believe of Himself, it would be irrational not to do so. In a word, "the final consummation does not rest with the human will", but with the revealing and enabling God.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE UNCAUSED BEING AND THE CRITERION OF TRUTH. To which is appended an examination of the views of Sir Oliver Lodge concerning the ether of space. By E. Z. DERR, M.D., Author of "Evolution versus Involution." 8vo; pp. vii, 110. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1.00 net.

It is refreshing in this age of indifference and often of avowed

hostility to metaphysics to find a writer who, as the author of this little volume, is nothing if not metaphysical, and whose metaphysic is invariably clear, sound and impressive.

Dr. Derr's aim is twofold; first, to prove the necessity of an "Uncaused Being" and, second, to establish a "criterion of truth". His argument for an Uncaused Being is, that if anything exists, an Uncaused Being exists; that the world exists; and that the world itself can not be the Uncaused Being: for inasmuch as the atoms or ultimate elements of the universe are in motion, it can not be a continuum, it can not be as large, consequently, as if it were a continuum, and hence it can not be infinite and so uncaused; and, on the other hand, no more may we say that the world is the uncaused being, if we regard it pantheistically, for that would mean that we, though only parts of the great whole or God, were comprehending and so judging him, and this would violate the *a priori* and so necessary axiom that the whole is greater than the parts. That is, unless the universe is a caused thing like man himself, it can not offer, as it does, a legitimate field of conquest for the human mind. In a word, we can not entertain the idea of cosmic evolution without violating an axiomatic truth. To be reasonable, therefore, we must hold to a First and Infinite and so Uncaused Cause; and while we can know him only in so far as he reveals himself to us, we must conceive of him as at least personal, intelligent, conscious and free—as at least all that dignifies us, who are most like him, only without limitation.

As to "the criterion of truth", the author finds it in "the concordance between pure or *priori* conceptions of the understanding and sense perception." Whatever will not stand this test in both respects, he would reject; whatever will, he would accept.

It is evident at once that such a discussion as the above must reckon with the pluralism of Prof. James and with Sir Oliver Lodge's teaching that the ether is a continuum and that universal space is a plenum of it. This Dr. Derr is doing; and his criterion, though brief, is effective and even adequate.

We regard this little book as a valuable addition to our literature in fundamental apologetics.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

BIBLISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT IN VERBINDUNG MIT DER REDAKTION DER "BIBLISCHEN STUDIEN" herausgegeben von DR. JOH. GÖTTSCHE LOWE, Professor des Alttestamentl. Exegese in München und DR. JOS. SICKEL, Professor der Neutestamentl. Exegese in Breslau. Siebter Jahrgang. Freiburg im Breisgau. Herdersche Verlagsbuchhandlung. St. Louis, No. 17 South Broadway: B. Herder. 1909. 4 Hefte pp. 440. By mail \$3.00.

Our announcement of the seventh year's issue of the *Biblische*

Zeitschrift is somewhat belated. The able manner in which the periodical continues to be conducted and the interesting *répertoire* which it again offers to its readers in this volume certainly deserve the fullest notice that can be given to any scientific theological publication, no matter whether published in the interest of Protestant or Catholic convictions. A mere glance at the table of contents of these four *Hefte* will show how varied and up-to-date the contributions are. We find here such articles as the following: The Bible-Canon of Flavius Josephus; the Genealogy of Jesus according to St. Luke; On the Number Seven of the Diaconate in the Mother-church at Jerusalem; The Name Mirjam; Aretas IV, King of the Nabataeans; a historico-exegetical study on II Cor. xi. 32 ff. and many others of an equally important and timely character. The only criticism we could wish to offer as to the makeup of the *Zeitschrift* is the one we have made before, viz. that it seems to avoid the discussion of more strictly doctrinal on even biblico-theological problems, as the enumeration of the above titles, which is fairly representative of the entire table of contents of the volume before us, will easily show. Can this have anything to do with the absolutely fixed doctrinal position of the Roman Church, which would leave room for freer movement only in the fields of literary history, and archaeological research? None the less we can heartily recommend the perusal of this periodical to Protestant readers. The time is surely past when the old adage was true *Catholica non leguntur*. A very careful bibliography to which an alphabetical index of all the authors discussed is appended, renders the volume highly valuable as an aid in Biblical study independently of its own contents.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

ANNALES DE TUKUTH-NINIP II, ROI 'D ASSYRIE 889-884, par V. Scheil avec la collaboration de J.- Et. Gautier. Ouvrage illustré de 2 héliogravures et 8 planches. Paris: Honoré Champion. 1909. 62 pp. Prix 7.50 frs. (Le 178^e fascicule de la Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études.)

In view of the fact that no remarkable "finds" have as yet been announced by the German excavators at Assur, although it is reported that much valuable material has been discovered, M. Scheil's enthusiastic conclusion of the Preface of this volume "On peut dire sans emphase que de longtemps n' a été faite en Assyrie une découverte plus remarquable, plus digne d'enrichir le Musée du Louvre" is well warranted. When we recall that in "The Annals of the Kings of Assyria" (1902), the editors, Budge and Kink were only able to say: "Adad-nirari II was succeeded by his son Tukuth-Ninib II, who reigned from B. C. 890 to B. C. 885; but of the reign of this king we know nothing and his fame rests upon the fact that he was the father of Ashur-nasir-pal the Great", there is indeed cause for rejoicing when a part even of the annals of this king are discovered.

The greater part of this tablet which contains c. 150 lines is taken up with an account of a military expedition in which the king "made a circuit of that part of Mesopotamia which is bounded by the Tartar, Tigris, Euphrates and Khabur". Several other previous expeditions are alluded to with more or less brevity. Whether the editors are correct in affirming that this expedition was the sixth and whether the *na'-di ilu* governor of Commogene in whose eponym it took place is to be identified with the *Ya-ri-i* of the Eponym Canon are questions which will probably not be definitely settled until further records are brought to light. The value of the tablet is as Schiffer (Gött. gel. Anz. 1911, Heft 1. s. 14f) points out chiefly of an historical and geographical nature, although as in the Annals of Ashur-Nasir-pal we find some data of interest to the philologist.

It is clear that the editing of this tablet, a task which was attended with considerable difficulty, because so much time and pains had first to be devoted to cleaning the tablet, was a labor of love on the part of the editors. The photographic reproduction, transscription and transliteration and translation, together with the notes, itineraries and chart are admirably executed. And M. Scheil and M. Gautier are to be congratulated on the success attending their efforts to make scholars everywhere acquainted with and to give them access to this new treasure of the Louvre.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

THE ESCHATOLOGICAL QUESTION IN THE GOSPELS AND OTHER STUDIES IN RECENT NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM. By the Rev. CYRIL W. EMMET, M.A., Vicar of West Hendred. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St. 1911. 8vo, pp. vii, 239. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50 net.

Of the seven essays which make up this volume, six were published before in various periodicals. New is the opening essay on The Eschatological Question in the Gospels, and both in point of size and timeliness it deserves the first place given it by the author. It is an attempt to show the weakness and fancifulness of the interpretation of the life of Jesus, which in his remarkable book *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* Schweitzer has recently propounded on the basis of what he calls the principle of "thoroughgoing eschatology". It is not in itself a difficult task to expose the glaring defects of this structure and the arbitrariness of the process by which it was reared. The faults are so obvious that exposure might even seem superfluous. But it should be remembered that they are covered up to the uncritical reader by the magnificent stylistic features of Schweitzer's book. Moreover the hyper-eschatological interpretation of Jesus' career is so introduced in this book as to seem the inevitable correlate of the lengthy preceding critique of the liberal Life-of-Jesus literature; a critique so incisive and convincing that it has earned the author just praise even from quarters where the "thoroughgoing eschatology" is not exactly in favor. Not only Father Tyrrell, who swallowed the whole theory,

but men of far more critical and cautious temper, such as Burkitt and Sanday, own their indebtedness to Schweitzer's book. In view of all this a real danger exists that out of admiration for the splendid historical critique, the crude wild theorizing which the brilliant German author has so closely linked with it, will receive more serious consideration than it should and would receive were it offered by itself. Consequently Mr. Emmet performs no superfluous task in carrying Schweitzer's critique one step further and including in it the "thoroughgoing eschatology"-stage itself. After first giving a succinct but extremely lucid and thoroughly fair exposition of the hypothesis to be criticized, he applies to it the usual exegetical and historical tests and finds it wanting in both respects. He further contends, with much force, that the Christ of "thoroughgoing eschatology" is unfit to figure as the ideal and inspirer of historic Christianity, and that the little that might be gained by this new interpretation of his life (such as e. g. the direct derivation of the idea of the church and the sacraments from his teaching) would be bought at an altogether disproportionate cost, seeing that the theory makes Christ himself a deluded visionary and his whole career a tragic failure.

Emmet throws back upon Schweitzer the charge which the latter so persistently makes against the liberal biographies of Jesus, viz., that they read too much between the lines of the Gospel-tradition, especially as found in Mark, and psychologize too much in weaving the single items together. He has no difficulty in showing that Schweitzer is equally guilty of both these faults. It is, however, hardly fair to characterize this as inconsistency. The two cases are not alike. There is this difference that, while Schweitzer openly acknowledges his work to be a mere experimenting upon the data, the writers in the liberal camp would have us regard their work in the light of scientifically constructed biography. The latter assume the interlinear meaning and the psychology to be somehow suggested or intended by the sources themselves. To this delusion Schweitzer is not subject; he knows that the ideas which bind the parts together are of his own devising. Of course it remains quite possible that the psychology of the liberals may in individual instances prove more correct and better to fit in with the tradition than the psychology of the extreme eschatologists. An illustration of this is furnished by Emmet's discussion of the element of secrecy in the Messianic self-presentation of Jesus. The earlier writers explain this from the desire of Jesus to keep his person and work free from all association with the political Messiahship. Wrede gives a literary explanation, finding in these features the dim reminiscence in the tradition, or in the mind of the Evangelist of the fact that Jesus had not been the Messiah during his life-time. The eschatologists, and especially Schweitzer, claim all this material in the interest of the mystery attaching to the eschatological Messiahship as something inherent in and inseparable from the conception. as part of the whole apocalyptic, transcendental frame of mind, by which they

think Jesus was dominated. Now, in order to preclude the older explanation from the outset, Schweitzer goes to the extreme of denying the existence of a politically-colored Messianic hope at the time of Jesus. If such a hope did not exist, then the secrecy practiced by Jesus cannot have been induced by it. But Emmet argues forcibly that there is no reason to assume the political Messianic hope to have been dead or dormant at that juncture in Jewish history, and that consequently it is quite permissible from a historical point of view to bring the phenomena of secrecy into connection with it. One might, however, well add the caution that sweeping, all-inclusive explanations should be avoided here as elsewhere. Wrede made the mistake of lumping all the instances of secrecy and quasi-secrecy together, and forcing them all to conform to his peculiar hypothesis. The older writers were perhaps equally unwarranted in attributing everything in the nature of secrecy to a recoil from the political Messiahship. In all probability a variety of motives were at play and some of the secrecy was actually due to the mysterious atmosphere which naturally accompanies the transcendental eschatological Messiahship. Especially into the use of the Son-of-Man title this seems to have entered. Mr. Emmet himself admits that the two traditions in regard to the Messiahship, the political and the eschatological, were alive and active side by side in Jesus' day. And it is at any rate significant, that, while silently rejecting the former, our Lord appears in no wise to have shunned or criticized the latter.

This brings us to the main caption we have to make on the author's work. He seems to us not to emphasize sufficiently Schweitzer's merit in focussing attention upon the general, eschatological atmosphere of Jesus' consciousness and teaching. Crude and arbitrary as Schweitzer's treatment of the record may be, on this one point it appears to us convincing; the eschatological was much more prominent and dominant in the Saviour's mind than the old liberal reproduction of his life and teaching allowed for. The framework of his thought was more supernatural, more superhuman, in the old orthodox sense, than had come to be believed. Emmet thinks that Harnack and Bousset are more nearly correct in distributing the emphasis as between the ethico-spiritual and the Messianic-eschatological than Johannes Weiss and Schweitzer. He also believes that a positive Christianity can more easily attach itself to Harnack's and Bousset's interpretation of Jesus than to that of the eschatologists, because, although the former give us a reduced Christianity, they give us something that can be built upon. We question the correctness of either view. Neither Harnack's theory, according to which the Messianic consciousness was a mere time-conditioned form, nor Bousset's according to whom it even was a burden to Jesus, can furnish a fit foundation for any adequate embodiment of the historic faith of the Church. We may *add* to these, but it would not be possible to *build* on them. And it is precisely here that the eschatological interpretation is strongest; after all excrescences are allowed for, it still must be said that it approaches far more

closely than the other to the core and center of the supernatural consciousness of our Lord, as the Church has always recognized it.

The second essay on M. Loisy and the Gospel Story admirably shows how radical and negative the French critics' conclusions as laid down in *Les Évangiles Synoptiques* really are. The next paper adds to this a searching critique of Loisy's view of the resurrection. It well brings out the peculiar difficulty in which all those involve themselves, who, like Loisy, first reject the Gospel narrative in toto, and then endeavor to show how by some psychological process the Apostles might have arrived at their belief in the resurrection. It is curious to observe how in the face of this unsparing exposé of radical departure from the common Christian faith, the tender feelings for a persecuted fellow-critic continue to assert themselves in Mr. Emmet. He tells us that in the matter of M. Loisy's excommunication the sympathies of English students could only be on one side (which means, we take it, M. Loisy's side). And even his horror and revulsion from the most extreme deliverances of the French critic assume the following mild form: "If the Roman Church is ever to excommunicate, it could hardly be expected to hold its hand here." There is something in this urbane treatment of extreme critics by their more believing confrères which reminds us of the attitude of the labor-unions towards those of their numbers whose methods are destructive of life and property in the civil sphere. We miss the true note of indignation. Why should the state have the right to defend itself against those who assail its very foundations and not the Church? A Church which must hold its hand everywhere, in order not to violate the sacred rights of criticism, would afford a truly pitiful spectacle indeed.

The fourth essay deals with Harnack's monograph on the Second Source of the First and Third Gospels. It gives a clear and skillful resumé of the German critic's well-known conclusions.

The fifth paper briefly reviews the evidence, textual-critical and contextual, bearing on the question whether the Magnificat should be ascribed (in the intention of Luke, not as to actual authorship) to Mary or Elizabeth. The author decides in favor of the traditional view.

In the next following paper the title of Galatians to be considered the first Pauline epistle in point of chronology is upheld chiefly on the ground that Galatians must have been written before the Apostolic Council (referred to in Gal ii. and identified with the proceedings of Acts xi., not of Acts xv.) since otherwise it would have been impossible for Paul to pass by the decree of the Council in silence. We looked in vain for a mention of Zahn's name in this connection. Mr. Emmet also inclines to accept the Western reading of the decree of Acts xv. in its recent Harnackian interpretation according to which it refers exclusively to moral and not to ceremonial questions.

The concluding chapter deals with the Problem of the Apocalypse, which it classifies with the general rubric of Apocalyptic literature. The inspiration of the writer is defined as subjective, which means

not only that it came from within, but also that it moves on various levels, high and low. And to the question: "What right, then, have we to speak of the Spirit at all? How do we know that the book is in the deepest sense true?" the answer is given: "Simply because our Christian consciousness recognizes it as such." And "we believe it to contain the 'Word of God', because the Divine in us answers to the Divine mind of the writer". Which amounts to saying that the test of inspiration is such as by its very nature to make inspiration superfluous.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY. By HENRY C. SHELDON, Professor in Boston University and Author of "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century", "Sacerdotalism in the Nineteenth Century", etc. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. 8° pp. 364. \$1.50 net.

Prof. Sheldon's book bears evidence on almost every page of thorough acquaintance with the subject and of quite unusual skill in presenting its matter to the best advantage. The field of New Testament Theology is a large one in itself and the intensified discussion of its many intricate problems during the last decades has vastly extended it. Yet in 364 pages the author succeeds in giving a fairly adequate, if not exhaustive, survey of its entire compass. No important phase of teaching or problem is passed by without at least some suggestive and illuminating reference. The condensation is even greater than the size of the volume indicates, for out of 364 no less than 76 pages are devoted to introductory discussion of the literary provenience of the sources. But the compression is not secured at the expense of thoroughness. Of the sketchy, superficial character which is apt to belong to small handbooks of theological science there is not a trace. To be sure the author has had to sacrifice, in order to secure this reduced compass, on the one hand all detailed exegetical discussion, on the other hand all but the most meagre reference to the literature. The naming of scholars prominently identified with certain problems or theories is avoided even where the text plainly shows that some well-known name was in the author's mind. Still another thing that is perhaps connected with the compactness of the book consists in what might be called its anatomical character. It analyzes and summarizes the doctrinal content of each source and does this admirably. But it scarcely ventures beyond this to describe the development of New Testament truth as a living organism, or to raise genetic questions. E. g., while attention is duly called to Paul's peculiar doctrine of the Spirit as the substratum of the entire Christian life, the problem how this peculiar Pauline advance upon the previously attained position is to be explained, is not discussed. It is only fair, however, to remember that the incorporation of these other, more abstruse, matters might have easily interfered with the positive and straightforward presentation which forms one of the main attractions of the book. While

in the sphere of anatomy the student deals largely with assured facts, in that of biology nearly everything is problematic and hypothetical. The origins and connections in the history of revelation are highly mysterious.

There are, of course, individual points wherein other students of the subject might take issue with the writer's conclusions. Thus is the treatment of the Pauline antithesis of "flesh" and "Spirit"; we believe that it is a mistake to choose one's point of departure in the psychological conception of "spirit". The contrast is not between the predominance of one part or element in man and that of another part or element, but between the natural and the supernatural. With the psychological use of *pneuma*, also found in Paul, this has little to do. On p. 238 a few words might have been devoted to the modern Ritschlian conception of "the righteousness of God" as a gracious principle, especially in connection with Rom. iii. 21ff. Exception also must be taken to the summary way in which the author disposes of the predestinarian element in the Pauline and Johannine teaching, principally on the ground that it is irreconcilable with the obvious universalism of their presentation of the Gospel as a whole, and that therefore the apparently absolute predestinarian statements must be explained as oratorical effusions not meant to be expressive of any fixed theory. It is entirely overlooked that both in Paul and John the principle of predestination is turned to the eminently practical account of furnishing the basis of the believer's assurance. Why is the one passage 1 Cor ii. 27 quoted to prove the possibility to Paul's mind of his own falling from grace, whilst all the numerous passages, which voice his absolute assurance of salvation are passed by in silence? But it were too much to expect from Prof. Sheldon an adequate exhibition of the predestinarian strand in New Testament teaching even as a matter of purely historical interest. Let us congratulate ourselves that in regard to the other, more common and fundamental issues, which the Church has at stake in the interpretation of the New Testament, such as the supernaturalism of religion and revelation, the deity of Christ, the vicarious character of the atonement, the supremacy of grace in salvation, the author throws the weight of his opinion unqualifiedly on the side of the old historic faith. While undogmatic in its methods, the book is essentially an orthodox book in its results. It proves that the Evangelical Protestant doctrine is in a large sense the faithful reproduction of New Testament teaching.

Princeton.

CEERHARDUS VOS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. International Theological Library. By JAMES MOFFATT, B.D., D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. Pp. xli, 630. Price \$2.50 net.

In the days when the Tübingen criticism was in the ascendant

Salmon wrote his *Introduction* and Lightfoot and Westcott made permanent contributions to the history and interpretation of the New Testament. Since that time the *Introductions* of Jülicher and Zahn have been translated. Dr. Moffatt's *Introduction* is, however, the first of its size and importance, conceived and written in English, to treat its subject in the light of current critical opinion and to register the results of recent investigation in statements of fact and judgments of appreciation. It is not strange therefore that it should be characterised as "a work which must for long be the only manual for English students and the basis for all their work on the subject" (Denney, *British Weekly*, May 18, 1911, p. 178). The book is well written in a delightfully clear and interesting style; and it is very learned—packed full of information about the subject and about the literature of the subject. Indeed the references to the literature constitute a most useful feature of the book. All students of the New Testament may well be grateful for the information it brings although all cannot be equally satisfied with its point of view and conclusions. The *Introduction* is a better book than the *Historical New Testament*. It will be more influential. But those who know the *Historical New Testament* will know also the method and in a large measure the results of the *Introduction*. For Dr. Moffatt is not in his day, as Salmon, Lightfoot and Westcott were in their day, opposed to but is rather in sympathy with and represents the "liberal criticism" of the New Testament. The service he renders therefore is a different one and will be less enduring.

Dr. Moffatt begins his *Introduction* with a Prolegomena which treats of the collection of the NT writings into a canon; method and materials of NT Introduction; arrangement of NT writings; literary sources of NT; structure and composition of NT (interpolation, displacement, pseudonymity); some literary form in NT (dialogue, diatribe, the address, the epistle); the circulation of the NT writings; some literary characteristics of the NT writings. Then follow chapters on the correspondence of Paul (1 and 2 Thess., Gal., 1 and 2 Cor., Rom., Col., Philm., Phil.); the historical literature (the Synoptic problem, Mk., Mt., Lk.—Gospel and Acts); homilies and pastorals (1 Pet., Jude, 2 Pet., 1 and 2 Tim., Tit., Heb., Jas., 2 and 3 Jn.); the Apocalypse of John; and a closing chapter on the Fourth Gospel, a Johannine tract (1 Jn.) and the Johannine tradition.

In general Dr. Moffatt accepts the Pauline authorship of nine of the thirteen epistles which bear Paul's name in the New Testament. He rejects the Pauline authorship of Ephesians, largely on literary grounds, and admits only Pauline materials embodied in the Pastorals, especially in 2 Tim. (p. 398), although in setting aside the release of Paul from his first Roman imprisonment he scarcely reckons seriously with the implications of this admission (p. 313). The nine genuine epistles are grouped in the usual order, 1 and 2 Thess., constituting the earliest group and written from Corinth on the second missionary

journey. Harnack's theory of the address of 2 Thess., (SAB, 1910, 560ff), was evidently published too late to be included in the discussion. In the literature on Galatians, as in certain other instances, some important books are omitted, but such omissions are generally rectified subsequently either in the text or in the notes. In the interpretation of Acts xvi. 6 and xviii. 23 the significance of the close and constant association of *χώρα* with *Γαλατική* in the changed order of the sentences might have been pointed out as it materially strengthens the argument for the North Galatian theory which Dr. Moffatt seems to favor. "Paul's correspondence with Corinth", writes Dr. Moffatt (p. 109f), "so far as traces of it are extant, included four letters from him": (a) 1 Cor. v. 9; (b) 1 Cor.; (c) 2 Cor. ii. 4, vii. 8-2 Cor. x. 1-xiii. 10; and (d) 2 Cor. i-ix. Our 1 Cor. was written from Ephesus. In discussing its attestation Dr. Moffatt says, apparently basing his statement upon NTA p. 85 which he quotes in the context (p. 115): "Alone among the Apostolic fathers, he [i. e. Polycarp] uses *οικοδομεῖν*, a favorite term of 1 Cor." This will strike even a casual reader of the Apostolic fathers as strange and a reference to any good index such as Goodspeed's (p. 165) will fully confirm the feeling. There is another somewhat startling piece of exegesis on p. 121 which plainly shows how deceptive extra-contextual appearance may be. Taken alone the expression *οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐλθόντες ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας* (2 Cor. xi. 9) does seem to "suit Ephesus better than Macedonia as the place of composition", but in its context it has reference to a past situation when Paul was in Corinth and thus has no bearing on the place of composition of the last four chapters of 2 Cor. Dr. Moffatt favors the view that Rom. xvi is a special note addressed to the church of Ephesus. "The balance of probability is upon the whole in favour of the hypothesis that i. 1-xv. 33 represents substantially the original epistle; that xvi. 1-23 was added to it when the Pauline canon was drawn up at Ephesus; that xvi. 25-27 represents an editorial climax to this composite production, and that the omission of *ἐν Ῥώμῃ* in i. 7 and the relegation of xvi. 25-27 to a place after 14 were due to subsequent liturgical procedure" (p. 142). Col., Phil.—the last letter he wrote (p. 159, cf. 166)—and Philm., are assigned to Rome after consideration of the Caesarean and Ephesian theories. The identification of the epistle *ἐκ Λαοδικίας* (Col. iv. 16) with Eph., is rejected.

Dr. Moffatt adopts the two-document hypothesis of the Synoptic problem. In discussing the statement of Papias' presbyter about Mk., he holds that the "divergence, e. g., between Mark's *τάξις* and that of the Fourth gospel seems to have occasioned surprise" (p. 187). He remarks further (*ibid.*) that Papias "quotes the presbyter in order to defend Mark against a certain depreciation, and his defence presupposes that the authority of the Fourth Gospel was so strong in certain local circles that it served as a standard for estimating the style and shape of earlier" (cf. also pp. 190, 567, 618). The process by

which Mk., reached its present form is outlined thus (p. 232): "Notes of Peter's reminiscences written down by Mk. (hence the Aramaic colouring and vivid detail of certain sections) were afterwards edited by a (Roman?) Christian who used not only the small apocalypse but some logia of Jesus (not necessarily Q)." There is not the slightest evidence that the original conclusion of Mk. was intentionally removed and all the evidence of the transmitted text is opposed to this hypothesis, yet Dr. Moffatt states with apparent sympathy (p. 239) the view of Rohrbach that it was suppressed because it gave, like the lost (suppressed?) part of the Gospel of Peter, a Galilean account of the Resurrection-appearances. The Gospel of Mk. is held to represent a final version of the Ur-Marcus composed shortly after the events of A.D. 60-70 (p. 212). Of Mt. it is said (p. 194): "The style and contents of Matthew show that it is neither the translation of an Aramaic source nor composed by an apostle. For this and other reasons it is impossible to identify it with a translation of the Logia-source mentioned by Papias. But the large amount of discourse-material which Mt. has incorporated with Mk. permits the identification of this special source with the Matthaean Logia of Papias." Mt. is assigned to a date between 70 and 110 (p. 212). Luke's date is left uncertain because of the uncertainty attaching to "the relations between his work and Josephus" (p. 212), but the following reconstruction of Luke's literary activity is suggested (p. 312): "Between A.D. (50) 55 and 65 he wrote his memoranda of Paul's travels; later, between A. D. 80 and 90 the third gospel; finally c. A. D. 100 he worked up his memoranda into the book of Acts. Unless the Josephus references, however, in the gospel are subsequent additions, the first of his works may also need to be placed towards the end of the first century."

Of the homilies and pastorals 1 Pet is assigned to Peter and its form in large measure attributed to Silvanus, Peter's amanuensis. Harnack's theory of pseudonymity is rejected. The situation implied in the sufferings of the Christians is found during the third quarter of the first century, especially subsequent to A.D. 64 (p. 325), which fixes the date between 64 and 67, if the traditional date of Peter's death be maintained. Jude falls in the early decades of the second century (p. 355) and 2 Pet.—a true pseud-epigraphon—sometime in the second century before 170 (p. 367). Ephesians is "a catholicised version of Colossians, written in Paul's name to Gentile Christendom" (p. 393), sometime previous to A.D. 96 (p. 394). The Pastorals are of unitary but unknown authorship and were written probably between 90 and 115. Of the traces of the Pastorals in 1 Clem., Dr. Moffatt says (p. 418): "Unless we attribute all these phenomena to a common milieu of church feeling, a literary dependence must be postulated on the side of the pastorals, or of Clement. The former is not impossible. It is erroneous to assume, in the case of a NT writing and an extra-canonical document, that the literary filiation must be in favour

of the former as prior: this is a misconception due to the surreptitious introduction of the canon-idea into the criticism of early Christian literature." Nevertheless Dr. Moffatt concludes with the admission (p. 419) that "the hypothesis of the use of the pastorals in Clement has also a fair case, which would involve their composition not much later than A. D. 80." The authorship of Hebrews remains unknown, but the readers, it is thought, are to be sought in some direction other than Jerusalem or even Palestine, most probably in Rome (pp. 443, 446f). James is a post-Pauline homily addressed to Christendom in general; and 2 and 3 John are second century notes of the presbyter John. The Domitianic date of the Apocalypse is favored (pp. 503f), and authorship by John the presbyter (p. 513). Of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel Dr. Moffatt says (pp. 569f) "Unless John the presbyter is brought in (. . .), the author of Jn. i-xx and the editor who revised it and added the appendix are both unknown." The appendix was added in the first half of the second century, not long after the composition of the Gospel. 1 Jn. is a tract from a member of the "Johannine school" who occupied a slightly different ground from that of the author of the Fourth Gospel (p. 592).

Dr. Moffatt's treatment of the Johannine literature culminates in the closing chapter in which he sets forth the grounds upon which he rests his adherence to the view that the Apostle John suffered an early martyrdom. The evidence for this view has been stated frequently of late—notably and most ably by Bousset—and Dr. Moffatt has nothing to add to it. His argument has been reviewed by Sir. W. M. Ramsay in the *Expositor* for June and July. A careful and judicious weighing of the evidence for and against the Ephesian residence of the Apostle John ought to disclose the superior strength and quality of the former; but the decision is not infrequently influenced not merely by the view which is held of the character and possible authorship of the Johannine literature but also by the presuppositions or assumptions with which early Christian literature is approached and interpreted (cf. C. Clemen, *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1911 (xxxvi) 295ff, and J. Drummond, *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1910, 196).

Unfortunately the printing of the book cannot be praised for its accuracy. There are many typographical errors, especially in the Greek—some of which are corrected in the *Expositor* for July, pp. 78f—and in the German. One of these furnishes an interesting example of the kind of phenomena upon which a really valid literary argument might be based. Even an English reader possessing only a fair knowledge of German will feel that something is wrong with the sentence (p. 407): "Doch zeigt sich in der Bilder mancherlei Umbiegung" etc. Conjectural emendation might easily go astray by correcting what appears to be wrong, for in this instance what appears to be right is wrong since for "in" should be read "im Sinn". The reference is also wrongly given: ZWT 1902 should be ZWT 1903. Another error is more serious since it seems to rest upon confusion.

On p. 225 O. Holtzmann is represented as regarding "Christ's verdict on this woman as an incident at the beginning of the Monday when he ate the passover meal with his disciples", etc. Of course, Holtzmann does not place the eating of the passover meal on Monday. He is arguing to show the accuracy of the Johannine tradition in dating Jesus' death on Friday Nisan 14 and in definitely fixing the time of the supper in Bethany on Monday Nisan 10. Again on p. 259 the Gospel according to the Hebrews is said to represent Jesus as refusing "at first to accompany his father and mother" to John's baptism, but the passage in question, which is preserved by Jerome (contra Pelag. iii. 2) speaks only of the mother of the Lord and his brethren (*Ecce mater domini et fratres eius*).

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

THE CHILDHOOD OF JESUS CHRIST according to the Canonical Gospels.

With an Historical Essay on the Brethren of the Lord. By A. DURAND, S.J. An Authorized Translation from the French, Edited by Rev. JOSEPH BRUNEAU, S.S., D.D. Philadelphia: John Jos. McVey. 1910. Pp. xxv, 316. \$1.50 net, prepaid.

The Modernist movement is helping to bring Roman Catholic scholarship to bear upon historical questions relating to the Bible. Startled by division within their own ranks, scholars of the Roman Church have rallied to the support of supernatural Christianity. The book of Père Durand is an example of this activity. It is a sensible defence of the historicity of the Virgin Birth, with full reference to recent discussion both Catholic and Protestant. The last chapter, on the Lord's Brethren, brings a defence of the perpetual virginity of Mary. Though probably inferior to the contributions of Bardenhewer and Steinmetzer, the book should not be neglected.

Detailed criticism would consume too much space. When Père Durand concludes (p. 61) from the well-known passage, Justin Martyr, *dial* 48, that most Christians even in Palestine believed in the Virgin Birth, the conclusion is correct, but it is insufficiently grounded. On pp. 86f., Harnack is quoted in favor of the view that Lk. i. 34, 35 was inserted by Luke himself into a Judæo-Christian document; whereas even in the article which Père Durand is here referring to (1901), and even more decidedly in his later contributions, Harnack represents the two verses as an interpolation into the completed Gospel, and favors the view that in the first two chapters of the Gospel Luke was employing merely oral tradition. On p. 100, the articles of T. Allen Hoben in the *American Journal of Theology* for 1902 are apparently included (erroneously) among treatises in defence of the Virgin Birth. On p. 179, in speaking of the "Hebrew ring" of Lk. i-ii, Harnack's investigations of the style of the two chapters should have been at least noticed if not refuted in detail.

Although the reviewer has not been able to examine the book in

its original language, he has the impression that a good deal has been lost in translation. On p. xi, *pur bavardage* has been translated "mere gossip" with doubtful propriety. On p. xiv, the "apparition" of the canonical Gospels is spoken of. In general the style of the translation is not all that might have been desired.

The "Ferrara" group of manuscripts appears several times (for example on p. 4) instead of the Ferrar group. Typographical errors are not infrequent. On p. 86, Haecke appears instead of Haecker. Greek accents and breathings have occasionally been a snare to the proof-reader.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

VORSCHLÄGE FÜR EINE KRITISCHE AUSGABE DES GRIECHISCHEN NEUEN TESTAMENTS. VON CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1911. pp. 52. M. 1.50..

A generation has passed since the great editions of the Greek Testament by Tischendorf and Westcott and Hort were published, and the need has long been felt of a new edition which should bring the critical apparatus up to date, and review the evidence for readings in the light of recent discovery and research. Two scholars in Germany, as is well known, Gregory in Leipzig and von Soden in Berlin, are now working independently upon such an enterprise, and Dr. Gregory has sent this pamphlet, outlining his plans and asking for suggestions and advice, to all the New Testament students whose names he could learn.

Up to the present the honors in textual criticism are pretty evenly divided between Germany and Great Britain. Tischendorf has added to the materials of textual criticism, especially by his discovery of the Sinai manuscript, and in the successive editions of his critical apparatus has made these materials accessible to scholars. Westcott and Hort, on the other hand, have done the most for the principles of criticism, and their *Introduction*, written by Hort, is still the glory of British scholarship in this field. Both the new editions are to appear in Germany, but it is a satisfaction to know that one of the editors, Dr. Gregory, while a Frenchman by descent, and for the greater half of his life a resident in Germany, is by birth and training an American, born in Philadelphia and a graduate of Princeton Seminary.

Both editors have been compelled by the multiplication of uncial manuscripts to alter the old method of designating them by letters, but it is unfortunate that a common system of notation has not been agreed upon. Von Soden has an elaborate system of numbers prefixed by Greek letters (δ ., $\delta\iota\alpha\theta\acute{\eta}\kappa\eta$, for the whole N. T., ϵ ., $\epsilon\upsilon\alpha\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\iota\omicron\nu$ for the Gospels, α $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, for Acts, Epistles and Apocalypse) intended to show at a glance, to those who master his system, the age, contents and in some cases the character of a manuscript. Gregory's notation is simpler, heavy faced numerals prefixed by **O** being used for

the uncials and smaller numerals for the cursives. The "primary uncials" are thus indicated by Gregory and von Soden respectively:

$$\aleph = \mathbf{O1} = \delta_2$$

$$\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{O2} = \delta_4$$

$$\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{O3} = \delta_1$$

$$\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{O4} = \delta_3$$

$$\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{O5} = \delta_5$$

Gregory proposes, we believe, to retain the old Latin and Greek symbols, A-Z, T-Ω, and \aleph , giving them alternative numbers, $\mathbf{O1}$ to $\mathbf{O45}$, and to number the other uncials from $\mathbf{O46}$ upward. His system has been adopted by Nestle in the 3rd edition of his *Einführung in das griechischen N. T.*, and is approved by Kenyon, Sandy and many other scholars. Yet, as Lake has pointed out, the nomenclature of what proves to be the standard critical edition must of necessity come into general use; and while Gregory has done invaluable service in the description and cataloguing of new manuscripts, von Soden has been able under the patronage of a wealthy Berlin lady to send to every library of the world known to contain a MS. of the N. T. and to secure a description of its character. It is to be noted that Gregory has catalogued (*Griechische Handschriften des N. T.*, 1908) 161 uncial MSS., 14 papyri, 2292 cursives, and 1540 lectionaries: total 4407. His *Vorschläge* brings the number of uncials to 168, of cursives to 2320, and of lectionaries to 1561; and the total to 4063.

What type of text will be adopted in the new edition? Gregory is a strong advocate of the principles of Westcott and Hort, and as he believes that the work of these editors and of Tischendorf was scientifically done, his own text will naturally not differ greatly from theirs. Von Soden, on the other hand, differs from Westcott and Hort, both in his arrangements of the families of manuscripts and in his theory of their genealogical relation. He distinguishes these types of texts with sub-types under each; a K-text (*Κουνη*), roughly W&H's "Syrian" or conflate text; an I-text (*Ἱεροσολυμα*) roughly the "Western" text of W&H; and an H-text (*Ἡσυχιος*) practically the "Neutral" or $\aleph\mathbf{B}$ text of W&H with their "Alexandrian" text incorporated as an unimportant subdivision. Underlying these three main forms of text von Soden thinks there can be discovered what he calls an I-H-K text of which these three are different recensions.

Those who have not the courage to follow von Soden through the closely-printed octavo pages of his prolegomena, now complete (1910) in some 2100 pages, may find information upon points at issue in Lake's "Text of the Gospels", *Expositor* vol. ix (1910); in Kenyon's "Numeration of the N. T. Manuscripts", *Church Quarterly Rev.*, Apr. 1909; and in the chapter on Textual Criticism in *Cambridge Biblical Essays* (1909). Prof. von Soden's volume of the text has been announced as likely to appear "early in 1911", and Dr. Gregory intimates that he has no intention of forestalling this edition, except in

the improbable event of a delay in its publication "until the Greek Calends". It is likely that the attention of New Testament scholars for some time to come will be occupied with these forthcoming editions and with the textual questions which they will raise.

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WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

THE CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY AT BETHLEHEM. By W. HARVEY, W. R. LETHABY, O. M. DALTON, H. A. A. CONSO and A. C. HEADLANS. Illustrated from drawings and photographs by W. Harvey and others. Edited by R. WEIR SCHULTZ, Honorary Secretary of the Byzantine Research Fund. London: B. T. Batsford. 1910. 4to; pp. xii, 76; Fig. 29; Pls., 12.

The Byzantine Research Fund, associated with the British School at Athens, has set a high standard for themselves in the publication of this their first volume. The book is in size large enough to permit of satisfactory reproductions. The drawings have been carefully made and the printing is excellent. The Fund has wisely selected for publication this "unique, oldest and worthiest amongst the remaining monuments of Christian art", and distributed the task to several capable scholars.

Mr. William Harvey, a goldmedallist and travelling student of the Royal Academy of Arts, made the drawings, took most of the photographs, transcribed the inscriptions with the assistance of Mr. Martin Sprengling of the American School of Archaeology at Jerusalem, and wrote the first chapter, which gives a particular description of the church.

Mr. W. R. Lethaby, who is widely known through his excellent book on Mediaeval Art and his thorough studies of Santa Sophia and of Westminster Abbey, follows with a general historical and descriptive account. After surveying the evidence, historical and stylistic, he concludes that the church, though it has experienced many modifications, is a monument dating from the time of Constantine. In this view he is sustained by de Vogüé, R. de Fleury, Leclercq, Baumstark and Stizygowskie. Viollet le Duc held it to be the work of Justinian, and this view is upheld by Diehl. Other writers believe the church to have been founded by Constantine and enlarged by Justinian.

The chapter on the surviving mosaics was entrusted to Mr. O. M. Dalton, who is otherwise known to us from his special studies of Byzantine monuments. Owing to the accumulation of dust on the walls, photographic reproductions are of little service; but the two colored plates bring before us a general view of such mosaics as survive. These show between the upper windows of the nave a procession of angels. Near one of them is inscribed *Basilus pictor*. Below is a broad zone on which are represented churches or architectural arcades framing inscriptions relating to the general or Provincial Councils. These inscriptions mention the number of Bishops

present, the purpose for which the Council was called and a summary of its decisions—in fact, an epitome of the history of doctrine. The intervening foliage decoration, half Roman, half Persian, is noteworthy. In the transepts there remain, in complete preservation, the incredulity of Thomas; almost complete, the Entry into Jerusalem; the lower half of the Ascension and a fragment of the Transfiguration. In the Bema is an important bilingual inscription, in Greek and Latin, indicating that the mosaics were finished by Ephraim, historiographer and mosaicist in the year 6677, second indiction, i. e., A. D. 1169. In a clear and well reasoned argument Mr. Dalton proves that this date may be accepted for all the surrounding mosaics of the church.

Mr. H. A. A. Cruso has gathered the accounts by pilgrims and other visitors to the church up to the year 1500 and arranges them in chronological sequence. This furnishes a valuable table of 35 documents, to which the authors of this volume frequently refer. On the other hand, Mr. Cruso appears to be over-deferential to previous translators, and in as many as nine cases publishes his documents out of their chronological sequence. He is not very successful in his translation from the Italian of Luriano, and his final paragraph, as it stands, is self contradictory.

Mr. A. C. Headlam contributes the concluding chapter on the Cave in Bethlehem. This subject evidently appealed to the author as an unimportant one and he accordingly devotes to it scant attention. In his annotations to the Mount Athos Manual Didron tells us á propos of representations of the Nativity that the Cave became a characteristic feature in the art of the Christian East and the Stable in the West. This distinction, however, was not always preserved. For example, in the 15th century the Italian sculptor Andrea Della Robbia frequently represented the Nativity, the scene being placed in a cave five times to once in a stable. It would be interesting to know the exact source of both traditions. The account in St. Luke's Gospel, ii. 7, "And she brought forth her first born son; and she wrapped him in swaddling clothes, and laid him in a manger (*ἐν τῇ φάτνῃ*), because there was no room for them in the inn" is indecisive as to whether the manger was in a building or in a courtyard or in a cave. The account in St. Matthew's Gospel is equally indecisive until the account is given of the visit of the Wise Men (Matt. ii. 11): "And they came into the house (*εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν*) and saw the young child with Mary his mother." This was of course sometime subsequent to the birth of the child. A European is likely to conceive of a "manger" as existing only in a stable, in either a simple barn or an elaborate construction like those pictured by Botticelli or Leonardo da Vinci. But an Oriental is more likely to conceive of a manger as in a courtyard or in a cave. Mr. Headlam says, "We do not know what was the origin of the tradition which transformed the stable at Bethlehem into a cave." The Oriental might well remark "It is a strange thing that the Europeans should have transformed the cave at Bethlehem into a stable."

The quotations which Mr. Headlam cites from Justin Martyr (155-160 A. D.) and Origen (249 A. D.) as the earliest testimony on the subject assume or declare a cave as the scene of the Nativity, and no authorities are cited for a built stable. The passage from Origen (*c. Celsus*, i. 51) is evidently based upon earlier testimony. It reads, "Corresponding to the narrative in the Gospel about his birth, there is shown the Cave in Bethlehem where he was born and the manger in the cave where he was wrapped in swaddling clothes." Now what Gospel is it that mentions the cave? Evidently none of the canonical Gospels, or the cave would have been familiar to Mr. Headlam. If he had referred to the apocryphal Gospel known as that of Pseudo Matthew, he would have found these words (xiii. 2): *Et cum haec dixisset, angelus jussit stare jumentum, quia tempus pariendi advenerat; et praecepit beatæ Mariæ ut descenderet de animali ea ingrederetur speluncam subter caverna, in qua lux nunquam erat sed semper tenebrae, quia lumen diæ recipere non potest.* The same Gospel makes a distinction between the cave and the stable (xiv. 1): *Tertia autem die nativitatis domini nostri Iesu Christi beatissima Maria egressa est de spelunca, et ingressa stabulum posuit puerum suum in praesepio, quem bos et asinus adoraverunt.* Or, if it be held that the Gospel of Pseudo Matthew was not written until after Origen, we may refer to a still earlier Gospel, dating from the first or second century, known as the Protevangelium of James, in which are found these words (xviii. 1): *Καὶ εἶπεν σπήλαιον ἐκεῖ καὶ εἰσῆγαγεν αὐτήν, καὶ παρέστησεν αὐτῇ τοὺς υἱοὺς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξελθὼν ἐζήτει μαῖαν ἐν χώρᾳ Βεθλεὲμ.* The Protevangelium also implies a transfer from the cave to the stable (xxii. 2): *Καὶ ἀκούσασα Μαριάμ ὅτι ἀναιροῦνται τὰ βρέφην, φοβηθεῖσα ἔλαβε τὸ παιδίον καὶ ἐσπαργάνωσεν αὐτὸ καὶ ἔθηκεν ἐν φάτνῃ βοῶν.* It would appear therefore that the cave, as well as some kind of a stable with a manger, had become a fixed element in narratives concerning the Nativity from very early times and requires no further explanation.

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ALLAN MARQUAND.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. By S. S. HEBBERT. Borough of Queens, N. J.: Maspeth Publishing House, 76 Milton Street. 1908. 8vo; pp. 307.

This is an interesting book. It holds the attention of the reader firmly from beginning to end, not by the charm of its style, but by the interest of the facts set forth and by the interpretation of them. It is a book alike for philosopher, theologian, historian. We can heartily recommend it as stimulating, especially for ministers, yet it is necessary to call attention to its weaknesses. Like others who have written on this subject, our author feels that he has discovered the key to all

the enigmas of history. His book closes with these words: "Is there now any flaw in this argument? . . . If there is not then a new epoch has opened in the history of human thought."

The dominant thought of the work is the author's theory of causality. He defines all thinking as a relating of cause and effect. God then becomes an "Infinite Cause acting self-sacrificingly for the sake of others". The explanation of historical development is always to be sought in the attitude of a people to causality—is it cause that they emphasize, or results? For instance, the Hindu civilization was perception." Whatever will not stand this test in both respects he based upon the overemphasis of causes, whereas Greco-Roman culture between pure or a priori conception of the understanding and sense rested upon a similar overemphasis of results. The same comparison can be made between the mediaeval and the modern Christian world. Thus the failures of the past and present have been due to one-sidedness, and the hope of the future lies in a proper balancing of the emphasis upon cause and effect.

The introduction to the book discusses the nature of thought. This must be carefully read, or else the book itself cannot be understood. In it the author purports to give the philosophical ground for his arguments. In order to prove his thesis that all thinking is in its essence causal-relating, our author naturally touches upon Hume and Kant. He easily shows the weakness of Hume's position. "Thus in the very act of denying causation, Hume is really affirming it over and over again." He has a profound contempt for the illusionism of Kant, and the idealism of Berkeley. "The so-called 'idealism' is at present so evidently in a state of disintegration that to oppose it seems very much like an attack upon the dead or dying." However, he does attack it in his discussion of space; but the discredited "Idealism" is not settled so easily as he thinks. What our author has to say of causality is largely true enough, but when he claims that he has a better way than "Idealism" by which to instruct mankind in the primary convictions of morality and religion, we are perhaps justified in a mild scepticism.

Book I takes up the civilization of India. This is really a fine piece of work. The writer has made a careful study of his sources. For such a work as this the sources are the monographs which have been written on Hindu religion, morality, science, art, commerce, social life, etc. For those who know little about the civilization of India we cannot recommend these pages too strongly. They are packed with valuable information. We can see here the author's method at its best. The explanation of all that is peculiar to India is found in "engrossment with causes, neglect of results". Thus, in religion the Hindus evolved the doctrine of metempsychosis. "The individual passes on through an endless series of mutations from an insect to a god, and then back again, perhaps nowhere is there finality, any definite result or purpose to be attained. Can anyone conceive of a more perfect portrayal of what I have described as the essence of the Hindu spirit—exaggerated

emphasis upon causality and a corresponding neglect of results?" This too, accounts for the fact that "the very essence of Hindu religion came to be the faith without hope." In Hindu morality we see the worst effects of this one-sided view of things. Ethical perspective is absolutely lost, when results are ignored. So "the slaughter of a cow excites more horror among many of the Hindus than the slaying of a man," while veracity and justice became unknown terms in India, because the people failed to see the valuable results of these two practical virtues. In science India has been distinguished only in mathematics. (The author incidentally remarks that he has certainly been hitherto the only thinker to explain this preëminence). The Indian mind perceived that numbers were merely the mental process of causation. Mathematical processes do not need to be verified by comparison with observed results. Thus the Hindu overemphasis of causes and neglect of results enabled him to be a leader in mathematics, but was also the cause of his absolute failure in the physical sciences.

In Books II and III our author applies the same method to the civilizations of the Classical and Mediaeval periods. The dominant feature of culture among the Greeks and Romans was interest in results, whereas the mediaeval church emphasized causes much in the manner of the Vedas. This is the reason that classical antiquity and the Middle Ages alike failed in the physical sciences, though for exactly opposite reasons. A similar explanation is found for social conditions. "Wealth is the product or the result of labor. India emphasizing causes exalted labor and despised wealth. Classical antiquity, absorbed in results, exalted wealth but despised and crushed labor. It is an almost mathematical antithesis; the same movement but in exactly opposite directions." (p. 152). The Middle Ages return to the spirit of India. "As mediaevalism strove to suppress the passion for wealth, so it strove for the exaltation of labor, the cause of wealth." Again the author says, "The ideal of the Middle Ages, I think, was a far nobler one than that of Classic antiquity. But in the realizing of that ideal there was a most lamentable deficiency." We have given enough to show the author's method, and plan of work. We also would call attention to his excellent treatment of the art of different periods, and to his portrayal of social and economic conditions. His treatment of the economic theories of the Middle Ages, though necessarily brief, is well informed and the results decidedly interesting. We are, of course, concerned to see what he will make out of the modern world. He classes it with the Greco-Roman world as being too much engrossed with results. Many of his statements about modern civilization are true, but this section is undoubtedly the weakest part of the book. The author lacks perspective and he fails to understand many of the currents in modern life.

The chapter on Protestant Religion is exceedingly weak. The facts are made to fit his theories. Thus, "Calvinism is really a lowering of faith in infinite causality." Calvinism is interpreted as part of a movement which in the world of nature gives us scientific determination.

Then we are informed that Calvinism is extinct. The same treatment is extended to the doctrine of justification by faith. Our author thinks that this shows a strange engrossment with results, and that it causes the fundamental principles of religion and morality to be left in the background. All this is pretty good evidence that the author does not have the slightest hold upon the great doctrines of Christianity; moreover, there is no evidence in the book that he has consulted any literature on this subject. If our author had studied Christian theology as carefully as he has studied the Vedantic philosophy or the commerce of the Middle Ages, it is probable that his treatment of Christianity would be largely changed.

Wooster, Ohio.

J. B. KELSO.

THE CENSORSHIP OF THE CHURCH OF ROME AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF LITERATURE. A study of the history of the prohibitory and expurgatory indexes, together with some consideration of the effects of Protestant censorship and of censorship of state. By GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, Litt.D. In two volumes, 8vo. \$2.50 each. G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press. 1906.

As the author himself remarks in his preface, these volumes will be used chiefly for purposes of reference. This work is the only one in the English language which presents, with any measure of completeness, the record of the Indexes. Even more than this, the book can justly be considered the best book in any language, giving a general survey of the purposes and results of the censorship of the Church.

In 1830 Joseph Mendham published a work, entitled, "*The Literary Policy of the Church of Rome*". This was based upon a study of many Roman and Spanish Indexes. From the nature of the case it was only a partial study of the field, and furthermore the book was intensely polemical and controversial from the Protestant standpoint. Hitherto this has been the best available book on this subject in the English language. In 1904 Joseph Hilgers, S. J., issued his "*Der Index der Verbotenen Bücher*", the best defense made so far of the policy of the Roman Church. This is a very scholarly and readable book, but it has the weakness of most Roman Catholic histories. It is one sided in the sense that all the facts are not stated, everything that is hostile to the purpose of the book being omitted. In this respect Hilger's book reminds us of Jannsen's "*Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*". The present work by Putnam is free from these defects. It covers the entire field, it presents both sides of the question; and though it is free from the polemical attitude, yet our author is not afraid to pass a definite judgment, when the facts demand it.

Although this work is largely for reference and for the specialist, there are portions which will interest the general reader. In the opening chapter one is given a general history of the Index and Censorship. The invention of printing and the Lutheran Reformation were

the two causes which forced the Church of Rome to its policy of Indexes. The history of papal censorship may be said to begin with the Council of Trent in 1559. From that time on the various Indexes have been of great value for the history of literature, since they have preserved a knowledge of many books, which otherwise would have been entirely lost. The Indexes were published at Rome, and other Catholic centres. They had a large part in saving the Latin nations to the papacy. In Spain, with the help of the Holy Office, they were the means of purifying the country from all traces of heresy, and incidentally of making Spain intellectually the most stagnant country in Western Europe, virtually destroying all literary production. In the other Latin countries the work could not be done so thoroughly, and hence the superior literary activity of France and Italy. Another interesting problem touched upon is the influence of the Index Expurgatorius upon the various editions of the Fathers. The works of Benson and Koch show how the text of Cyprian was tampered with in favor of the theory of papal supremacy. Uudoubtedly Putnam is correct when he thinks that this entire matter needs further study. The influence of the Indexes on the various patristic texts, would make a good topic for investigation in some doctor's thesis.

By means of a comprehensive index it is possible to utilize the two volumes in a very practical way. To most people it will be very interesting to know what is the policy of the church to-day, and we find that the latest utterance of the church is the Index of 1900, under Leo XIII. This Index is very attractively printed, and in the prefatory matter we find a good defense of the literary policy of the Church. We are specially interested however in noting some of the important books, which are specifically condemned. Among others are Lord Acton's, *Zur Geschichte des vaticanischen Conciles*; Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*; Sabatier, *Vie de S. Francois d' Assisi*; Thomas à Kempis, *De imitando Christo*; Ranke, *Die römischen Päpste*; F. D. Maurice, *Theological Essays*; Mill, *Principals of Political Economy*; James I, *Four treatises*; Hallam, *Constitutional History of England*; Frederick the Great, *Works*; *Book of Common Prayer*; the works of Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Hobbes and other philosophers. "Of the publications of the last ten years of the 19th century, 131 works, representing 82 authors, are selected for condemnation. These books of recent date comprise 60 Italian volumes, 47 French, 16 Spanish and Portugese, 4 German and 4 English. This selection may be considered as indicative of the lack of familiarity of the examiners with the language or with the modern literature of Germany or of England." We see then how the index has to-day become largely an Italian and almost exclusively a Latin institution. In this respect it is very much like the papacy itself. Another thing that we note at once is that there is no settled principle in which certain books are put upon the Index, whereas others are omitted.

Not the least interesting portion of this work to Protestants is the account of the censorship in the countries of the Reformation. Dr.

Putnam admits all that Hilger is able to bring against this censorship, but he shows where Hilger is weak. He points out the fact that in these countries it was the state and not the church that acted as censor, that the object was more often political than religious, and that for practical purposes this censorship was generally a dead letter. That is, in Protestant countries the censorship had no appreciable influence in checking the development of learning or literature. On the other hand our author does not hesitate to give his compliments in vigorous language to the Prussian political censorship, which to-day is a much more vigorous institution than the Index at Rome.

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J. B. KELSO.

THE INQUISITION IN THE SPANISH DEPENDENCIES. SICILY—NAPLES—SARDINIA—MILAN—THE CANARIES—MEXICO—PERU—NEW GRANADA. By HENRY CHARLES LEA, LL.D., S.T.D. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1908. Pp. xlv, 564. Price \$2.50.

It would be a work of supererogation to attempt any belittling criticism of this book. It goes without saying that in this field this is the best available work in any language. It is a great historical book, superceding and making unnecessary all else that has been written on the subject. Dr. Lea examined all the authorities, from the Archives at Simancas to the latest monograph, and as the Germans say, "he made himself master of his stuff." It is a book for scholars, as the valuable footnotes indicate, and we gain confidence in the work, where we see every statement so amply supported.

It is a pity that such a careful and diligent investigator as Dr. Lea did not possess also the other qualities requisite to an historian of the first rank. Although to be classed with the greatest American historians, Parkman, Motley, Bancroft, he will never be widely read, for he lacked the power to make scenes live. What would not Carlyle or Motley have brought forth from such material and such a workshop! This book can never be popular; it is scientific history, and not great literature.

One notes a sarcastic tone from time to time in Dr. Lea's writing. This is not surprising. He was dealing with an institution ostensibly maintained for the defence of pure religion and morality. He finds it in reality the supporter of tyranny in church and state, the enemy of all liberty a business concern for the purpose of enriching corrupt princes and corrupter priests, and above all in the name of religion temporizing with indescribable immorality and vice within the church. It is rather surprising that Dr. Lea is so restrained, and that he shows his standpoint only occasionally by his irony.

The Spanish Inquisition flourished in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the mainland of Italy it never displaced the Papal Inquisition, but everywhere else it had no rival. In Sicily we get a very good picture of the workings of this "Holy Office" in the European dependencies of Spain. At first the chief victims were the Jews. They were always looked upon with favor by the Inquisition,

because of their wealth. Undoubtedly Lea is right in his contention that the Holy Office was to a large extent used for the purpose of extorting money. It was one of the regular financial agents of the Spanish Crown. Thus in 1575 King Ferdinand was able to make a gift to his Queen of 10,000 florins, the confiscations of the year in the city of Syracuse. However, others than the Jews were made to suffer, and these methods of raising money became exceedingly unpopular. The Holy Office in consequence had a rather troubled existence, on the one hand fearing the popular disaffection, and on the other hand being continually engaged in conflict with the civil authorities.

After the Reformation had fairly started in N. Europe, the Lutherans were feared more than any Jews or Moors. In 1541 three Protestants were burnt at Palermo, and thereafter for many years these new heretics furnished the chief material for the *auto-da-fe*. Unfortunately the Holy Office did its work only too well in this case. All vestiges of Protestantism were stamped out in Sicily. It is natural that the author should indulge in occasional sarcasm, as he tells of the horrors on one page, and on the next describes the characters of the spiritual judges. These were often men of good families but criminals, committing their crimes under protection of their office; assassination, rape, and fraud in money matters being mentioned in official reports.

It is interesting to note the activity of the Holy Office in Milan, which was Papal and not Spanish. Milan was the part of Italy most endangered by the Reformation on account of its proximity to the Protestant Cantons of Switzerland. Charles Borromeo was here the mainstay of the Counter-Reformation—we note the fairness of Lea in giving this saintly man all due praise. However, he hated heresy, and one of his wishes was to prevent all commerce with lands infected with the disease. Thus a Lombard merchant visiting Zurich was likely to find himself apprehended by the Holy Office on his return. No wonder that after the Reformation Protestant lands out-distanced their competitors in wealth and commerce.

The story of the Inquisition in Spanish America has a melancholy interest for all Americans. It tells how the faith was kept pure in these lands, but also why they are so low in the scale of knowledge, culture and morality. Protestantism never had a chance in any of these lands. As soon as anyone suspected of Lutheranism or Calvinism was taken, he had to choose between recantation and the stake. Under these conditions the Reformation never got the slightest hold in Mexico or S. America.

In contrast to this desire for purity in doctrine was a corresponding laxity in moral discipline. Herein we see the secret of the immorality prevalent in Latin America. One common crime among priests was that known as solicitation, or the seduction of women in the confessional. It was the duty of the Holy Office to discipline this. A typical case is that of Fray Francisco Diego de Zarate, President of a large Franciscan Mission. In his trial it was proved that he had

solicited on 126 occasions and that he had seduced 56 women. The worthy father admitted these charges, and confessed many other similar acts. Now as to his punishment. The Fray was deprived of the right to hear confession, forbidden to celebrate mass for six months, and ordered to spend two years in the seclusion of a monastery. This sentence was regarded as unduly severe by the clergy. It is plain that many priests indulged in these practices and in most cases with impunity.

The Holy Office was not only a bulwark against heresy and morality in the church, but by its censorship of books it kept the people of Latin America in the densest ignorance. In the period of the French Revolution it was kept busy trying to exclude the new political ideas, but here it was destined to fail. With the opening of the 19th century even the benighted and neglected continent could no longer tolerate such an unholy institution as the Holy Office.

Wooster, Ohio.

J. B. KELSO.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BAPTISTS. New and illustrated edition. By HENRY V. VEDDER. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1907. 8vo; pp. xvi, 431.

As the author states in his preface, this work is the outgrowth of a smaller book published in 1892, also entitled "Short History". The new volume is about twice as large as its predecessor, and in addition contains many illustrations hitherto unpublished. It is not too much to say that this book is the best in the English language on the history of the Baptists. For that matter it is the best published in any language if we wish to find a single book in which the history of the Baptists is given from the earliest times down to the present day. We can heartily recommend this book to anyone who wishes to gain a knowledge of the subject. There are several reasons for this commendation. In the first place, the book can be looked upon as authoritative. The author gives abundant evidence of having consulted all the important literature on the subject, and he has also gone to the original sources. He thus has done the fundamental work of a true historian. Nor is the judicial attitude lacking. The author has tried to discover the facts as they really are and to be impartial in his conclusions. In addition to these essential qualifications, without which no book can be termed a history, this present work has some special features that are worthy of note. Chief among these is the fine series of illustrations. This is probably the only available book in which are to be found the portraits of the leaders of the Anabaptists of the Continent and their brethren in England. The literary form is suitable to the subject, and the book is quite readable.

It is not in our province to take up any controversial points and to join issue with the author. However, after having said these good things about the book it is necessary to call attention to its limitations. In the first place, this book must in its present condition be of the popular order rather than a book for scholars. The author quotes

freely, but there is an absolute lack of references. Its scholarly value would be greatly increased by an appendix giving the exact authority for each statement of fact or quotation. In the second place, it is apparent on every page that the author is a Baptist and that he is writing history from the Baptist standpoint. This, no doubt, is an excellent standpoint, but history written from any standpoint loses some of its scientific value. This book is about as judicious and impartial as, for example, most of the articles in the Catholic Encyclopedia, with of course the fundamental difference between the Baptist and the Catholic viewpoint. It is for this very reason that the book loses its value to one who is not a Baptist. It is a historical plea for a particular denomination, meant for the edification of its members. In the third place there are some remarkable errors in a book which has been so thoroughly and carefully revised. Thus on p. 270 we are told that Vavasour Powell was born in 1677, that in 1642 he went to London and joined the parliamentary party there, and in 1646 he returned to his native land of Wales. In the fourth place, there are some notable omissions. On consulting the index we find that the word "negro" is not given, and a careful perusal of the book shows that there is no account of the Baptist movement among the American negroes. The author estimates that "one person in every seven or eight of the entire population may be reckoned a Baptist in sentiment." (p. 366.) This is based on the census of 1900 which gave the Baptists 4,181,686 members out of a total population of a little more than seventy-four millions. It would have been only fair to have explained that almost half this number were negroes. (The denominational reports for 1905 give 2,189,000 negro communicants.) In fact this absolute omission of the Negro Baptists from the history has two serious sides. It gives a wrong impression of the actual influence of the Baptist Church in America, and it also fails to give the well-merited praise to the Baptists for their great missionary work among the negroes of North America. A chapter could well have been written on the Baptist Church as the greatest missionary agency of modern times.

Wooster, Ohio.

J. B. KELSO.

THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESRICHT, unter Mitwirkung von — — —, herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. G. KRÜGER in Giessen und Prof. Dr. M. Schian in Giessen. Neunundzwanzigster Band enthaltend die Literatur und Totenschau des Jahres 1909, erster Theil. Des ganzen Bandes iv. Abtheilung: KIRCHENGESCHICHTE bearbeitet von PREUSCHEN, KRÜGER, VOGT, HERMELINK, KÖHLER, ZSCHARNACK, WENDLAND, SCHIAN, WERNER. Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger; New York: G. E. Stechert & Co. 1911. 8vo, pp. 742. Price, mk. 30.55.

As usual in recent years the section of this indispensable survey of current theological literature which deals with Church History is late in coming out; this volume though due in 1910 has reached us only in the early summer of 1911. As usual, also, it is by far the largest sec-

tion of the work, equaling in extent, in fact, the whole remainder. It is interesting to observe that the great activity in the study of Church History which it chronicles has been largely expended on the modern period. Half of the present volume is occupied with the literature which deals with the period subsequent to 1648; only 26 of its 742 pages are given to literature on the Ante-Nicene age; seventy-two pages suffice to bring us to the Middle-Ages; only 188 are devoted to literature dealing with the Pre-Reformation period. On the other hand 220 pages are required to give an account of the literature which treats of the period since 1815,—the latest Christian century. The men of our time seem determined to know their time.

It was in 1909 that the Calvin Jubilee fell and possibly the most interesting single group of publications reviewed in this volume is the mass of literature called out by that event (pp. 302-342). "The Genevan Calvin-jubilee", remarks Köhler, the reviewer, "became a great and impressive manifesto of the whole of Protestantism. The host of evangelical Christians scattered over the whole earth gathered together, as Lobstein well says, in a single great congregation, the old contradictions between Lutherism and Calvinism seemed to pass away, even universities like Giessen or Breslau which are through and through Lutheran, honored the Reformer." The immense output of Calvin literature called out by the jubilee is reviewed by Köhler with fair but not perfect impartiality; but without any attempt at orderly arrangement. There are some marks of haste, indeed, throughout the volume, as well there might be when such a mass of literature had to be dealt with in so short a time.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

PERSONALITY IN CHRIST AND IN OURSELVES. By WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; Hon. Fellow of Exeter College; Fellow of the British Academy; Chaplain in Ordinary to the King. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch. 1911. 8vo, pp. 75.

Dr. Sanday's *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, published last year, was reviewed in this journal for January, 1911, pp. 166-174. His purpose in that book was, he tells us, to suggest a "tentative modern Christology". The "modernness" of the Christology he suggested consists in two things. First, it deserts the historical Christology of the Two Natures and proposes to us a Christ who is, phenomenally at least, of only a single nature, and that nature purely human. Secondly, it seeks to explain what is divine in Christ by pointing to the "subliminal self" which underlies the conscious self of every man, and explaining that even in common men this "subliminal self" is invaded by divine influences—or rather washed into by the Divine—and may

well be supposed in Christ's case to have been so invaded in a unique measure. Thus, as was pointed out in our review of the book, the Divine-human Christ of the New Testament, and of historical Christianity deriving from the New Testament, was reduced to a purely human Christ, in whom God dwelt, though in a fuller measure, just as He dwells in all men.

In the pamphlet now before us, Dr. Sanday gives us a supplement, or perhaps we may rather say a complement, to the *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*. As the title of the pamphlet advises us, its interest lies in the philosophical basis which that volume proposed to us rather than in the Christological structure erected on it. The pamphlet consists of two lectures delivered in November, 1910, in which an effort is made to ascertain precisely what personality is in man, with a view to preparing the way for Dr. Sanday's doctrine of the subliminal self as the *locus* of divine influences; and a "retrospect" in which he passes in review such of the criticisms of the *Christologies, Ancient and Modern* as he considers especially worthy of remark, chiefly or wholly, again, with reference to the philosophical side of that work. As will be seen, the Christology suggested in that work passes largely out of sight in this supplementary material. This, we think, a pity. Partly because we do not find Dr. Sanday's further remarks on the philosophical basis of his new Christology very helpful; and partly because the purpose of the book was, after all, to suggest a new Christology, and the Christology suggested ought to hold, and in our own case, we frankly admit, does hold the place of chief interest.

It must be confessed that the few allusions to Christology which are found in the pamphlet are distinctly discouraging. In reading the book, one could not help hoping that, in the enthusiasm of propounding a new theory of the Person of Christ, Dr. Sanday might have failed to observe all its implications, and especially its reduction of Christ to merely a divinely endowed man. But our startled eyes can scarcely miss taking up from the pamphlet phrases and even paragraphs which though few, seem only too clearly to intimate that Dr. Sanday's conception of the Incarnation is fatally inadequate, that the Incarnation is reduced in his thought of it to mere inhabitation, and that, indeed, to all appearance it is confused with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

Already at the opening of the first lecture we hear the Incarnation spoken of as "the meeting of Human and Divine" (p. 4), in a context which suggests that its specific character is not fully allowed for. But it is towards the end of the second lecture that the most disturbing phraseology occurs. It is not merely that inexact language is employed. Such a phrase as "His incarnate nature" (p. 4), for example, as Dr. Sanday uses it, is distinctly untheological. In strict speech it can mean nothing but our Lord's Divine Nature: which is the one Nature in His Person of which incarnation can be affirmed. But Dr. Sanday does not mean by it His Divine Nature, in distinction from His Human Nature; but apparently uses the phrase to speak of our Lord's total Being

as some sort of composite. What clear sense can be attached to the term "incarnate" in the phrase does not appear. If our Lord has but a single nature and that nature is human, to qualify this nature by the epithet "incarnate" seems merely a very loose and misleading way of saying that Christ's human nature is in some way more divine than that of other men. "Incarnate" has sunk to be little more than a honorific epithet, notifying us that in Christ we are dealing with a particularly divinized man.

A couple of pages further on Dr. Sanday cites Paul's great words: "Nevertheless I live, yet not I; but Christ liveth in me," and pronounces them the enunciation of an ideal which "never has been, and never will be, completely realized." Paul, however, is not here proclaiming an ideal but describing an experience; and an experience cannot but be realized. Not only Paul, but every Christian, in point of fact, realizes this experience; and no one is a Christian at all of whom it cannot be affirmed, each no doubt in his own measure; for it is only another way of saying that the Spirit of Christ dwells in us and takes the guidance of our lives, and "if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His." But Dr. Sanday comments on it as follows: "If we could conceive of it as realized we should say, not that there were two Gods, but that there were two Incarnations" (p. 49). This comment is not perfectly clear to us; we do not understand what the import of the negative clause is. But it seems certainly to imply this much: that in Dr. Sanday's mind a perfect indwelling would be an incarnation,—the ideal of Paul carried to its complete realization is what Dr. Sanday understands by Incarnation. "Incarnation" is, therefore, in its mode an indwelling.

On the immediately preceding page (p. 48) he tells us this explicitly. There is only one God, he tells us, and only one Divine; and the Holy Spirit who dwells in us is the same Holy Spirit who dwelt in Christ. What is the difference, then, between Christ and us? "The difference," he tells us, "was not in the essence, nor yet in the mode or sphere, of the indwelling, but *in the relation of the indwelling to the Person*" (italics his). The Divine influences working alike in Him and in us "do not *hold and possess*" our person, "as the Deity within Him *held and possessed* the Person of the incarnate Christ" (italics again his). Then, does the fact that the Holy Spirit (Dr. Sanday explicitly mentions the Holy Spirit as the indwelling agent), dwelling alike in us and in Him, "held and possessed" His Person—"meaning the whole Person—each several organ and faculty—but especially the central core of Personality, the inner controlling and commanding Person"—as He does not "hold and possess" ours, constitute our Lord "the incarnate Christ"? "Incarnation", we perceive, is reduced explicitly to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit: Christ is just the man in whom the Holy Spirit dwells without measure. Needless to say, here is a complete evacuation of the meaning of the term "incarnate"; and equally needless to say, here is a complete evacuation of the conception of incarnation. Christ is

merely a man in whom the Holy Spirit dwells in greater measure than He dwells in other men. He is not God and man; He is not even God in man; He is man with God dwelling in Him—as, but more completely, God dwells in all men.

Now, of course, the Scriptures teach that the Holy Spirit does dwell in Jesus Christ, and they teach that the Holy Spirit that dwells in Him is the same Holy Spirit that dwells in us, and that He dwells in Him after the same fashion in which He dwells in us, only beyond measure in Him, while He dwells in us each according to his measure. But the Scriptures do not confound this indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the human nature of Christ with the Incarnation. This indwelling is, according to the Scriptures, additional to the Incarnation, and fits the human nature which is assumed into personal union with the Divine in the Incarnation for its great companionship. The substitution of this indwelling of the Spirit in Jesus Christ for the Incarnation is just the elimination of the Incarnation altogether; Christ's Divine Nature is cut away from Him and His Spirit-indwelt Human Nature is presented to us as the whole Christ. How this differs in essence from Socinianism and Ebionism, it would certainly be interesting to learn.

If we may be permitted conjecturally to penetrate behind what lies on the face of Dr. Sanday's pages and attempt to discover the origin of the error which has led to these conclusions, we should be inclined to find it in a conception of the incarnating act as the entrance of God into a man, or a human nature, so that God, so to speak, clothed Himself in human nature. Such is not the conception of Scripture. According to Scripture God the Son did not at the incarnation enter into a man, but took a human nature up into personal union with Himself. Accordingly "assumption" is the theological term to describe the act; and it would be truer to speak of the human nature of Christ as existing in God than of God as existing in it. Jesus Christ is primarily not a man in whom God dwells, but God who has assumed into personal union with Himself a human nature as an organ through which He acts. Even historically, the term Incarnation does not mean the insertion of Deity into flesh, or humanity. *Incarnari, incarnatus, incarnation* are just the Latin equivalents of *σαρκόομαι, σαρκωθείς, σαρκώσις* (cf. *Iren Adv. Haer.* I. x. i., III. xix. i.) and mean just "to be made flesh", "made flesh", "making flesh." The impression which has grown up among us that reads the sense of the insertion into flesh into them, is just a "disease of language", and is perhaps responsible for more bad thinking on the Incarnation than we realize.

This pamphlet has been incorporated into a new edition of the *Christologies, Ancient and Modern* (1911).

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

GRUNDRISS DER EVANGELISCHEN DOGMATIK. VON DR. OTTO KIRN, Professor der Theologie in Leipzig. Dritte, durchgesehene Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf. (Georg Böhme). 1910. Ss. 141.

Since the publication of the first edition of this Outline of Dogmatics in 1905, two editions have appeared—the second edition in 1907, and this third edition in 1910. It is not necessary to give any detailed account of the contents of the book, or criticism of the Author's general standpoint and views on the several Christian doctrines, since this has already been done in this REVIEW in a notice of the first edition, *THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, 1905 (vol. iii.) pp. 694-697.

The author's general standpoint remains essentially the same as in the first and second editions. Professor Kirn occupies, as we said before, a mediating position between the tendency which, broadly speaking, may be called Ritschlian and that of evangelical Lutheranism, his position being very much nearer the former than the latter. His views in regard to specific doctrines also remain essentially unchanged. Accordingly we shall refer the reader to the statement and criticism of these views in the above mentioned notice, and proceed at once to indicate briefly the additions and alterations in this new edition of the book.

The second edition contained two sections which were not in the first edition—Part I, § 23, on "The Proof from Scripture in Dogmatics", and § 29 on "The Proof (i. e., of the truth of Christianity) from the History of Religion."

In the third edition Professor Kirn has had three ends in view, as he tells us in the Preface to this edition. These are, to remove obscurities, to introduce new problems so far as the character of the book will permit, and especially to keep in mind the results of investigations in the sphere of the historical criticism of the Scripture, because the Revelation which lies at the basis of Dogmatic theology is one that has taken a historical form.

Apart from a number of merely formal changes, the most important additions and alterations which appear in this third edition are the following:—in Part I, § 3, on "The Method of Dogmatics", is added a closing paragraph in which the author takes a critical attitude in reference to the application of the method of the history of Religion to Dogmatic theology; in Part I, § 8, on "The Psychological Phenomenon of Religion", a paragraph is added at the beginning of the section in order to emphasize the truth which is the subject of this section, *viz.*, that Religion, subjectively speaking, embraces man's entire inner life; Part I, § 32, of the second edition (§ 30 of edition first) on "Faith and Knowledge", is in this third edition expanded into three sections—§ 32, "The Genesis of the Knowledge which belongs to Faith" (*Glaubenserkennntniss*), § 33, "The Knowability of the Objects of Faith", § 34, "The Reconcilability of Faith and Knowledge"; in Part II, which contains the doctrinal system, there is added a section (§ 34) giving a "Systematic Summary of the Christological Views". Besides these more important additions and changes, there are certain minor ones in the sections on the Attributes of God and on the Sacraments. The references to literature at the head of each section have been increased, though no attempt has been made to make the bibliography exhaustive. These

references are for the most part to books which have appeared since the publication of the second edition of this "Outline", though in some cases references to earlier works have been added.

It is no easy matter to pack so much into such small compass, and at the same time to avoid making the subject obscure. We can, however, commend Professor Kirn's "Outline" for its clearness and conciseness, though we differ fundamentally with his theological views, as can be seen by referring to the notice of the first edition, to which reference was made above.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

THE BASAL BELIEFS OF CHRISTIANITY. By JAMES H. SNOWDEN, D.D., LL.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. ix, 252. \$1.50 net.

This book could only have been written by one who possesses that talent for omission which, as Stevenson says, might make Iliads of daily newspapers. It is no ordinary achievement to expound a system of doctrine in 250 pages not only keeping the perspective but also expressing the thought in a charming English style.

Summaries are always inadequate and often misleading. Nevertheless, the leading thoughts of the present volume may be put as follows: The sources of our knowledge of God are nature, man, the Jewish people on whom God bestowed "a genius for religion", Jesus Christ in whom the "chosen race came to its highest and one perfect blossom", and personal experience "the source . . . that is more important than all others". God's personality is to be emphasized and in connection with it the Trinity. The divine attributes are Holiness and Love; after them come Fatherhood and Sovereignty. To make clear God's relation to the world a system of idealism is used closely akin to that of Berkeley. "Nature as we know it is the experience we have as our minds react on God's mind. . . . It is therefore not an extended and insensate substance and is nothing apart from God, but is his own life as he thinks and feels and wills the world. . . ." Man's origin is divine but "the Scriptures speak in general terms, describing the end and result of the process (i. e., of man's formation)" and so room is left for any length of time and number of links in the process itself. Evolution is to be accepted as the process through which man came into being, and "Evolution is simply God's way of doing things". Sin is defined not ethically by reference to an objectively set norm but psychologically as selfishness. The heredity of sin is explained by the fact that human beings are "units in a social organism in both the good and the evil of which they must share". In dealing with sin "God is necessarily limited by the freedom of the human will, but within these bounds he is exerting all power in heaven and on earth to overcome and cleanse and cure human sin." A purely theistic faith proves insufficient to cope with the problem of salvation and so Dr. Snowden introduces at this point the Incarnation, the Bible and Miracles. The Bible

is a "human book" and "a great national literature that grew through the ages". It is also "divine" but this is hard to define. Concerning Miracles the "first and fundamental difficulty is their relation to natural law". To meet this the idea of the supernatural must be reconstructed. The idealism already alluded to provides for this and so the question of miracles reduces to one of historic fact. The laws of nature are "the habits of God" [a phrase which Joseph Cook once used] and God may modify his habit whenever the occasion arises. In regard to Christ the union of the two natures is one in which each imparts itself in some degree to the other so that "Jesus Christ the man had knowledge and powers which he could not have had as a mere man . . . In like manner the humanity was imparted to and in a degree limited the divinity." But why should not our author follow the historic Reformed Christology which has consistently refused to see in the union any limiting of either nature but rather a fitting of the Theanthropic person for his work? In regard to the death of Christ "we never can fathom the depths of its mystery and can only catch glimpses of its meaning." Of the Cross it may be said that Christ died as our example, to show us God's love, as a vicarious sacrifice, as a substitute; he is the head and representative of humanity and the cross satisfies God. It cannot, however, be said that the meaning given to satisfaction is consistently penal, it leans rather towards "satisfactory". The Virgin Birth of Christ is defended, but "we do not think belief in the Virgin birth is now essential to faith in the Gospel." In salvation the starting idea is the believer's union with Christ, "effected on the divine side through the sovereign agency of the Holy Spirit, but on the human side it is effected through the free action of the soul itself." Concerning the church "the one outstanding fact . . . is that there are no divinely appointed or authoritative officers and polities enjoined upon the church in the New Testament, but they grew up as they were needed to meet the existing conditions."

This interesting volume, if it does not attempt theological reconstruction, still aims at theological restatement. The restatement is for those who find the old formulations of theology inadequate for their own personal needs as well as for the requirements of their work. Can we use the book before us to estimate some of the agreements and differences between old and new? The old phraseology is retained but frequently with a subtle change of meaning not always apparent at first glance. The old and the new recognize the "light of nature" and "the light of revelation"; but the old emphasises the latter, the new the former. The old always tried to be very definite on Revelation, Inspiration, etc.; the new is somewhat hesitating in its remarks on these topics. The old accepts a revealed fact even if no earthly analogy can be found; the new is somewhat suspicious of such unless analogies are available. The old always tried to attach itself to some well defined doctrinal type; the new tends to be eclectic. The new welcomes the "well established truths of science" often accepting as facts what

scientists themselves merely take as helping concepts and provisional hypotheses; the old was somewhat more cautious and preferred to build up from Scripture itself. However, these contrasts are offered not so much as criticism but, to borrow the phrase of Augustine, in order that "the spice of disagreement may season the monotony of consent". Dr. Snowden's book makes no claim to belong to any theological system; but with all its suggestiveness the thought comes whether the Reformed Theology cannot develop organically its own method and its own principles without having recourse to systems with which historically it is not connected, or if it must use such systems why not assimilate them to its own genius and not vice versa? The missionary and social uplift work of the present church are in great measure the historical outcome of the Calvinistic side of the Protestant Reformation. The theology which will help us to get a grip on this work and carry it through to a successful issue ought to be an equally legitimate descendant of the same Reformation.

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GEORGE JOHNSON.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, A Criticism of the Augustinian Point of View.

By MARION LEROY BURTON, B.D., Ph.D. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1909. Pp. x, 234.

"This book is not intended for the popular reader." It devotes 175 pages to a detailed exposition of Augustine's treatment of the problem of evil and the concluding 44 pages to an equally detailed criticism. The expository part is carried out with great completeness, every statement made being accompanied with a wealth of citation which leaves little to be desired. As is well known, Augustine's doctrine of sin contains two elements; the one philosophical, the other religious. Dr. Burton considers only the former and makes no effort to examine the scripture basis, since this would be required only by an exposition of the latter aspect. Throughout his book Dr. Burton finds that Augustine is chargeable with many errors and not a few fundamental fallacies. Indeed, after the sifting process is over very little is left apparently that is worth saving.

The careful reading of the expository portion of the volume suggests several reflections. In all exposition of an ancient author a prime requisite is as exact an understanding of the terminology he employs as possible and, further, where of several possible meanings of a term one saves the thought from inconsistency, it is not asking too much to request that that meaning should be employed. One of the key words in Augustine is the term "Good", and if it is defined in terms of function, many otherwise obscure places will be cleared up. Thus in Augustine's system the universe is in relation to God and its function both as a whole and in part is determined by God and his will for it. This means that its function or good consists in movement towards God whereby His purpose is realized. The same thought is in Plato and still more in Plotinus, but Augustine Christianized it so to speak. It does not appear that Dr. Burton emphasizes sufficiently this aspect of Augustine's

system. He thinks that "what Augustine meant by 'bonum' is simply that the object so described has existence", and he fails to see that the Platonism of Augustine comes through Plotinus and so has in it that dynamic element or movement towards the "One" which marks the chief change which Plotinus made in the system of Plato and which is normative for his view of Good and of Evil. We think that if this had been kept in mind many of the difficulties which Dr. Burton finds in Augustine would have disappeared. In proof of our statement let us cite the following examples: When Augustine calls sin *privatio boni*, *negatio*, *non esse*, *defectus*, etc., he does not mean, as Dr. Burton seems to think, that sin is a non-existent but that it is a reversal of function and as such a most terrible reality, as his own experience had taught him. It also renders consistent his statements concerning freedom. Dr. Burton's idea of freedom is derived from Prof. G. H. Palmer and is "the ability to reduce a dual or multiple future possibility to a single actual result". But if this is freedom, it is difficult to see why the humble cow in the pasture who at every munch reduces to one the multiple possibilities afforded by the grassy areas at her disposal is not as much free as her owner. But for Augustine freedom is "*animi motus cogente nullo*" or what was later called "*causa sui*", and it is only true while man fulfils his function; this lost, then the Platonic figure of the lost wings is true, he can do evil but not good, he can no longer determine himself with a view to an ideal. This is what Dr. Burton seemingly fails to understand. Once more it clears up the two terms "*causa efficiens*" and "*causa deficiens*". To translate the latter "deficient cause" as Dr. Burton does and to explain it as a barren negation is to render unintelligent a phrase which in Augustine is not at all difficult to understand in the light of what has already been said. It does not mean that the cause of evil is lacking, incomplete, or inadequate: but since *causa efficiens* is the cause which brings it about that the organized thing fulfils its function, the *causa deficiens* is that which produces just the opposite; revolt, falling away, defection from the highest.

In the critical portion of the volume Dr. Burton assumes as true an "evolutionary theory of sin" and then by the law of contradiction rejects everything in Augustine which is not in accord with such a theory. In outline the theory seems to be that man lived through countless generations of mere brute existence, emerging finally with the burden of a sensuous nature. At first his state was non-moral, but when the higher nature began to dawn man was confronted with the task of subordinating the non-moralized elements of his nature to a developing conscience. Evil arose when man deliberately failed to do so. How is such a theory to be compared with that of Augustine? One possible way is to treat each as symbolic and then compare them according to their expressiveness of that reality which both agree in assuming as existing. Which is more expressive, the evolutionary "primitive man", (indispensable being that he is), non-moral, with his sensuous load, finding his end with no knowledge of God in some adjustment to physical and social environment, or the Augustinian Adam, a moral being

able to determine himself in view of an end and this end God? Which again is more expressive, the evolutionary "gradual ascent" or the Augustinian "catastrophic fall"? There are some things, for example, the coming into being of a house, which, as Aristotle tells us, cannot be anything else than catastrophic. Is not the first evil necessarily a catastrophic event? Again, is Augustine's *massa perditionis* and *propagatio* any less expressive than the evolutionary phylogeny and ontogeny? We do not say that evolutionary ethics is impossible but until it gives up its alliance with biology its view of life will be too narrow and the tools with which it works inadequate to the task.

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GEORGE JOHNSON.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PRAYER BEFORE THE PASSION, or Our Lord's Intercession for His People. A study exegetical and practical in the seventeenth chapter of the Gospel according to St. John, by the Rev. JAMES S. STONE, D.D., Rector of St. James' Church, Chicago. Longmans, Green & Co. 1911. Pp. xiv, 263.

There is nothing in this volume to suggest the strenuous life out of which it has come. Its tone is so elevated that one would suppose it came out of the cloister instead of from the study of the rector of one of the largest and most influential churches in the country. St. James' represents the extremes of social conditions and adapts its work to the needs of all classes under its care. Its rector is at the head of all this good work, giving himself without stint to his laborious duties and, besides, filling well his place in the larger life of the community. His book is an incentive to others in like laborious positions of the ministerial office that, even in the din and roar of the city, and with incessant demands upon time and sympathy, they may produce literature of high value.

Dr. Stone's purpose is "not so much to make an intellectual or a scholastic contribution to the literature on the Gospel according to St. John, as to afford more directly a help to the spiritual and religious life". He has succeeded. No Christian man can read these pages without experiencing a more ardent devotion to his Lord and a deeper insight into His relation to us. In this particular, the book will take rank with the best devotional writings. Among Anglicans it suggests Dean Goulburn and the present Bishop of Durham. While the spiritual has been his purpose, he has not overlooked the questions of scholarship which meet him on the way. He has weighed all these and has reached his own conclusions, and, with fine self-restraint, has used these conclusions merely to carry him forward surely and steadily to the end he has in view. The difficulties of the study arise, in his judgment, not so much from historical or textual criticism as "from lack of spiritual insight". Recognizing the place of criticism, he holds that criticism itself is subject to the same method of examination and revision to which it has put the Bible. He finds that the Gospel of John

thus far has "held its own". "No one has given it up; not even its opponents." The tradition of John's authorship has been vigorously assailed, but "it has never been successfully refuted". The Apostle may have used an amanuensis, and this amanuensis may have been John the Elder, who, however, is "one of the most shadowy individuals in history". The whole controversy suggests "that it is not so much the author, as it is the doctrine, that is objectionable; and the readiest way to dispute the doctrine is to question the authorship."

The plan of the author carries him verse by verse, and sometimes phrase by phrase, through the whole of the chapter. He expounds it without chapters of his own, and even without an index, as if he would fix the attention of the reader first upon the words of the Divine Speaker; yet when one has finished the volume he becomes aware that there is scarcely a question of vital interest in our modern religious life on which the author has not brought this Wondrous Prayer to bear. He finds that the chapter divides itself into three sections, vss. 1-5 concern our Lord Himself, vss. 6-10 concern the disciples, vss. 20-26 concern all believers. It must suffice us to indicate very briefly the conclusions of the author in the line of Christian doctrine, the Christian Church and certain features of the Christian life.

Naturally, the author finds, in this Prayer, Christian doctrine in some of its highest and holiest forms. The approach of the Divine Son to His Divine Father reveals, at a glance, the divine relation between them, and to the reverent reader makes an end of much current theological disputation. The word "Father" expressed "the relationship, love, and confidence which had existed between the Father and the Son from all eternity, and never more so than during these years of the Humiliation." In this lay the mystery of the divine sacrifice "the Love of God and the Wrath of God meet in the Cross of Christ. 'Wrath' is a severe word; but when applied to God it does not mean unreasonable anger, fury, or passion. It is rather an impulse or energy expressing the antipathy of the Divine Nature to all that is evil." Our Lord's assumption of Deity "is unmistakable. Deity, indeed, from its very nature, could not be imparted; there never was a moment when the Lord Jesus was not God: co-equal with the Father, in eternity, power, majesty, and life." No one can understand why the innocent should suffer for the guilty and we are prone to wonder why it must needs be that our Lord should suffer and yet "we have no right to assume that God did not select the very best means possible for averting evil and securing good." Our author recognizes in this Prayer the high mystery of Predestination, but thinks that the Scripture does not clearly teach whether God from all eternity chose men irrespective of anything in them or whether He chose them because of His foreknowledge of the use they would make of His grace. The devout believer reviewing his experiences finds it impossible "to attribute these things to chance or even to fate. He will fall back upon the truth, even though he may not understand it, of God's election and predestination." He finds that the godly consideration of this theme is "full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort". If Dr. Stone's volume will recall

the Christian thought of our day to these fundamental verities, it will serve a great purpose.

Not less significant are the teachings of this Prayer concerning the Christian Church. The author's treatment of vss. 20-23 is a contribution to the cause of Christian unity none the less valuable because, among recent Anglicans, it is almost unique. To go no farther than Dr. Stone's own diocese, the contrast between his views and those of his Bishop is very marked. The Bishop, the Right-Reverend C. P. Anderson, D.D., delivered the opening address at the Layman's Missionary Convention on May 3rd, 1910, in which, amid loud applause, he proclaimed the unity of believers and demanded that this unity should proceed on the basis not of "minimums" but of "maximums"; and yet in the charge delivered on May 24, 1910, to his Diocesan Convention, he divides Christians into two classes, Catholic and Protestant, and divides Catholics into three groups, the Roman, Eastern and Anglican, while "Protestants are divided into a large number of separated organizations, representing various shades of belief and opinion, embracing many who approximate Catholic doctrines and practice at one end, and at the other end many who are doubtfully called either Protestant or Christian." Between "Roman imperialism and Protestant federation" he finds that "the Anglican communion may be very tightly squeezed". On the one side, Rome has closed up all avenues of approach, and "we must row in the same boat with Protestants, and if so, we must keep a hand on the steering oar. A well organized catholicised Protestantism, with a Pope of its own, if you like, with Catholic schools, with all Rome's power, plus Protestant piety, would give the world a Catholic church greater than Rome, for it would have her power consecrated by an evangelical fervor." It is apparent that we must understand far more about the proposals coming from the school of Bishop Anderson before we acquiesce in a movement for unity, which is to "catholicize Protestantism". In Dr. Stone's volume there is no trace of this. His view of the Church is distinctly Anglican like that of Dr. Downer in his recent volume on "The Mission and Ministration of the Holy Spirit". Neither of these authors apparently recognizes the findings of modern Anglican scholars, such as Hatch, as to the identity of the Bishop and the Presbyterian in the Apostolic Church. Dr. Stone contents himself with saying that the function of government came to the apostles "so that, speaking generally, to the Apostolate was added the office and work of the Bishop", and he traces, in the typical Anglican way, the development of the Priesthood and the Diaconate. But, while this is true, there is not in all his volume a word which jars upon the Christian who is not of his communion. On the other hand, there is a recognition of the Disciples of our Lord of every name, which, if it could prevail in his communion, would do far more to promote the cause of unity than seems possible from the utterances of some who are conspicuous in the movement at this time. Amid the applause and enthusiasm which the subject always evokes, it will be found that thoughtful men will call for particulars before assenting to comprehensive schemes, especially when these schemes are to include

not only the Anglican but also the Roman communion. The application of this to our missionary movement is obvious.

Dr. Stone declares boldly that "the opinion that communion with the Bishop of Rome, as such, or perhaps to be more exact as the Vicar of Christ, is necessary to membership in the Church of God, has no warrant in the writings of the New Testament or the ancient fathers." He holds that if history teaches anything it is the failure to show that the oneness of which our Lord spoke "meant what is known as ecclesiastical unity, either in the Papacy or the Episcopacy. Probably the Papacy has done more to disturb Christendom than any other single agency; nor has Episcopacy, judging from the growth of denominationalism in England and the United States, proved itself to be a unifying element. . . . Ecclesiastical unity has done nothing towards convincing the world that the Father sent the Son", which is the purpose for which our Saviour prayed that His people might be one. "A Christian community errs grievously when it assumes to sit in judgment on another Christian community." Dr. Stone believes that the Anglican Churchman has one of the most glorious heritages in Christendom and may well rejoice in the history, the polity and the literature of his Church. This, of course, is no more than the Presbyterian Churchman does, and, as Dr. Stone says, "It will be a sorry day for Christendom when this privilege is denied, or is no longer exercised." Holiness, in his judgment, is the true and real bond of union, and this appears "in the satisfaction which one believer has in another believer, when each discerns in the other the fact of consecration. . . . The world which does not appreciate the meaning of ecclesiastical barriers discerns the oneness of life of people who oftentimes know nothing of it themselves. Then the world rejoices, too: for as many a man loves truth for which he has neither sought nor labored, so holiness can touch with joy even those who do not possess it."

The author is not disturbed by the cry that "Christendom is in fragments, the Church is divided". Because Christians are parted it does not follow that the Church is divided. With great force he asks:

"Is there division in the Church of God, which is the Holy Catholic Church, spoken of in the Creed, for which Christ died, and into which the children of God are baptized? Is there such separation among its members in any essential particular that the unity of the whole is broken? If so, then, throughout and after these eighteen hundred years, the Prayer of Christ that believers may be one is not only unanswered, but apparently is without hope of answer."

These quotations must suffice. If they direct attention to Dr. Stone's view on the subject of Christian unity, they will have served their purpose. And if the type of Anglican thought represented by Dr. Stone could be introduced more fully into the current discussions, and could, in the language of Bishop Anderson "keep a hand on the steering oar", the prospects for substantial results would be very much brighter than they are now.

This review had been prepared before the notable Portsmouth address of Canon Henson was published. It appears in the new volume

entitled "The Road to Unity", by Rev. H. Hensley Henson, D.D., Canon of Westminster, (London; Hodder and Stoughton). The address was delivered before the National Council of the Evangelical Free Churches in March of this year and deals directly with the broad question of Christian unity in its ecclesiastical aspects. Differing as the two writers do in the subjects before them, their agreement on the principles at stake is significant. Canon Henson lays bare the real question in the pending negotiations and meets it squarely. Speaking of the Evangelical Free Churches and the Church of England, he says:

"There is no fundamental division between them, if they both express, though with characteristic differences, the Evangelical conception of Christianity, but if it be the case, as is very persistently asserted in some quarters, that the Church of England is essentially Sacerdotal, then I can see no prospect even remote of any approximation towards the Free Churches. For the distinction between the Evangelical and Sacerdotal conceptions of Christianity is a distinction which goes down to the very roots of conviction and determines necessarily all ecclesiastical policy."

With Dr. Stone in America and Canon Henson in England, we are surely nearer the day of the answer to the Master's prayer "that they all may be one."

So much space has been given to this theme of Christian unity that none remains to set forth Dr. Stone's views on the Christian life, and we must content ourselves with saying that he looks for the final triumph of Christendom, that he sees no substitute for it even in modern philanthropy, the tendency of which "is to exclude religion and to hold that benevolence is the equivalent of worship". Dr. Stone has placed the Christian Church as a whole under deep obligations by his timely volume.

Chicago.

W. S. PLUMBER BRYAN.

THE BIBLE FOR THE HOME AND SCHOOL. COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF DEUTERONOMY, by W. G. JORDAN, B.A., D.D. THE BOOK OF THE PROPHECIES OF ISAIAH, by JOHN EDGAR MCFADYEN, D.D. COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO MATTHEW, by A. T. ROBERTSON, A.M., D.D. New York: Macmillan Co. Cloth, pp. 263, 423, 294. Price 60 cents each.

Like the previous volumes of this series, these books claim to embody "the *assured results* of historical investigation and criticism". It is therefore a question whether it is morally right to print, under such a caption, the false assumptions and unproved hypotheses which these books contain. To those familiar with modern radical criticism nothing will be found which is original or interesting, yet to many readers in our "homes and schools" such a dogmatic presentation of destructive theories could hardly fail to be subversive of faith in the inspiration and authority of the Bible.

In this particular series one might expect to find, as we do, that Deuteronomy is set forth in "introduction" and "notes" as a forgery perpetrated in the days of Josiah, and containing among its component documents material which is even exilic in date; but one is surprised to find that the text of Deuteronomy is boldly divided into sections, by

large marginal letters, "J", "JE", "P", "H", "D", "D²", "D*", "D*", "D*", indicating the documentary sources of the book, according to the "assured results of historical investigation". These critical assumptions, and the consequent denial of the historical statements of the book, might be more easily overlooked if the commentary contained notes which were specially illuminating or valuable, but careful search reveals little which could be so characterized.

The first part of the commentary on Isaiah, entitled "The Book of the Prophet Isaiah" is of a far higher order, and contains many helpful suggestions; but the discussion of "The Exiles' Book of Consolation" by the "Deutero-Isaiah" (chapters 40-55), and of the work of the "Trito-Isaiah" (chapters 56-66), is rendered of little value because of imaginary historical settings and mythical "sources".

The least objectionable of these commentaries is the volume on Matthew; yet in presenting "assured results" it is rather remarkable to find one so confident of the solution of the "Synoptic Problem" that he will venture to divide the actual text of the Gospel by the obtrusive capitals "M", "Q", "R", and "V", placed on the margin of the pages.

It might be safe to quote from one who recently reviewed this volume, and to state of each of these three, that "it is simply one of the crowd of nearly worthless 'commentaries' which follow one another into oblivion."

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education, Worcester, July: F. T. MAYER-OAKES, Authority of Jesus and its Meaning for the Modern Mind; EDWARD CARPENTER, On Connection between Homosexuality and Divination and the Importance of the Intermediate Sexes Generally in Early Civilizations; JOSIAH MORSE, Religion and Immorality; ARTHUR E. WHATHAM, Sign of the Mother-Goddess.

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, July: BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, The "Two Natures" and Recent Christological Speculation. 1. Christology of the New Testament Writings; DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?; BENJAMIN W. BACON, The Resurrection in Primitive Tradition and Observance; KAUFMANN KOHLER, Dositheus, The Samaritan Heresiarch, and his Relations to Jewish and Christian Doctrines and Sects; JOHN A. FAULKNER, A Word of Protest; Must Christians Abandon their Historic Faith?; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, Text of the Toronto Gospels; M. SPRENGLING, Bardesanes and Odes of Solomon; ED. KÖNIG, Concerning Paton's Review of KÖNIG's Dictionary.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, July: RAYMOND L. BRIDGMAN, The World Person; HERMAN BAVINCK, Christological Movements in the Nineteenth Century; HENRY M. WHITNEY, The Latest Translation of the Bible; E. S. BUCHANAN, The Golden Gospels in the Library of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan; WILLIAM H. WARD, The "Zadokite" Document; G. E. WHITE, The Waxing and the New Phase of the Turkish Crescent;

AUSTIN RLCE, *Historical Facts and Religious Faith*; HAROLD M. WIENER, The "King" of Deuteronomy 17:14-20; HAROLD M. WIENER, *The Higher Critical Quandry: A Correspondence with Drs. Briggs and Driver*.

Church Quarterly Review, London, July: HERBERT KELLY, *Community Work and the Church of England*; W. R. MATTHEWS, *Morals of Immoralism*; *Glimpses of the Church of England in the Eighteenth Century*; W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, *Reincarnation*; HILDA D. OAKELEY, *Poetry and Freedom*; Oxford *Five Hundred Years Ago*.

East & West, London, July: EUGENE STOCK, *Future of Native Churches*; W. H. T. GAIRDNER, *El-Azhar University at Cairo*; BISHOP MONTGOMERY, *China*; HOANI PARATA, *The Maori of New Zealand today*; WALTER MILLER, *Ought Christian Missions be allowed in Moslem Lands?*; A. LLOYD, *The Prince of Parthia*; DR. SMYTH, *Discipline on a Mission Station*; S. M. ZWEMER, *Movements in Islam*; DR. PALMER, *Impressions in Western India*.

Expositor, London, September: JAMES MOFFATT, *The Problem of Ephesians*; HAROLD M. WIENER, *Samaritan Septuagint Massoretic Text*; JAMES DENNEY, *Criticism and the Parables*; A. BÜCHLER, *Private Sacrifices before the Jewish Day of Atonement*; B. W. BACON, *The Odes of Solomon: Christian Elements*; W. M. RAMSAY, *Iconium and Antioch*.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, September: *Notes of Recent Exposition*; JAMES IVERACH, *Truthing it in Love*; A. R. S. KENNEDY, *Codex Edinburgensis*; R. MARTIN POPE, *Studies in Pauline Vocabulary*; A. H. SAYCE, *Archaeology of the Book of Genesis*.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, July: WILLIAM M. SALTER, *Schopenhauer's Contact with Theology*; HENRY W. CLARK, *Rational Mysticism and New Testament Christianity*; GEORGE F. MOORE, *The Covenanters of Damascus; a Hitherto Unknown Jewish Sect*; WARREN S. ARCHIBALD, *God in All and Over All*; VERGIL V. PHELPS, *The Pastor and Teacher in New England*.

Hibbert Journal, Boston and London, July: OLIVER LODGE, *Christian Idea of God*; J. W. MARRIOTT, *The Kingdom of the Little Child*; B. W. BACON, *Mythical Collapse of Historical Christianity*; P. H. WICKSTEED, "Magic"—*A Contribution to the Study of Goethe's Faust*; JOHN DEWEY, *Maeterlinck's Philosophy of Life*; JAMES DEVON, *The Criminal, the Criminologist, and the Public*; CHARLES F. THWING, *The American Family*; *Religion in Jerusalem at the Present Hour*; OTTO J. BIERBAUM, *Dostoyeffsky and Nietzsche*; R. H. COATS, *Lancelot Andrewes and John Bunyan*; W. WOODING, *the Pre-Christian Jesus*; S. UDNY, *Dante and the New Theology*.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin and New York, July: H. POPE, *The Scholastic View of Inspiration*; P. DAHMEN, *Buddhism, Past and Present*; D. BARRY, *Validating Marriage without New Consent*; E. ROCKLIFF, *Parables*; H. BEWERUNGE, *Metrical Cursus in the Antiphonal Chants of the Mass*; J. MACCAFFREY, *Forms of the Creed in the Irish Church*.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, July: J. D. WYNKOOP, *A Peculiar Kind of Paronomasia in the Talmud and Midrash*; A. B. RHINE,

Secular Hebrew Poetry of Italy; V. APTOWITZER, Controversy over the Syro-Roman Code; HENRY MALTER, A Talmudic Problem and Proposed Solutions; FELIX PERLES, A Miscellany of Lexical and Textual Notes on the Bible; M. H. SEGAL, Notes on Fragments of a Zadokite Work"; ALEXANDER MARX, Strack's "Aboda Zara"; JACOB HOSCHANDER, Berry's "Old Testament among Semitic Religions"; H. BRODY, Some Notes to "Davidson's Poetic Fragments from the Genizah II".

Jewish Review, London, September: Hermann Adler; The Zionist Congress; ISRAEL LEVI, I. ELBOGEN and S. H. MARGULIES; The Late Chief Rabbi; A. WOLF, The Philosophy of Bergson; J. SNOWMAN, The Arrest in the Development of the Jewish Law; DR. ELIAS, Work of the "Alliance Israelite Universelle"; NORMAN BENTWICH, Jewish Schools in Palestine.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, July: E. S. BUCHANAN, An Old-Latin Text of the Catholic Epistles; MARTIN RULE, The So-Called Missale Francorum, II; M. R. JAMES, A New Text of the Apocalypse of Peter; A. SOUTER, The Type or Types of Gospel Text used by St. Jerome as the Basis of his revision, with especial reference to St. Luke's Gospel and Codex Vercellensis; O. WARDROP, Georgian Manuscripts at the Iberian Monastery on Mount Athos; E. NESTLE, 'He Said' in the Latin Gospels; I. ABRAHAMS, 'How did the Jews Baptize?'; J. MEARNS, 'Nothing either great or small'.

London Quarterly Review, London, July: W. T. DAVISON, The Resurrection and the Modern Mind; W. H. S. AUBREY, Survival of the Unfit; ANNE E. KEELING, Antonio Fogazzaro; and the Difficulties of Allegiance to Rome; R. MARTIN POPE, The New Paganism; CHARLES BONE, China under the Empress Dowager; THOMAS F. LOCKYER, John Wesley at Aldersgate Street; THOMAS NICOL, Recovery of Memphis; DORA M. JONES, The Sensitiveness of Thackeray.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, July; HUGO HOFFMAN, Adjusting the Faith; J. M. HANTZ, St. Paul's Sense of Duty; J. E. WHITEKER, Address to the General Synod at Washington; F. W. KLINGENSMITH, The Mind of Christ and the Old Testament; J. A. W. HAAS, Christianity and Modern Trends of Thought; EDWARD T. HORN, An Historical and Theological Criticism of the Oxford Movement; PETER ALTPETER, Chemnitz's Examination of the Second Part of the Decrees of the Tridentine Council; J. FRY, Impediments to Sermons; C. M. JACOBS, The Augsburg Confession. IV. The Doctrine of the Sacraments—The Chief Point of Conflict; E. P. H. PFATTEICHER, Men for the Ministry; J. C. F. RUPP, Efficient Methods of Lutheran Evangelization; J. W. HORINE, Methods of Catechisation; GEORGE DRACH and C. F. KUDER, Beginning of Foreign Mission Work in the Lutheran Church in America; T. W. KRETSCHMANN, Biblical Conception of Sin.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, July: L. B. WOLF, Original Sin; V. G. A. TRESSLER, Unification of Higher Lutheran Education; G. U. WENNER, The Bible; W. H. FELDMANN, Method in Catechisation; JOHN A. FAULKNER, Luther and Economic Questions; JOHN R. BRAEUER, Pedagogic Value of Bloody Sacrifice; C. W. SIFFERD, Lutheran Church

in Southern Illinois; W. C. SEIDEL, Faithful Catechisation and its Results.

Methodist Review, New York and Cincinnati: F. M. NORTH, Preparation of Ministers for Social Work; G. C. SELL, Luther's Lectures on Paul's Epistle to the Romans; H. C. STUNTZ, An Hour with Kiplin; FRANK CRANE, Psychology and Salvation; E. S. TIPPLE, Whitefield's Divine Gift; A. W. CRAWFORD, Caliban's Theology; S. O. MAST, The Purpose of Science; C. C. WOODS, A Study of Sorrow and the Soul; W. M. BALCH, What is Social Service?

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, July: WM. HARRISON, The Prince of Modern Preachers—Alexander Maclaren; O. P. FITZGERALD, Credentials of the Preacher; JOHN C. GRANBERY, Nietzsche; GEORGE H. CLARKE, The Ring and the Book: an Exposition; H. G. ENELOW, Ethical Element in the Talmud; REMBERT G. SMITH, A Vital Factor in College Life; CLAUDE OREAR, Significance of Channing's Unitarianism; C. J. NUGENT, Methodist Episcopacy According to the Methodist Fathers; JAMES CANNON, The Duty of the Church to Own, Control, and Support Her Colleges.

Monist, Chicago, July EUGENIO RIGNANO, On the Mnemonic Origin and Nature of Affective Tendencies; CHARLES C. PETERS, Friedrich Nietzsche and His Doctrine of Will to Power; PAUL CARUS, Max Stirner, the Predecessor of Nietzsche, A. KAMPMEIER, The Christ Myth of Drews; PAUL CARUS, Rignano's Theory of Acquired Characteristics; EDMUND NOBLE, The Fetish of Originality.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster and New York, September: HAROLD H. JOACHIM, Plato's Distinction between 'True' and 'False' Pleasures and Pains; W. B. PILLSBURY, The Role of the Type in Simple Mental Processes; ANDRÉ LALANDE, Philosophy in France, 1910.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, July; BRANDER MATHEWS, The American Language; W. F. HEIL, Necessity and Function of Suffering in a Minister's Life; WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, Johannine Interpretation of the Work of Christ; J. FRANK BUCHER, The Task of Christianity in China; F. W. HOFFMAN, Place and Significance of Prayer in the Christian System and World-View; EDWIN B. NIVER, The Episcopal Church and Unity; WILLIAM B. OWEN, Value of Discipline; A. V. HIESTER, Contemporary Sociology.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, July: JOHN CLIFFORD, Attitude of Baptists to Catholicism—Roman and Greek; E. Y. MULLINS, Baptists in the Modern World; HENRY C. MABIE, Attitude of Baptists to the Non-Christian World; A. H. NEWMAN, History of Baptists Organization; W. J. MCGLOTHLIN, The Struggle for Religious Liberty; W. W. LANDRUM, Some Types and Tendencies among American Baptists; JOHN HORSCH, Origin and Principles of the Anabaptists; R. E. NEIGHBOR, Moral Significance of Baptism.

Theological Quarterly, St. Louis, July: Walther the Lutheran; Dr. Martin Luther's Treatise of Confession, Whether the Pope Have Power to Enjoin the Same; Status of English Work in the German Missouri Synod.

Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes, Paris, Jul-

let: HIPPOLYTE DELEHAYE, Les martyrs d'Interamna; JEAN RIVIÈRE, La doctrine de saint Irénée sur le rôle du démon dans Rédemption; JACQUES ZEILLER, Les Monuments chrétiens du patais de Diocétien à Spalato; Le proconsul d'Archaïe; PIERRE DE LABRIOLLE, Une Esquisse de l'histoire du mot "Papa".

Deutsche-Amerikanische Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Berea, September-Oktober: H. GREUTER, Die Gemeinde Jesu Christi im Lichte des Neuen Testaments; WM. HESSKAMP, Das Millenium in Verbindung mit anderen biblischen Ereignissen; Ist unsere ewige Existenz Realität oder ein Gebilde der Phantasie?

Lehre und Wehre, St. Louis, September: Die Assyriologie und das Alte Testament; Taten und Schicksale des erhöhten Joseph in Agypten; 'Εν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Septembre-Octobre: ALBERT CONDAMIN, Les caractères de la traduction de la Bible par saint Jérôme; LOUIS DE MONDADON, Bible et Tradition dans saint Augustin. Second art.: La controverse donatiste.

Revue D'Histoire Ecclésiastique, Louvain, Juillet: J. LEBON, La version philoxénienne de la Bible; J. FLAMION, Les Actes apocryphes de Pierre. B. Les Actes de Pierre en Orient (suite et fin); PAUL FORNIER, Le Décret de Buchard de Worms. Ses caractères, son influence (à suivre); G. CONSTANT, La transformation du culte anglican sous Edouard VI. II. Tendances zwingliennes et calvinistes (suite et fin).

Revue de Theologie et des Questions Religieuses, Montauban, Mai: J. A. PORRET, Un coup de sonde dans une grande question; J. SEGUIN, A propos d'une étude psycho-physiologique sur conversion de saint Paul; L. KREYTS, A propos de la conversion de saint Paul; CH. BRUSTON, La prétendue primauté de l'apôtre Pierre et le martyre de Pierre et Paul à Rome; George Tyrrell et le Catholicisme; A. WABNITZ, Les Religions; G. DUMONS, Henri de Mirmand et les réfugiés de la Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes; F. PILLON, Le caractère personnel de la vie chrétienne; F. PILLON, La Course chrétienne. Un seul esprit.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Kain (Belgique), Juillett: A. GARDEIL, La "Certitude Probable"; P. DONCOEUR, La Religion et les Maîtres de l'Averroïsme, Ibn Rochd.; J. B. FREY, L'état originel et la chute de l'homme d'après les conceptions juives au temps Jesus-Christ; H. D. NOBLE, L'Individulité affective d'après E. Thomas, M. S. GILLET, Bulletin de Philosophie; A. LEMONNYER et B. ALLO, Bulletin de Science des Religions; M. JACQUIN, Bulletin d'Histoire des Institutions ecclésiastiques.

Theologische Studiën, Utrecht, XXIX Jaarg. Afl. V: G. VELLENGA, De dood des Heeren; TH. L. W. VAN RAVESTEYN, Jahve's Gericht in Jesaja 1-35; W. L. SLOT, JR., Een verzoek.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Insbruck, XXXV Band, 3 Heft: E. DORSCH, St. Augustinus und Hieronymus über die Wahrheit der biblischen Geschichte; H. WIESMANN, Der zweite Teil des Buches der Weisheit (2 Art.); H. BRUDERS, Mt. 16: 19; 18: 18 und John 20: 22-23 in frühchristlicher Auslegung. Afrika bis 312; A. BUKOWSKI, Die Missdeutungen und Entstellungen der römisch-katholischen Glaubenslehre in den russisch-orthodoxen Handbüchern der Theologie.



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